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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
1.1 Ontology 
The title of this essay is ‘Moderate Nominalism and Moderate 
Realism’, which indicates that its subject is ontology. ‘Nominalism’ 
signals that in particular and appears to be (almost) exclusively used in 
the context of ontology. ‘Realism’, on the other hand, is used 
frequently in almost every area of philosophy. In any event, whether a 
philosopher is a nominalist or a realist, what he or she takes an 
interest in is a project which was initiated by Plato and Aristotle. They 
have marked out the issues ontology centers on to a great extent. In 
his early work, Categories, Aristotle lists ten categories of reality: 
substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, date, posture, state, action 
and passivity.1 Any true description of reality should be made in 
terms of these ten categories. They can be characterised as the most 
abstract notions used when describing something, for example, we 
tend to say that things have qualities. For instance, the Swedish flag is 
partly blue; if we look at a particular flag, its blue colour has specific 
nuance. In the terminology introduced by W. E. Johnson,2 the colour 
is a lowest determinate of a number of determinables. Most of these 
determinables do not have any specific adjectives expressing them. 
Further, the highest determinable among the colours is colour itself, 
but it is not the (categorially) highest determinable in the line starting 
with the lowest colour determinates. A still higher determinable is 
quality itself. Since quality is not a determinate in relation to any 
higher determinable, we have by now reached the end of the line: a 
category. This procedure can be applied to Aristotle’s other nine 
categories as well. Note that in this example we started out talking of 
                                                     
1 The names of some of these ten categories vary between the English 
translations made of Aristotle’s Greek terms.  
2 Cf. Johnson 1921, chapt. XI. 
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notions used when describing things and were fairly soon referring to 
traits of the things themselves. This oscillation between concepts and 
traits of things is difficult to avoid. However, we can use it to make a 
point. It is that the determinate–determinable distinction is applicable 
to traits of things as well as of concepts that are used to describe 
them. If our conceptual scheme is true to how things are, the con-
cepts used have counterparts in rerum natura.1 
According to some, the categories listed by Aristotle are not 
independent of each other. For example, the category of substance is 
said to be reducible to one or more of the others, in particular, 
quality. This has been a common view among empiricists and still has 
its proponents today.2 Others stick to the idea that the reduction is 
impossible in principle; arguing that categorial distinction between 
substance and quality should therefore be maintained.3 
There is also a long tradition of trying to reduce relations to 
qualities. Aristotle himself is, at least to some extent, part of that 
tradition. His description of relations as the “least of all things a kind 
of entity or substance”4 has often been pleaded by adherents of this 
particular reductionism. During two millennia this was in fact the 
majority view among western philosophers. Nowadays, quite a few of 
the guardians of this tradition are found among trope theorists. Since 
it is difficult, I would say impossible, to consistently uphold this 
reductionism, the reductionist claim is only partly maintained by most 
of its adherents. Thus, while the so-called internal relations are con-
sidered to be reducible, this is not so with regard to the so-called 
external relations. 
Central to the debate between proponents of nominalism and 
realism are the notions of particularity and universality. The distinc-
tion between these two is applicable to all of Aristotle’s categories, as 
                                                     
1 Cf. Johansson 2000, p. 101. Ingvar Johansson points out that Johnson 
invented the pair of terms: ‘determinate’ and ‘determinable’. He did not 
invent the distinction. 
2 Cf. David Armstrong, in Armstrong 1978b, p. 67, as an example of that.  
3 Cf. Lowe 1989, chapter 3, and Johansson 1989, chapter 3. 
4 Metaphysics, 1088a22. 
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well as to those proposed by others. Particularity and universality can 
be characterised as transcategorial notions, though strictly speaking, 
only realists recognise the distinction and its applicability. In fact, this 
is not even the case as regards all versions of realism. According to 
one “extreme” version, most appropriately called ‘universalism’, 
everything which exists is universal. Still strictly speaking, all versions 
of nominalism deny the existence of universals. Thus, according to 
nominalists the distinction between particularity and universality is 
lacking one of its relata. However, even nominalists tend to recognise 
the need for something doing the work which universals perform in 
realistic ontologies. Keep in mind that the traditionally proposed 
surrogates for universals must themselves be particulars; if they are 
not, the nominalistic project of making universals unnecessary 
collapses. The implication is then that the need for particulars as well 
as (real) universals is recognised only by the major fraction of the 
realists.  
Donald Williams makes a distinction between two branches of 
metaphysics: (i) analytic ontology and (ii) speculative cosmology. His 
description of the first branch reads: 
First philosophy, according to the traditional schedule, is 
analytical ontology, examining the traits necessary to 
whatever is, in this or any other possible world. Its cardinal 
problem is that of substance and attribute, or at any rate 
something cognate with this in that family of ideas which 
contains also subsistence and inherence, subject and 
predicate, particular and universal, singular and general, 
individual and class, and matter and form. It is the 
question how a thing can be an instance of many proper-
ties while a property may inhere in many instances, the 
question how everything is a case of a kind, a this-such, an 
essence endowed with existence, an existence differen-
tiated by essence, and so forth.1 
                                                     
1 Williams 1953a, p. 3. 
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In the last sentence of the preceding quote, we find versions of two 
questions which both have been described as expressing what 
traditionally is called ‘the problem of universals’. The first one 
mentioned is: How can a thing be an instance of many properties? 
The second is: How can a property have many instances?1 The 
second question is perhaps the one which best expresses what 
traditionally has been considered to be the problem. A slightly 
different formulation of it is: How can numerically different 
particulars have the same property? Sometimes this problem is called 
‘the One over Many’. However, that might be a slightly misleading 
name of the problem; it seems more appropriate as a name of a specific 
solution to the problem. The solution to it is that particulars have the 
same property because they instantiate, or exemplify, the same 
universal. Thus, ‘One over Many’ suggests a platonistic solution. 
Therefore, the universal property is considered to be “over” the 
things having it. This proposal has its own problems; a major one is 
that it is difficult to understand the nature of instantiation or 
exemplification. It is easier to understand another realistic solution to 
the same problem. It can be called ‘the One in Many’. According to 
this proposed solution, different things have the same property due 
to their sharing the same universal. In other words, the same 
universal is a constituent of the particulars in question. 
In a series of works David Armstrong has discussed various 
ontological issues.  What he means by the problem of universals is 
the second question from the preceding paragraph. One representa-
tive description of his is that it is “[…] the problem of how numeri-
cally different particulars can nevertheless be identical in nature.”2 He 
takes the One in Many to be the correct solution.3 
                                                     
1 I have slightly reformulated what Williams says. 
2 Armstrong 1978a, p. 41. 
3 Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra points out that Armstrong’s way of formulating 
the problem gives it a form which Robert Nozick points out that many 
philosophical problems have. The form is: How is a certain thing, call it ‘X’, 
possible given (or supposing) certain other things? Nozick mentions the 
problem of free will: How is it possible for us to have free will, supposing 
that all actions are causally determined? Here X is free will and what 
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The first version of the problem of universals mentioned above 
was: How can a thing be an instance of many properties? According 
to Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra this is what should be considered the 
problem of universals. In line with that he uses the designation ‘Many 
over One’. This denomination indicates that the problem is that of 
explaining how a particular can have various properties. He quite 
rightly remarks that, since the problem is one of properties, not 
universals, the designation ‘the problem of universals’ is a misnomer.1 
Bearing in mind that he is a (classical) resemblance nominalist, the 
problem which he has to master can also be described as that of 
explaining how a particular can have properties at all.2 
Williams’ description of the second branch of metaphysics is 
found in the following quotation, which also hints at the relationships 
between the two branches. 
Concerned with what it means to be a thing or a kind at 
all, it [analytic ontology] is in some wise prior to and 
independent of the other great branch of metaphysics, 
                                                                                                   
apparently excludes it is determinism. The apparent excluder in Armstrong’s 
case is the numerical difference among particulars. The fact that he considers 
it to be an apparent excluder is indicated by his use of ‘nevertheless’. Cf. 
Nozick 1981, p. 9, and Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, pp. 18-9. 
1 Cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, p. 1. 
2 His reasons for considering Many over One to be the real problem is due to 
his resemblance nominalism in combination with his view that what should 
be meant by ‘the problem of universals’ is a problem regarding truthmakers. 
The following quotation might give a rough idea of how he sees things. 
That the Problem of Universals is the Many over One, that is, 
that the Many over One rather than the One over Many is the 
phenomenon to be explained, should not be surprising. For the 
One over Many has as its starting-point facts about a multiplicity 
of particulars sharing some property or other, facts expressed by 
sentences like ‘a is F and b is F’. But given that the Problem of 
Universals is one about truthmakers, and that truthmakers of 
these conjunctive sentences are the truthmakers of their 
conjuncts and that, given the multiplicity of properties had by 
particulars, there are many such conjuncts for each particular, the 
One over Many vanishes into the Many over One. (Rodriguez-
Pereyra 2002, p. 47) 
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speculative cosmology: what kinds of things are there, 
what stuff are they made of, how are they strung 
together?1 
If interpreted in a wide sense, speculative cosmology may include the 
highly speculative philosophical systems of the 17th, 18th and 19th 
centuries. Speculations regarding the nature of reality, whether it is 
spiritual or material, would then fall within its field of research. The 
fact that this is part of what Williams intends by the designation 
‘speculative cosmology’ may be concluded from another quotation:  
We are only beginning to philosophize till we turn from 
the bloodless proposition that things in any possible world 
must consist of tropes, to specific studies of the sorts of 
tropes of which the things in this world actually consist. It 
is a virtue of our thesis that it does not strangle or 
eviscerate the great problems in the philosophical cradle 
but keeps them alive and ready for the legitimate judgment 
of experience and logic. It will be a further virtue if it 
assists, as I think it will, in their formulation and appraisal. 
Are there only physical objects and energies, or only minds 
or spirits, or are there both? How, specifically, is a physical 
object constituted, and how a mind, and how are they 
related? These topics of gigantic hypothesis are the last of 
philosophy for which the first is made.2 
As we shall see in chapter II in connection with a discussion of 
Williams’ trope theory, ‘trope’ is his technical term for unit properties 
and relations. According to his first philosophy (analytic ontology) 
the primary denizens of the universe are tropes. They are the building 
stones of which everything consists. Among the tasks for last philo-
sophy (speculative cosmology) is finding out of what sorts of tropes 
things consist.  
                                                     
1 Williams 1953a, p. 3. 
2 Williams 1953b, p. 191. 
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Williams’ distinction between the two branches of metaphysics 
is referred to by Armstrong near the end of his seminal work, Arm-
strong 1978a. He says first: 
Here are three world-hypotheses in decreasing order of 
generality. (1) The world contains nothing but particulars 
having properties and related to each other. (2) The world 
is nothing but a single spatio-temporal system. (3) The 
world is completely described in terms of (completed) 
physics. I put forward the view that each of these proposi-
tions is true. Notice that although (2) is less general than 
(1), and (3) less general than (2), the propositions seem to 
be logically independent. (Though it would be strange to 
accept (3) and deny (2).) Nor do I suggest that there is any 
particular epistemological order of priority among the 
hypotheses; although (3) seems the most dubious.1 
That is followed up with: 
Following D. C. Williams […], we may distinguish 
between ‘analytic ontology’ and ‘speculative cosmology’. 
(1) is a thesis of analytic ontology, i.e., first philosophy 
[…]; (2) and (3), by comparison, are simply theses of ‘spe-
culative cosmology’.2 
A brief remark on world-hypothesis (1) — the world contains 
nothing but particulars having properties and these are related to each 
other. Armstrong 1997 is partly devoted to this hypothesis. One of its 
essential claims is that states of affairs cannot be analysed according 
to mereological composition. Furthermore, it asserts that states of 
affairs in themselves constitute non-mereological composition. The 
problem of instantiation is declared to be solved by virtue of there 
being states of affairs. Differently put, the instantiation of a universal 
                                                     
1 Armstrong 1978a, p. 126. These world-hypotheses are discussed more in 
detail in Armstrong 1997, chapt. 1. They are listed there as: (1) factualism, (2) 
naturalism and (3) physicalism.  
2 Armstrong 1978a, p. 127. 
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by a particular is nothing more than the state of affairs itself.1 I 
mention Armstrong’s view here only in passing; it will not be 
discussed anywhere in the rest of this essay,2 which is devoted to 
moderate forms of ontology, i.e., moderate nominalism and moderate 
realism respectively. Armstrong’s immanent realism does not adhere 
to the moderate form. It does hold the premise that the world is a 
world of states of affairs in common with Donald Mertz’s moderate 
realism, which is discussed in chapter V.  
1.2 Terminology 
This essay falls within analytic ontology. Although I do not explicitly 
advocate any specific ontological view within its covers, I make no 
secret of the fact that I consider myself a moderate realist. Un-
fortunately, terminological anarchy rules here, as in many other areas 
of philosophy; it is therefore not obvious what being a moderate 
realist amounts to. Although I realise that hoping to bring order into 
chaos would be in vain, I venture to propose a terminology to be 
applied to ontological positions, which will be used partly in this 
essay. 
The first distinction to be made is between realism and 
nominalism. The former recognises universals, the latter does not. No 
surrogates for real universals suffice to turn a nominalism into 
realism. The recognition of real universals is the essential divide. 
Within the frame of realism there is the extreme position according to 
which only universals exist; I propose that it be called ‘universalism’. 
The next distinction is between transcendent realism, or Platonism, 
and immanent realism. According to transcendent realism, universals 
are non-spatiotemporal, while according to immanent realism they are 
spatiotemporal. Next, we find the distinction between moderate and 
non-moderate realism. Moderate realism recognises unit attributes, 
called instances of universals; non-moderate realism does not. If a 
                                                     
1 Cf. Armstrong 1997, p. 119. 
2 This is not completely true. A view of Armstrong concerning composition 
is in fact commented on in section. 5.3.4. 
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realism recognises substrates, ‘realism’ is prefixed with ‘substrate’. If 
substances are recognised, ‘substance’ is prefixed. I think that more 
or less completes the list for realism.1 To form a denomination, one 
simply lines up these terms according to requirement. 
Matters are a bit more complicated with regard to nominalism, 
but regardless of that, a nominalism which recognises tropes is a 
moderate nominalism.2 Tropes are property, relation or substance 
instances. If substrates are recognised, ‘nominalism’ is prefixed with 
‘substrate’. If substance tropes are recognised, ‘substance’ is prefixed. 
A nominalism according to which qualitative content is due to mem-
bership in a specific class is called ‘class nominalism’; corresponding 
to mereological sums, where ‘sums’ is left out. If concepts or predi-
cates are considered to give entities their qualitative content, the 
positions are called ‘concept nominalism’ and ‘predicate nominalism’, 
respectively. A nominalism which takes qualitative content to be due 
to resemblance between entities is called ‘resemblance nominalism’. 
Further, if resemblance is in fact a universal, the position should be 
looked upon as a form of realism. Consequently, ‘resemblance 
realism’ can be used. However, if need arises, I recommend that 
‘resemblance nominalism2’ is used instead.3 Unfortunately, this 
solution is rather unpractical in speech.  
The term ‘particularism’ is used as an umbrella term for 
ontologies recognising instances of any sort. The denomination ‘trope 
                                                     
1 Mertz 1996 has inspired my use of ‘moderate realism’. In Armstrong 1989, 
p. xi, the same term designates what is more appropriately called just 
‘immanent realism’. 
2 In Hochberg 1988 and 2002, ‘moderate nominalism’ designates a position 
recognising one single universal, which is the tie of similarity, together with 
instances of qualities and relations. I believe that what David Armstrong, in 
Armstrong 1989 and 1991, is aiming at using ‘moderate nominalism’ is the 
same view as the one I have in mind. Strangely enough, Herbert Hochberg 
says that Armstrong is the one who has called his attention to the variant of 
nominalism which he himself calls ‘moderate nominalism’. The designation 
‘moderate nominalism’ is used by Donald Mertz, in Mertz 1996, p. 26, as an 
alternative for ‘trope theory’. 
3 Cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, p. 123. 
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theory’ is also used as an umbrella term; preferably, it is used as an 
alternative for ‘moderate nominalism’.  
The heading of chapter IV is ‘moment nominalism’, this parti-
cular denomination is a rather special case. It names Ivar Segelberg’s 
ontology. Since it recognises unit qualities, but no quality universals, 
and universal relations, but no unit relations, it is hard to fit into the 
proposed terminological scheme. Furthermore, Segelberg’s preferred 
term for unit qualities is ‘moment’.  
1.3 Disposition and Method 
Regarding the disposition of this essay I refer the reader to the 
overviews at the beginning of the major sub-subsection. These over-
views are easily found by consulting the table of contents at the 
beginning of the book. 
There is no royal road to agreement in ontology. Unquestion-
able refutation or proof is hard to come by. As a result of that, the 
dispute between nominalistic and realistic minded philosophers is a 
perennial one. The fundamental assumption, which the realist makes 
and the nominalist rejects, is that universals are needed for an 
adequate description of reality. Being a realist myself, I am inclined to 
be sceptical of even moderately nominalistic ontologies. Examples of 
nominalistic ontologies are discussed in chapters II, III and IV using 
a strategy according to which I try to show that universals are pre-
supposed, even though, officially, their existence is declared un-
necessary.1 I invoke a principle, which may be described as methodo-
logical, saying that an analytical regress should be avoided. I would 
say this principle is primary in relation to Ockham’s razor. Although 
being a methodological principle, that principle is (just) an econo-
mical one.  
As regards another sense of ‘method’, I would like to add that 
although my aim is critical, I sincerely hope that my criticism is 
describable as being gently polemical. 
                                                     
1 Universals are not totally rejected by Ivar Segelberg, whose moderate 
nominalism is discussed in chapter IV; he does recognise universal relations. 
 CHAPTER II 
D. C. Williams on the Elements of Being 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the 1950’s, the analytic ontology of Donald Cary Williams 
(1899–1983) has been a source of inspiration for quite a few 
philosophers working in that field of metaphysics. In particular, 
Williams 1953a is frequently referred to with approval. In spite of 
that, detailed discussions of its doctrines, as well as of those of his 
other articles in the same field, are hard to come by. 
Williams intended to write a monograph on analytic ontology, 
though he never did.1 Instead of being presented in one complete 
statement, his doctrines are scattered in various articles. The 
discussion in this chapter is based on six of these articles: Williams 
1931, 1951, 1953a, 1953b, 1963 and 1986. The time stretch between 
some of them is considerable, although not quite as big as it seems, 
since the sixth on the list cannot have been written later than 1959.2  
In course of time his views can be expected to have changed. 
The most radical change would be a conversion from realism to 
nominalism, or the other way round. I believe there are good reasons 
for maintaining that there is such a change. It comes about between 
the publications of Williams 1931 and 1953a. In the former article, 
the presupposed ontological position is a form of moderate realism. 
That of the latter is a form of moderate nominalism. Owing to the 
elusiveness of the way in which Williams expresses himself, this 
conversion might be overlooked. In one of the later articles the 
position he argues is said to be an immanent realism. Entities which 
he calls ‘universals’ are explicitly said to be components of their 
instances.3 This has the appearance of being a frank expression of 
                                                     
1 Cf. the editor’s footnote to Williams 1986. 
2 Cf. Williams 1986, footnote 1. 
3 Cf. Williams 1986, p. 10.  
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realism. Notwithstanding that, some form of moderate nominalism is 
the predominant tendency of that article. This also holds for the 
other five, later articles. In other words, although properties and rela-
tions are recognised (real) universals are not. 
Williams’ contribution to the philosophical vocabulary is the 
term ‘trope’. It makes its first appearance in Williams 1953a. Strictly 
speaking, he is not the first to use it within the frame of philosophy. 
That seems to have been George Santayana. His sense is not the one 
Williams has in mind for it; in fact, their two senses are the opposites 
of each other. I hasten to add that it would be more correct to say 
that one of the senses Williams uses it in is the opposite of that of 
Santayana’s since, as it turns out, Williams’ use of ‘trope’ is rather 
varied. The tendency among his interpreters has been to bring out 
just one of these. 
The notion of trope has something of a forerunner in the 
ontology of the early Williams. The latter notion there is called 
‘abstract particular’. That denomination is something which the two 
notions have in common. It may easily obscure the fact that what is 
called ‘abstract particular’ by the early Williams is a realist notion, 
while in his later ontology, it is a nominalist notion. The difference 
between the two is significant.  
2.2 The Analytic Ontology of the Early Williams 
2.2.1 Overview 
While the ontology presented in Williams 1931 is not given any name 
of its own, the one argued for in the later articles is given two names. 
The one which he prefers is ‘trope theory’.1 This trope theory is 
discussed in section 2.3. The present section, section 2.2, deals with 
the moderate realism of the first. Since the account of it given in 
Williams 1931 is rather summary, what follows below is a recon-
struction of it, based on the scanty information which can be found 
in the article.  
                                                     
1 The other name is ‘trope-kind theory’. It is used only in Williams 1986. 
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In 2.2.1 two pairs of notions are introduced. The notions of 
these two pairs can be described as making up the frame in which the 
rest of Williams’ ontology is chiselled out. Section 2.2.2 deals with the 
combinations of the two pairs.  
2.2.2 Two Pairs of Notions: Universal–Particular and Abstract–Concrete 
The pronounced purpose of Williams 1931 is to propose a scheme 
exhibiting the relations of two pairs of notions. One of these two 
pairs is that of the universal and the particular.1 The other is that of 
the abstract and the concrete.2 The notions of these two pairs are 
combined in a matrix. The same matrix apparently appears in the later 
articles as well. As a consequence of Williams’ conversion to nomina-
lism, the content of it is bound to be somewhat changed.  
With a mixture of humility and self-confidence Williams asserts, 
by way of introduction: 
On a topic so ancient I can hardly hope to disclose 
anything which shall be both tolerably simple and really 
novel. On the contrary, my principal interest is only to 
make explicit the notions which must have been taken for 
granted in the more profitable moments of traditional and 
contemporary discussion, and to isolate them from certain 
other inaccurate and incompatible notions, equally taken 
                                                     
1 Regarding a near cognate of ‘particular’ Williams says: 
The term “individual” is often employed in the same sense in 
which I define “particular.” Otherwise I do not attempt to define 
it, but leave its ambiguity to be enlightened only by what 
incidental illumination is afforded by my total scheme. (Williams 
1931, p. 585) 
Later on he mentions a particular sense of ‘individual’. It will be described 
later on. 
2 As in the terminologies of many other philosophers, Williams’ terms 
‘universal’ and ‘particular’ play the role as nouns as well as that as adjectives. 
‘Abstract’ and ‘concrete’ play a simple role as adjectives. While the early 
article has two noun counterparts of ‘abstract’, i.e., ‘abstractum’ and 
‘abstraction’, there is none for ‘concrete’, though in later articles ‘concretum’ 
is used. Furthermore, each member of the quartet ‘universality’, ‘particularity’, 
‘abstractness’ and ‘concreteness’ is used in the early article. 
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for granted, with which they have been disastrously con-
fused. As the typical and perhaps the most significant con-
fusion I shall regard the rather popular assumption that an 
“abstraction” is ipso facto a universal, or vice versa.1 
It may be concluded from this that the notions of the abstract and the 
universal are not supposed to be exclusively related to each other. If 
they were so related, it would go against the assumption that the two 
pairs are combinable, without restrictions, in a matrix. The resulting 
four compound notions can be listed accordingly: abstract universal, 
concrete particular, abstract particular and concrete universal.2 The 
determinations of these four compound notions obviously depend on 
those of the, at least relatively, simple ones which make up their 
content. It seems well-advised to first take a look at what is proposed 
regarding the four simple notions. 
The first on the list is that of the universal. The following is 
offered: 
Let us mean by “a universal” an entity whose being is not 
confined to or defined by its presence in any one event, 
instance, or area in space and time, or in a specific plurality 
of such. An entity of this sort can be utterly and 
numerically identical with itself in any number of spatio-
temporal contexts or occurrences or in none. Specifically, 
its being is that of an essence, or kind, or character, as 
such. It is the identity of a thing or quality or relation 
wherein consists what it is rather than that it is. This 
peculiarity I have clumsily called “universality.”3 
                                                     
1 Williams 1931, p. 583.  
2 Also conceivable are: universal abstractum, particular concretum, particular 
abstractum and universal concretum. I presume that Williams would consider 
these to be the same as those on the official list. His use of ‘abstraction’ in 
the last sentence supports this.  
3 Williams 1931, p. 584. 
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Although it is a bit elusive,1 this apparently expresses the view of an 
ontological realist. The phrase ‘or in none’, in the second sentence, 
suggests that a universal is, as it is often put, a one over many. It would 
appear then that some version of transcendent realism, or Platonism, 
is presupposed. If ‘or in none’ is disregarded or excused, the 
suggestion is instead that a universal is a one in many. The 
presupposed ontology would then be some version of immanent 
realism. The latter interpretation finds support in another paragraph, 
where a stipulation is made regarding the term ‘generality’.  
The word “generality” […] is often employed to mean the 
same as “universality.” I shall rather factitiously define it, 
however, to mean a realized universality, i.e., the fact of 
the actual existential presence of any universal in a 
considerable number of instances.2 
I take it that the phrase ‘actual existential presence in’ is used literally.3 
On the other hand, the occurrence here of ‘realized universality’ 
suggests to some extent that unrealised universality is also reckoned 
with; this might be an expression of transcendent realism. While 
being a one in none is not considered to be in line with immanent 
                                                     
1 The enumeration — of essence, kind or character, as such — might evince 
a tristinktion between three different sorts of universals. If that is indeed the 
case, thing, quality and relation — which are listed immediately after the 
quotation — might be examples of (some of) these sorts. Presumably, quality 
and relation would be characters. It is less obvious what would be the 
universal counterpart of a thing. One possibility is that it is essence. It might 
also be kind. There is also another slightly different interpretation which is 
also possible to make. According to that, the referents of the terms ‘quality’ 
and ‘relation’ are particulars. The same of course holds for ‘thing’. I hasten to 
add though that ‘quality’ and ‘relation’ are also used for universals. 
Furthermore, the term ‘character’ is also used in a wider sense. Cf. Williams 
1931, p. 590, where the total universal content of Socrates is the intended 
referent of the phrase ‘the character of Socrates’.  
2 Williams 1931, p. 584. 
3 The matter would have appeared differently if a phrase involving ‘par-
ticipation’ had been chosen. This since ‘participation’ is frequently used by 
transcendent realists, who for sure do not intend it to imply that universals 
are spatio-temporal entities. 
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realism traditionally, being a one in (just) one is. On the other hand, 
the phrase ‘realized universality’ need not imply transcendent realism. 
If Williams were to use it, he might have unrealised combinations of 
universals in mind, where the included universals taken singly are 
realised. Immanent realism would then still be the presupposed view. 
The elusiveness of the text makes it difficult to establish exactly what 
form of realism is actually being expressed. The truth may even be 
that Williams oscillates between different versions of realism. How-
ever, he is a realist either way.  
In the quotations presented so far we have come across several 
occurrences of the term ‘instance’. As it turns out, it can have various 
senses. Williams calls attention to, and distinguishes between, two of 
them. Irrespective of which one of these is intended in a certain 
context, the existential presence of a universal is essential. This is 
evident from the next quotation. In it we also find information about 
the second notion on the list — that of the particular.  
A particular is defined by the contradictory of the above. 
It is an entity whose being is confined to and defined by its 
presence in some one event, instance, or area in space and 
time, or in a specific plurality or continuum of such. 
Specifically, its being is that of an occurrent, or continuant, 
or occupant, as such. This peculiarity I shall call “particu-
larity.” It is generally supposed that a particular can be an 
“instance” of a universal character. Usage differs, however, 
among other ways, in that it ascribes the name “instance” 
either, first, to the complete volume or concrete substance 
in which the character occurs as a component, or, second, 
to the character as it occurs. The second use seems to me 
more accurate and valuable, and I shall adopt it here.1 
From this, together with what we have seen earlier regarding the 
notion of the universal, it is quite clear that a particular cannot be 
present in its entirety in several, separate places simultaneously.  
The determination here is made in terms of space and time. 
Perhaps space and time are essential for the notion of the particular 
                                                     
1 Williams 1931, pp. 584-5. 
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as well as for that of the universal. This might be just appearance 
though. Put differently, whether the incapacity of a particular to be 
present in separate places simultaneously is due to its being a 
particular or if it is the other way round, is not clear from what is 
stated.1 Whatever the exact answer is, there are two distinct senses of 
‘instance’. To illustrate this we can use a ripe tomato and the universal 
character redness.2 In the first sense of ‘instance’ the tomato, in its 
entirety, is an instance of redness. Of course, the tomato is a parti-
cular, not a universal. What about the second sense of ‘instance’? 
Well, according to the last quotation, such an instance is a character 
as it occurs. In our tomato example, redness would be such an 
instance as it occurs. The term ‘component’ is reserved for such 
instances. Williams’ way of expressing himself may give the im-
pression that the components of things are universals. Unfortunately, 
                                                     
1 In Campbell 1990, p. 56, it is reported that Williams once told the author 
that he was inclined to think of being a particular as a basic fact about every 
particular; his reason being that the extra-spatio-temporal should not be ruled 
out by the very notion of particularity itself. Although not depending on any 
unique location of any sort, the typical manifestation of being a particular, 
known to us, is unique spatio-temporal localisation. In Maurin 2002, pp. 20-1, 
Williams’ view is reckoned to be in line with what the author believes is a 
thesis of G. F. Stout. It is that being particular accounts for certain facts 
regarding spatio-temporal position. Stout is quoted saying: 
Two drops of water, for instance, may conceivably be exactly 
alike except that they must have different positions in space, and 
whatever further differences this may involve. Why must they 
have different positions in space? Because they are distinct 
particulars. There is no other reason. This difference then 
presupposes their particular distinctness and cannot constitute it; 
but in all other ways there is nothing in their general nature to 
distinguish them. (Stout 1952, pp. 76-7) 
I suppose the phrase ‘different positions in space’ here is short for ‘different 
positions in space and time’. What Stout says in connection with this 
quotation makes it clear that he is not referring to particulars in general. He 
is, in fact, not claiming that being particular explains why particulars cannot 
share spatio-temporal location with each other. Some particulars supposedly 
do share such location. The particulars in question are what he calls ‘abstract 
particulars’. Williams evidently is of the same view. 
2 This example is mine. Williams does not present any example of his own. 
18                                               CHAPTER II 
phrases like ‘redness as it occurs’, ‘character as it occurs’ or ‘universal 
as it occurs’ easily lend themselves to misunderstandings. However, a 
careful reading makes it quite clear that the intended references of 
these phrases are particulars. Thus, both ‘instance’ and ‘component’ 
refer to a universal as it occurs.1  
In the last sentence of the last quotation we see that of the two 
distinguished senses of ‘instance’ the second is the one which is 
preferred by Williams. The presumption is therefore that whenever 
he uses ‘instance’, without any reservation, the intended referent is a 
universal as it occurs.2  
Let us move on to the next pair. From the introduction of it we 
see that its two notions are considered to make up a more murky 
matter than those of the former pair. 
[T]he terms “abstract” and “concrete” have not been so 
often and explicitly argued as have “universal” and “parti-
cular.” Perhaps for this very reason the confusion that has 
obfuscated the doctrine of the universal and the particular 
is as sunlight and crystal in comparison with the confusion 
that has enshrouded the doctrine of the abstract and the 
concrete.3 
                                                     
1 Cf. Williams 1931, p. 589, where instances of abstract universals are said to 
be abstract particulars. In Williams 1953a ‘component’ is used for the abstract 
particulars of Williams’ later ontology.  
2 This having been said, the following question presents itself. What sense 
does ‘instance’ have in the second sentence of the last quotation? A particular 
is said there to be an entity whose being is confined to and defined by its 
presence in some one event, instance, or area in space and time, or in a specific 
plurality or continuum of such. If ‘instance’ has the second, preferred sense 
here, the result seems a bit odd. If a particular is present in an instance, that 
instance has the particular as a part. Perhaps a more plausible interpretation 
of this occurrence of ‘instance’ is that it has the sense of ‘moment’. An 
instance is a point in time. This interpretation of course also applies to the 
determination given earlier of the notion of the universal. 
3 Williams 1931, p. 585. 
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Part of the ambiguity referred to here probably is the view that an 
abstractum ipso facto is a universal, or vice versa.1 Furthermore, there are 
many different uses of the terms, especially of ‘abstract’.2 These also 
contribute to the state of confusion.  
Williams’ own determination of the notion of the abstract is 
indicated like this: 
I suggest that the more useful and consistent interpretation 
of “abstract” is to be found nearer the literal one:3 that is, 
to designate the part that is artificially alienated from the 
whole to which it belongs; an element withdrawn from its 
natural existential context. Hence the propriety of such 
familiar connotations of “abstract” as fragmentary, iso-
lated, impoverished, empty, thin, or tenuous.4 
                                                     
1 As a terrible warning to the rest of us, five distinguished philosophers, who 
allegedly identify the notions of the abstract and the universal, are mentioned: 
John Locke, John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, R. M. Eaton and Alfred North 
Whitehead. This list is not intended to be exhaustive. On the contrary, this 
particular identification is said to be found in countless influential philo-
sophers. This is obviously a deliberate exaggeration. Being that, it is a so-
called hyperbole — one of the tropes of rhetoric. 
2 Examples of such senses are indicated by terms such as ‘fictitious’, ‘vague’, 
‘confused’, ‘indefinite’, ‘indeterminate’, ‘rational’ and ‘conceptual’. Cf. 
Williams 1931, pp. 585-6. Still more senses, or at least connotations, are 
mentioned in the main text. 
3 Also mentioned, and rejected, is C. D. Broad’s suggestion that abstracta are 
non-existent entities. Being non-existent they are not literally in time. In spite 
of that, they are real. Qualities and relations are included in the class of 
abstracta. Cf. Broad 1925, pp. 19-20. Another determination, which I believe 
can be found in Whitehead, is rejected as well: 
[T]o be abstract is to transcend particular concrete occasions of 
actual happening.” (Williams 1931, p. 586)  
Perhaps, these determinations are different versions of the view that abstracta 
are universals.  
4 Williams 1931, pp. 586-7. It is asserted immediately before this quotation: 
No moral turpitude, certainly, is involved in using “abstract” as 
synonymous with either “non-existent” or “universal.” But 
something valuable is lost out of language and thought if such 
conduct results in obscuring a real and more appropriate distinc-
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A crucial phrase here is ‘natural existential context’. The sense of 
‘abstract’ will vary with how the meaning of that phrase is fixed. 
Williams distinguishes two principal doctrines regarding this matter. 
The description of at least one of them involves the term ‘concrete’. 
As a result, the determinations of the notions of the abstract and the 
concrete are interwoven with each other, which is what could be 
expected.  
There remain1 two principal doctrines of the natural con-
text. These are (a) the traditional atomistic and naturalistic 
assumption that it is what we ordinarily mean by a “solid 
concrete thing,” a continuous and delimited volume of 
space or of space and time with all of its existent content; 
and (b) the idealistic and organismic assumption that it is 
what we ordinarily mean by a “system,” a thread of 
structural unity with its ramifications, a coherent pattern or 
organization.2 
Using the terms chosen by Williams, the natural existential context 
according to the atomistic doctrine is a chunk. The counterpart 
context of the organismic doctrine is a web. Thus, the atomist takes 
chunks to be the concrete entities. He considers anything which, in a 
certain sense, is less than a chunk to be abstract. According to the 
idealist, the concrete entity is a web. He considers anything which is 
                                                                                                   
tion which the words would otherwise mark. 
Williams’ claim here is en clair that he has both reason and etymology on his 
side. 
1 According to a third interpretation, found in Whitehead, the phrase ‘natural 
existential context’ has the same meaning as the phrase ‘the world of 
existence in general’. The stated reason for rejecting it is that 
[…] the resultant meaning of the word “abstract” is already 
supplied by the words “subsistent” and “universal.” (Williams 
1931, p. 587) 
If this is supposed to imply that ‘universal’ has the same sense as the phrase 
‘the world of existence in general’, it comes as a surprise. This seems to be in 
conflict with the sense assigned to ‘universal’ earlier in the article. I suppose 
Williams’ intention is not to abandon the latter sense.  
2 Williams 1931, p. 587. 
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less than a web — even though it might be a chunk —to be abstract. 
Williams prefers the atomistic proposal. His justification for this 
reads: 
[…] I beg leave to adhere for the rest of this paper to what 
I call the atomistic usage, not because I think the atomist’s 
metaphysics is better, but because I think this usage is the 
more prevalent one, nearer the original sense of the word, 
and better capable of illuminating and consistent develop-
ment.1 
The denial here of the claim that the atomistic doctrine is better than 
its rival is probably not completely sincere. This doctrine is most 
likely thought of as being an example of what has occurred in a 
profitable moment of the ongoing discussion.2 However that may be, 
the statements underline the notion that stipulations are what can be 
offered. 
The proposals regarding the notions of the concrete and the 
abstract are as follows: 
A concrete entity is one which affords or can afford the 
total content of a spatio-temporal volume, or of a chunk. 
An abstract entity is one which does not and cannot afford 
the total content of a3 spatio-temporal volume, or chunk.4 
Presumably, the total content of a volume is nothing less than its total 
content. If a distinction is made between contents of categorially 
different sorts, the total content of a chunk is the totality of both, or 
all, its sorts of contents. In the case of a spatio-temporal volume the 
total content does not coincide with just its universal content. The 
latter should therefore, not least for the sake of clarity, be called 
something else. An obvious choice is ‘total universal content’. 
Evidently, the term ‘total content’ is potentially ambiguous. I suspect 
                                                     
1 Williams 1931, p. 587.  
2 Cf. the first quotation of this chapter. 
3 A more transparent way of expressing the thesis would be to use ‘any’ here, 
instead of ‘a’. 
4 Williams 1931, p. 588. 
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that Williams does not notice this ambiguity. This suspicion is more 
or less corroborated by what he says later regarding the notion of the 
concrete universal. 
The characterisation of an abstract part — when artificially 
alienated from its natural existential context — as being fragmentary, 
isolated, impoverished, empty, thin or tenuous suggests that it is 
dependent on its surrounding. The latter being the chunk it belongs 
to. This might be in conflict though with a principle stated in 
Williams 1953b. According to this principle there is no entity which 
depends on any whole which it is a part of; nor does it depend on any 
other part of the whole.1 
In the last quotation, reference is made to space and time. One 
may wonder what the significance of that is. Does the phrase ‘being 
abstract’ more or less have the same meaning as ‘not filling up any 
space-time volume’? And, consequently, does ‘being concrete’ more 
or less mean the same as ‘filling up some space-time volume’? Since 
the statements are supposed to be definitions2 of the two notions, the 
suggestion is that the reference to space-time is essential. In any case, 
it is perfectly clear that no abstract entity can afford the total content 
of any spatio-temporal volume. This is stated once more in the next 
quotation. A concrete entity, on the other hand, can afford the total 
content of some spatio-temporal volume. 
2.2.3 The Combination of the Two Pairs 
As reported, each notion of the pair abstract–concrete is supposed to 
be combinable with each one of the pair universal–particular. The 
first resultant compound notion is that of the abstract universal. The 
determination of it is as could be expected. 
Triangularity is an abstract universal. It is universal in that 
it is an entity which can be identically present or exem-
                                                     
1 Cf. Williams 1953b, p. 189, where it is stated: 
Part does not depend on part, nor whole on whole, nor part on 
whole, and that whole does depend on part is for the trivial 
reason that the whole is at least the sum of its parts. 
2 The description of them is that are informal definitions. 
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plified in any number of spatio-temporally distinct occur-
ences. It is abstract in that it does not exhaust the total 
content of any one of the spatio-temporal volumes in 
which it occurs. An existent chunk cannot be triangular 
and nothing else. The same status is possessed by such 
entities as justice or the number three, and […] by qualities 
like blueness and by relations like betweenness.1 
The message of this is fairly clear, though the combined use of the 
phrases ‘spatio-temporally distinct occurrences’ and ‘the spatio-
temporal volumes in which it [i.e., triangularity] occurs’ may obscure 
it a bit. Most of the time, if not consistently, the term ‘occurrence’ is 
used by Williams to refer to a particular which lacks spatial volume. 
An instance of triangularity is such a particular. The notion that 
triangularity does not exhaust the content of any chunk indicates that 
it is abstract. Thus, its being universal and its being abstract 
respectively are determined in the quotation by reference to two 
different sorts of particulars. A slightly different way of characterising 
the ontological status of the same universal would be as follows: 
Since it can simultaneously be exemplified by several, separate 
chunks, it is universal. Since it does not exhaust the total universal 
content of any chunk, it is abstract as well. When applied to a 
relation, this should be interpreted as saying that it can simultaneously 
be exemplified by several, separate n-tuples of relata. However, it 
does not exhaust the universal content of any such n-tuple of relata.  
The second compound notion is that of the concrete particular.  
This table is a concrete particular. It is particular, by the 
usual opinion, because it is confined to here and now, or 
to a space-time tube uniquely continuous with here and 
now, and has not the peculiar space- and time-leaping 
identity of a universal. It is concrete, because it is a chunk, 
the total content of a definable spatial or spatio-temporal 
volume. A concrete particular is thus properly called an 
“individual” by those persons who mean by the latter 
                                                     
1 Williams 1931, p. 588. The context suggests that ‘qualities’ and ‘relations’ 
refer here to universals, not particulars.  
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word a substantial occurrent chunk, with all its occurrent 
attributes.1 
Note that a concrete particular is explicitly said here to be the total 
content of a spatio-temporal volume. Obviously, this is not the same 
as saying that its universal content is the total content of the same 
volume. The disjunction — i.e., that it is the total content of a 
definable spatial or spatio-temporal volume — suggests that, at least 
two different notions of the concrete are contemplated.2 
                                                     
1 Williams 1931, p. 588. The sense of the term ‘individual’ mentioned here is 
the one referred to in the beginning of section 2.2.1.  
2 Similar hints can be found in later articles. Williams 1953b, pp. 173-4, 
provides a sample: 
[A] surface does seem to occupy a sort of borderline status, but 
this is no more than our doctrine entails, for we have expressly 
denied that “between the abstract and the concrete there can be 
no intervening stages.” As the shape is to the surface, perhaps, so 
the surface is to the solid. The bigger difference is that a surface 
is “concrete” in two dimensions as a triangle on it is not concrete 
at all. This sort of quasi-concreteness, we note, belongs also to an 
instantaneous three-dimensional solid in comparison with one 
which is appreciably extended in time. Only an old familiarity 
with the terms of geometry, I think, makes anyone suppose that a 
surface or an instantaneous solid has in any fundamental way a 
more robust being than a four-dimensional shape or temperature. 
A spatially three-dimensional solid is described here as being quasi-concrete, 
indicating that the temporal dimension is required for being (fully) concrete. 
This is confirmed in Williams 1951, p. 459: “[A] concrete object can no more 
exist with zero duration than with zero breadth and length.” Perhaps, this 
reason is from symmetry. What holds with regard to space should do so with 
regard to time as well. Furthermore, the phrase ‘sesqui-concrete — concrete 
and a half, so to speak’ is used for describing a set. Cf. Williams 1953b, p. 
174. Although it is not obvious what the intended sense of the phrase is, I 
would say that being concrete and a half is a suitable description for some of 
the entities which he came to classify as tropes. That it has been denied 
expressly that there cannot be any intervening stages between the abstract 
and the concrete might mean that they both can appear in degrees. That 
concreteness appears in degrees is explicitly asserted in Williams 1931, p. 590. 
In Williams 1953a, p. 6, the same is said to hold with regard to the abstract. 
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The notion of a concrete particular, as exemplified by a certain 
table, is described above as being a substantial occurrent chunk with 
all its occurrent attributes. This brings to fore the intricate question 
whether instances of substantial forms are reckoned with. Unfor-
tunately, it is not possible to extract more information about this 
issue from Williams 1931. I will come back to it below when 
discussing the moderate nominalism of his later articles.1 
At this point, we have come to the third compound notion, 
which is that of the abstract particular. It has been referred to quite a 
few times already.  
[S]urely there are abstract particulars, too. We have defined 
and exemplified the abstract universal; and we have 
defined an instance. Now, an instance of an abstract uni-
versal is an abstract particular. Just this occurrence of the 
shape of this table is an abstract particular. A sneeze is an 
abstract particular. The grin of the Cheshire cat was an 
abstract particular. […] 
 Each of these things is particular because it is by 
definition confined to an immediate spatio-temporal occa-
sion or continuity. It is abstract because it is less than the 
whole chunk in which it inheres, less than any volume of 
which it is an element. It is less than a volume or chunk in 
a peculiar and otherwise nameless way, and not in the 
ordinary way in which a little chunk can be part of a big 
chunk, so that it is peculiarly important to retain the word 
“abstract” to mean just this way of being less than any 
whole chunk.2 
Although they are not explicitly mentioned here, instances of 
relations are of course abstract particulars as well. The same would 
hold for instances of substantial forms. Furthermore, abstract parti-
culars are what have been referred to as instances — in the second 
sense of ‘instance’.  
                                                     
1 My impression is that instances of substantial forms are recognised in his 
later articles. They are not mentioned more than in passing though. Cf. 
Williams 1953a, p. 10, 1953b, p. 189, and 1986, p. 6.  
2 Williams 1931, p. 589. 
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In the second paragraph of the last quotation we find an 
important piece of information regarding the notion of the abstract. 
An abstract thing is said there to be less than any volume of which it 
is an element. Due to the occurrence of the word ‘any’, the characteri-
sation is in line with the hypothesis that the senses of ‘being abstract’ 
and ‘not filling up any spatio-temporal volume’ are intimately related. 
Hence, the suggestion is that an abstract entity is non-extensionally 
less than the whole which includes it. A concrete part, on the other 
hand, is extensionally less than the including whole. It seems to be 
taken for granted here that the including whole is a chunk.1 
The phrase ‘abstract particular’ became part of the philosophical 
vocabulary thanks to G. F. Stout.2 Williams makes several references 
to him. In one of these references, he mentions particular round-
nesses. 
[T]he category of abstract particularity accommodates very 
well, although it does not demonstrate the final validity of, 
Mr. G. F. Stout’s conclusion that “Each billiard ball has its 
own particular roundness, separate and distinct from that 
of any other ball.”3 
The sentence within quotation marks4 does not specify whether the 
roundness of a billiard ball is an instance of the universal roundness. 
According to Stout, it cannot be an instance in that sense; however, 
this is due to his being a nominalist. He advocates a kind of class 
nominalism, which is also a moderate nominalism. Notwithstanding 
that, Williams considers him to be an ally when it comes to the notion 
of abstract particular. 
The fourth and last compound notion is that of the concrete 
universal. 
                                                     
1 In later articles concrete parts of abstract wholes are reckoned with. Such 
wholes fit the description of being concrete and a half. 
2 Cf. Stout 1923, p. 114. 
3 Williams 1931, p. 589. 
4 It originates from Kemp-Smith 1927, p. 394. 
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The easiest way to define a genuinely concrete universal 
would be: that it is that of which a concrete particular is or 
can be an instance. A concrete universal is a compound or 
complex universal which is concrete in that it is adequate 
to exhaust the content of a total existent volume or chunk, 
and yet a universal in that it might be realized and identical 
in any number of existent chunks. 
 [---] A concrete universal would be the superlative 
degree of what he [G. Santayana] calls “complex” or “syn-
thetic” essences — such an essence, to use his example, as 
“my dog’s nature,” or, to use a familiar historical instance, 
the exact whole nature of just this kind of table. The 
adequate and analytic description of an “individual form” 
of this sort would perhaps require an infinite number of 
adjectives, infinitely hyphenated.1 
It appears from the first paragraph that a concrete universal is that of 
which only a concrete particular is or can be an instance. Thus, the 
concreteness of a concrete universal is due to its exhausting the 
universal content of a concrete particular. In the second paragraph 
Williams seems prepared to consider kinds as being concrete univer-
sals. Or, perhaps he is reporting what he considers to be a common 
use of the term ‘kind’. If he decides on the former, the notions of 
kind and of individual form collapse into each other. Yet a third name 
for the same notion would be ‘truly infima species’ as found in the next 
quotation. Note that if the term ‘content’ is used a bit indeter-
minately, it may result in the appearance that a concrete universal is 
identical with a concrete particular.2 Williams ascribes such a view to 
G. W. Leibniz.  
If we identify degrees of such complexity or hyphenation 
with degrees of concreteness, we may expatiate by saying 
that the defining character of a species is more concrete 
(i.e., nearer concrete) than that of its genus, and so forth. 
A thoroughly concrete universal is the defining character 
                                                     
1 Williams 1931, p. 590.  
2 This squares with what has been pointed out regarding an ambiguity of 
‘total content’. 
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of a truly infima species. Leibniz believed that such a 
concrete universal must be ipso facto a particular thing or 
person, because he believed in the identity of indiscer-
nibles. We need only admit, however, that a concrete 
universal, being perhaps infinitely complex, is perhaps 
infinitely unlikely to be manifest in a plurality of instances; 
and this is a different matter.1 
The notion of a truly infima species is identified here with that of the 
total (universal) content of a concrete particular. This, according to 
the view ascribed to Leibniz, makes it identical with the concrete 
particular it is the content of. Evidently, this is in conflict with what 
Williams’ view should be. The way he uses the term ‘concrete’, in 
‘concrete universal’, suggests to some extent that he implicitly agrees 
with the alleged Leibnizian view. Remember that each notion of the 
two pairs of distinctions is supposed to be combinable, without any 
restrictions, with each one of the other pair. This supposition 
includes that each one of the four simple notions is the same in each 
combination. The term ‘concrete’ in ‘concrete particular’ supposedly 
has the same meaning as the term ‘concrete’ in ‘concrete universal’. 
The same should hold mutatis mutandis with regard to the ‘abstract’ of 
‘abstract particular’ and ‘abstract universal’. But can this supposition 
hold? Well, in the phrase ‘concrete particular’ the term ‘concrete’ 
bears upon the total content of a chunk. In ‘concrete universal’, on 
the other hand, it only has bearing on the total universal content of a 
chunk. The same holds mutatis mutandis with regard to the ‘abstract’ of 
‘abstract universal’ and of ‘abstract particular’. Keep that in mind 
when reading the next sentence. 
Most dictionaries define the two [i.e., ‘universal’ and 
‘abstract’] by reference to one another, and often the only 
way to explain to the recalcitrant student what a 
“universal” is, is to tell him it is an “abstraction.”2 
                                                     
1 Williams 1931, p. 590. 
2 Williams 1931, p. 586. 
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In context, the implication1 here is that the dictionary writers, as well 
as the teachers answering recalcitrant students, are mistaken. I would 
say that they cannot be completely wrong though. After all, how 
could something universal ever be anything other than abstract? No 
matter how complex the universal content of a concrete particular is, 
it can only exhaust its universal content. Thus, in the true sense it can 
never be more than abstract.  
The notion that a concrete particular is some sort of compound 
of abstract particulars seems to suggest itself here. In spite of its 
importance, this issue is not more than touched upon in Williams 
1931. Some of the few pieces of information there are can be found 
in the following, somewhat cryptic, statement: 
One way of phrasing the opposite characteristics of the 
abstract universal and concrete particular is to say that 
each of them evinces its own kind of “unity in diversity.” 
An abstract universal is a unity of character pervading a 
diversity of occurrences. A concrete particular is a unity of 
occurrences which invests a plurality of characters. A 
completely abstract particular or (probably) a completely 
concrete universal misses each characteristic unity-in-
diversity of its type.2 
In the third sentence ‘occurrences’ is used, instead of ‘abstract 
particulars’ or ‘instances’. This choice of term muddles the message to 
some extent. The singular form of the verb, ‘invests’, contributes to 
the confusion. A better phrasing of what probably is the intended 
message of the third sentence is: a concrete particular is a unity of 
abstract particulars, of which each invests a character.  
Williams does not postulate the existence of any substratum. It 
is therefore likely that the proposed ontology is a so-called bundle 
theory.3 His particular version of the bundle theory should be con-
                                                     
1 It is perhaps more accurate to say that it is an insinuation. 
2 Williams 1931, p. 592. 
3 A third possibility is that he is contemplating a network theory. More will be 
said about this alternative to substratum and bundle theories in the last 
chapter. 
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sistent with moderate realism. The view ascribed to Leibniz in an 
earlier quotation more or less identifies a concrete particular with a 
bundle of universals. Evidently, Williams cannot agree with such a 
view on concrete particulars. Instead, he should take concrete par-
ticulars to be instances of concrete universals. An alternative denomi-
nation of compound universals of such complexity is of course 
‘bundle of universals’ — or, more accurately, ‘complete bundle of 
universals’. This having been said, there still remains much explaining 
to do concerning how abstract particulars compose a concrete par-
ticular of which they all are components. 
The last quotation also has some bearing on the sense of the 
term ‘instance’. The same issue comes to fore in another passage, 
which has already been quoted. 
The easiest way to define a genuinely concrete universal 
would be: that it is that of which a concrete particular is or 
can be an instance.1 
A concrete particular obviously is an instance of a concrete universal 
in the first sense of ‘instance’. How could it not be? This concrete 
particular is also an instance of the same concrete universal in the 
second sense of the term ‘instance’. In reason, nothing less than a 
concrete particular can be as universal as this. Thus, with regard to 
the instances of concrete universals, the two senses collapse into each 
other.  
2.3 Williams’ Trope Theory 
2.3.1 Overview 
Williams’ most celebrated notion, trope, is presented in section 2.3.3. 
Preparations for that discussion are made in section 2.3.2. By means 
of that notion Williams claims that he can give an account of 
properties and relations which steers clear of the alleged mistakes 
inherent in realism as well as in traditional forms of nominalism. 
                                                     
1 Williams 1931, p. 590. 
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Besides that, it is assigned the role as a building stone of reality.1 In 
what follows, these two things will not be kept strictly apart. My, 
perhaps poor, excuse is that Williams himself does not keep them 
apart.  
Sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5 deal with Williams’ views on concrete 
objects. After that his views on what should substitute for universals 
are discussed. Evidently, the latter subject is a central one for any 
nominalistic ontology. In two short sections, sections 2.3.6 and 2.3.7 
respectively, so-called ‘painless realism’ and predicativity are discussed 
briefly. Painless realism gives expression to a strategy which is quite 
common among moderate nominalists, however abortive. The last 
subject is evidently an essential notion of any ontology. I would say 
that it is something of a touchstone.  In Williams’ case it turns out 
that only relations are looked upon as being predicative.  
2.3.2 Parts and Components 
According to Williams, metaphysics is anchored to experience. This 
view is expressed clearly in the following two sentences. 
Metaphysics is the thoroughly empirical science. Every 
item of experience must be evidence for or against any 
hypothesis of speculative cosmology, and every experi-
enced object must be an exemplar and test case for the 
categories of analytic ontology.2 
                                                     
1 Fredrik Stjernberg calls attention to the fact that tropes are introduced for 
two different reasons.  
[O]ne is to give an account of properties, the other is to present 
tropes as the fundamental building blocks of the world. Tropes 
are allegedly the fundamental entities in the world, things that 
make up everything else. (Stjernberg 2003, p. 37) 
He is inclined to believe that this is one task too many. Cf. Stjernberg 2002, 
p. 44. 
2 Williams 1953a, p. 3.  
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The purpose of illustrating the categories1 of analytic ontology is well 
in line with the view expressed here, to use commonplace examples 
instead of more dignified ones. Since examples of the latter kind are, 
in Williams’ own words, “darkened with a patina of tradition and 
partisanship”, a commonplace example may even be a better choice. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that among his examples there is 
one which stars three lollipops. From what is stated at the end of the 
first paragraph of the next quotation, we realize that great things are 
expected from this example: 
Let us […] imagine three lollipops, made by a candy man 
who buys sticks from a big supplier and molds candy 
knobs on them. Lollipop No. 1 has a red round pepper-
mint head, No. 2 a brown round chocolate head, No. 3 a 
red square peppermint head. The circumstance here which 
mainly provokes theories of subsistence2 and inherence is 
similarity with difference: each lollipop is partially similar 
to each other and partially different from it. If we can give 
a good account of this circumstance in this affair we shall 
have the instrument to expose the anatomy of everything, 
from an electron or an apple to archangels and the World 
All. 
 My chief proposal to that end may be put, to begin 
with, as nothing more tremendous than that we admit 
literally and seriously that to say that a is partially similar to 
b is to say that a part of a is wholly or completely similar to 
a part of b.3 
                                                     
1 In Williams 1931 ‘category’ occurs twice. The indication is in both that 
abstract particularity is a category. Presumably, the same holds with regard to 
abstract universality, concrete particularity and concrete universality. Being a 
nominalist in his later articles, he has reductive ambitions concerning 
universals. Abstract particularity is declared to be the single fundamental cate-
gory. It can be expected that other categories are supposed to be reducible to 
the fundamental one.  
2 Although it is suggested here that subsistence is an essential notion, 
Williams does not discuss it any further; at least not under that name. 
3 Williams 1953a, p. 4. Williams uses phrases such as ‘wholly similar’, ‘com-
pletely similar’, ‘exactly similar’, ‘precisely similar’ and ‘perfectly similar’ as 
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Mark well the statement of the second paragraph: “to say that a is 
partially similar to b is to say that a part of a is wholly or completely 
similar to a part of b.” This wording has the appearance of a semantic 
principle but can easily be paraphrased into an ontological idiom. It 
then reads: every partial similarity between entities presupposes a 
complete similarity between parts of each. I strongly suspect that 
Williams does not regard it to be especially important to distinguish 
between these two versions of the principle and therefore embraces 
them both. Henceforth, when I use the definite description the 
similarity principle, I will be referring to the ontological version of it. Do 
not fail to notice that this principle is put forward here as the chief 
proposal regarding which instruments to use when exposing the 
anatomy of everything. From what is stated in the next quotation, it is 
evident that it is supposed to be completely general.  
Some of the entities appearing in his examples are given proper 
names of their own. The example with the three lollipops is a case in 
point. Since these names will be mentioned and used from now on, I 
may as well introduce some of them. The three lollipops themselves 
are called ‘Heraplem’, ‘Boanerp’ and ‘Rindesta’.1 Heraplem’s stick is 
called ‘Paraplete’. ‘Merrinel’ is the name of Boanerp’s stick. Rindesta’s 
stick remains nameless. More names will appear as we proceed. 
The lollipop affair gives proof of a number of similarities. 
Among these is the similarity between Paraplete, Merrinel and their 
nameless colleague, which is stipulated to be exact,2 as a result, 
Heraplem, Boanerp and Rindesta are partially similar to each other. 
An explanation Williams provides for the situation is that the 
lollipops are partially similar with respect to stick. It seems more 
                                                                                                   
synonyms. In what follows I will do likewise. 
1 While the first two names occur already in Williams 1953a, the third does 
not do so until Williams 1986. Due to a misprint ‘Rindesta’ is said there to be 
a (new) name of lollipop No. 2. It is clear though, from the description of it, 
that ‘Rindesta’ is intended to be the name of the hitherto nameless lollipop 
No. 3 of Williams 1953a. 
2 In Williams 1953a, p. 4, it is said that, on physical grounds, it is not likely 
that any solid objects are exactly similar to each other. It is intelligible though 
to stipulate that some of them are. 
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appropriate to say that they are exactly similar with regard to stick. Be 
that as it may, let us move on and acquaint ourselves with some of 
the other similarities. In doing that we witness the introduction of 
entities called ‘property cases’. Evidently, these are closely related to 
the instances of Williams 1931.  
But what now of the rest of each lollipop and what of 
their more subtle similarities, of color, shape, and flavor? 
My proposal is that we treat them in exactly the same way. 
Since we can not find more parts of the usual gross sort, 
like the stick, to be wholly similar from lollipop to lollipop, 
let us discriminate subtler and thinner or more diffuse 
parts till we find some of these which are wholly similar. 
[…] Just as we can distinguish in the lollipops Heraplem 
and Boanerp the gross parts called “sticks,” namely, 
Paraplete and Merrinel, so we can distinguish in each lolli-
pop a finer part which we are used to call its “color” and 
another called its “shape” — not its kind of color or 
shape, mind you, but these particular cases, this reddening, 
this occurrence or occasion of roundness, each as uniquely 
itself as a man, an earthquake, or a yell.1 
I take it that the description of the property cases as being parts of 
their respective lollipops is meant literally. Compared with the gross 
parts, cases are but finer parts of the including lollipops. Further-
more, each part of a lollipop is thought of as being a particular. 
Regarding the notion of the particular, it is asserted in another place: 
[P]articular entities are those which do not conform to the 
principle of the identity of indiscernibles,2 which is that 
identity of kind entails identity of case; that is, particulars 
                                                     
1 Williams 1953a, pp. 4-5. 
2 In McTaggart 1921, p. 101, an apposite remark is made regarding this 
designation of the principle: 
The name [‘The Identity of Indiscernibles’] […] is not a good 
one. For the principle does not assert that there are indiscernibles 
which are identical, but that there is nothing which is indiscer-
nible from anything else. It would be better to speak of the Dis-
similarity of the Diverse. 
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are entities which may be exactly similar and yet not only 
distinct but discrete.1 
The phrase used here to express Leibniz’s principle is ‘identity of kind 
entails identity of case’. Incidentally, it seems as if a consistent 
adherent of the principle would not recognise cases. After all, what 
would be the purpose of recognising such entities if exactly similar 
ones are supposed to be identical? There would be a point if they 
were never more than almost exactly similar to each other. Never 
mind that though.2 Instead, reflect on another question and its 
answer: Since particulars have the capacity of being exactly similar, 
while still not being numerically identical, with each other, what 
entities do actually conform to the principle? Williams’ answer is: 
Universals.3 Coming from a nominalist this has the appearance of 
being problematic at the very least.  
Another issue not touched upon above is whether two property 
cases can be partially similar to each other. We have seen it declared 
that such subtle similarities should be treated in the same way as 
other similarities. Thus, the similarity principle is supposed to be 
applicable to property cases as well. Partial similarity between two 
cases implies that at least one of them has a part of some sort. This 
part is either exactly similar to the other case or each case has a 
proper part which is exactly similar to a part of the other. I hasten to 
add though that Williams might hold conflicting views regarding the 
similarities between entities such as these. The determining principle 
of one of these views is the similarity principle; it is more difficult to 
grasp what that of the other view is. I will come back to this below. 
In connection with the introduction of property cases Williams 
starts to use ‘part’ in a more narrow sense. From then on it refers 
especially, but not consistently, to what has been described up to then 
                                                     
1 Williams 1986, p. 3. A distinction between being discrete and being distinct 
is hinted at here. Whatever it amounts to, no further use seems to be made of 
it.  
2 I will come back to this matter in a footnote in chapter IV. 
3 Cf. Williams 1986, p. 8. Cf. also Williams 1963, p. 615, where we are 
informed that what we mean when we say that certain entities are particulars 
is that they do not obey the principle of the identity of indiscernibles.  
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as gross parts of things. The term ‘component’ is reserved for their 
finer parts. There is also the term ‘constituent’. It covers gross as well 
as fine parts. In spite of this terminological distinction, components 
are essentially thought of as being parts of their including wholes.1 
Williams’ repeated use of the term ‘part’, when referring to property 
cases, is circumstantial evidence of this.  
As one might expect, there are proper names in store for some 
of the property cases mentioned so far; as well as for some soon to be 
mentioned. For example, Rindesta’s colour case is christened 
‘Rastoc’.2 Two other new names appear in the next quotation along 
with some confirmation and reiteration of some previous notions.  
[…] Heraplem and Boanerp are partially dissimilar in as 
much their knobs or heads are partially dissimilar because 
some of their finer parts, for example, Harlac and Bantic, 
their colors, are dissimilar. 
 In like manner, to proceed, we note that Harlac, the 
color component of No. 1 (Heraplem), though numeri-
cally distinct from, is wholly similar to the color compo-
nent of No. 3. But No. 1 has not only a color component 
which is perfectly similar to the color component of No. 3; 
it has also a flavor component perfectly similar to the 
flavor3 component of No. 3. [---] 
 Crucial here, of course, is the admission of a “fine” or 
“subtle” part, a “diffuse” or “permeant” one, such as a 
resident color or occurrent shape, to at least as good 
                                                     
1 Anna-Sofia Maurin points out that this is the appropriate imagery, proposed 
by Williams, for the properties of things. According to her, this part-imagery 
yields three traits of the property cases: simplicity, particularity and abstract-
ness. Cf. Maurin 2002, pp. 9f. I am not sure whether Williams is supposed to 
actually agree with all of this. Anyhow, the sense Maurin assigns to the term 
‘abstract’ is not the one Williams has in mind for it. Furthermore, I am quite 
certain that she does not want to claim that any of the enumerated traits 
themselves appear as property cases. As will be seen below, Williams is not 
entirely out of sympathy though with concreteness, and by implication 
abstractness, doing that. 
2 The first appearance of it is in Williams 1986.  
3 The flavour cases remain nameless. 
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standing among the actual and individual items of the 
world’s furniture as a “gross” part, such as a stick. The fact 
that one part is thus finer and more diffuse than another, 
and that it is more susceptible of similarity,1 no more 
militates against its individual actuality than the fact that 
mice are smaller and more numerous than elephants 
makes them any the less real.2 
Immediately after this, he states that the fine parts of things are 
described as being abstract and their gross parts are described as 
being concrete. In the following passage, Williams 1953a introduces 
the pair ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’. 
To borrow now an old but pretty appropriate term, a gross 
part, like the stick, is “concrete,” as the whole lollipop is, 
while a fine or diffuse part, like the color component or 
shape component, is “abstract.” The color-cum-shape is 
less abstract or more concrete or more nearly concrete 
than the color alone but it is more abstract or less concrete 
than color-plus-shape-plus-flavor, and so on up till we get 
to the total complex which is wholly concrete.3 
In an earlier quotation we saw the phrase ‘the World All’ being used. 
It strongly suggests that an entity including everything is assumed; 
perhaps the phrase ‘the Big It’4 does so to a larger degree. Whether 
any counterpart entities in the other end are also reckoned with is less 
certain. One looks in vain for clear-cut information with regard to 
something being “wholly abstract”.  
Later in the same article there is a characterisation of the 
abstract, which refers to the one given in Williams 1931. 
At its broadest the “true” meaning of “abstract” is partial, 
incomplete, or fragmentary, the trait of what is less than its 
whole. […] The more usual practice of philosophers […] 
                                                     
1 I take it that ‘similarity’ here is short for ‘exact similarity’. 
2 Williams 1953a, p. 6.  
3 Williams 1953a, p. 6.  
4 Cf. Williams 1986, p. 2. 
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has been to require for “abstractness” the more special 
sort of incompleteness which pertains to what we called 
the “thin” or “fine” or “diffuse” sort of constituent, like 
the color or shape of our lollipop, in contrast with the 
“thick,” “gross,” or chunky sort of constituent, like the 
stick in it.1 
The noun ‘chunk’, found in the early article, appears here in its 
adjective form ‘chunky’. Furthermore, I take it that by using the 
phrase ‘the more special sort of incompleteness’, the characterisation 
made earlier of being, in a certain sense, less than an including whole 
is alluded to. What is stated here regarding the abstract lets itself be 
interpreted in line with the doctrine of Williams 1931. 
In both the early and the later articles, there is something of a 
suggestion that the notions of the abstract and the concrete form a 
continuum. At one extreme we find the wholly concrete entities. 
Presumably, being wholly concrete is being as concrete as anything 
can get. Lollipops are such wholly concrete entities.2 So are their 
sticks. It is less evident what can be expected at the other end of the 
continuum. Nothing is explicitly singled out as being wholly abstract. 
There are a few possible hints though, such as the remark that colour-
cum-shape is less abstract than colour alone and that the former is 
more abstract than colour-plus-shape-plus-flavour. The evident 
implication here is that a single property case is more abstract than a 
complex of several property cases. Single property cases might 
therefore be found at the other end of the continuum. If a property 
case itself has some sort of constituents, the latter would be even 
more abstract. Part of the message of the following quotation seems 
to imply that at least some property cases do have constituents.  
We need not propose that a red sensum, for example, is 
perfectly abstract (whatever that might be). But even 
though it has such distinguishable components as a shape 
and a size as well as a color, and though the color itself 
                                                     
1 Williams 1953a, p. 15. 
2 I suppose that the maximum entity, given that it exists, is bound to be 
wholly concrete. 
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involves the “attributes” of hue, brightness, and saturation, 
still it is abstract in comparison with a whole colored 
solid.1 
The suggestion here is that a colour case has cases of hue, brightness 
and saturation as components. The quotation marks around ‘attri-
butes’ may evince uneasiness about cases of properties themselves 
having properties.2 Regardless, I suppose the latter three are more 
abstract than the colour case itself. We may have reached rock 
bottom at this point, at least in the sense that there is nothing in the 
colour case which is more abstract still. Though it may be that the 
insertion within parentheses is an expression of the strategy that 
better not be too certain.3 
The reflections made above concerning the constituents of 
property cases being more abstract than the property cases them-
selves may appear perfectly sound. It will be evident though, from 
what is reported in the next section, that it is not true that for all 
abstract particulars each of their parts are more abstract than their 
including wholes. This paradoxically sounding thesis is in accordance 
with Williams’ doctrine due to a stipulation made in his definition of 
trope. 
 
 
                                                     
1 Williams 1953a, pp. 17-18.  
2 The possibility of there being a level of sub-properties, and perhaps even 
further levels below that, threatens to invalidate the model according to 
which property cases are the fundamental building blocks of reality.  
3 To bring out the matter in relief, Whitehead, who is referred to in Williams 
1931, concerning another matter, can be mentioned. He accepts neither an all 
inclusive entity, nor a smallest one. He takes reality to be topless as well as 
bottomless. Furthermore, between any two entities a and b, where a is a 
proper part of b, there is supposed to be an entity c which has a as a proper 
part and is itself a proper part of b. Cf. Whitehead 1916 and 1919. 
Incidentally, Anaxagoras seems to have been an early advocate of this view. 
Cf. Barnes 1987, p. 227. David Lewis proposes the denomination ‘atomless 
gunk’ for an entity satisfying the given description. Cf. Lewis 1990, p. 20. 
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2.3.3 The Alphabet of Being: Tropes 
Although he is not the inventor of the term ‘trope’, Williams’ name 
will forever be associated with it in its ontological sense. Moreover, it 
has a long history in rhetoric, where ‘trope’ is the catchall term for 
expressions used figuratively, as metaphors, synecdoches, meto-
nymies etc. Williams is of course well aware of this, even if his source 
of inspiration is not rhetoric. If anything or anyone is to be singled 
out as being that, it would be George Santayana. But, the sense he 
gives the term is not the one Williams has in mind.  
Santayana […] used “trope” to stand for the essence of an 
occurrence; and I shall divert the word […] to stand for the 
abstract particular which is, so to speak, the occurrence of an 
essence.1 
Santayana’s sense of ‘trope’ seems to be that of ‘universal’, where the 
sense of the latter is compatible with realism. While the notion of 
universality was recognised and assigned a prominent role in Williams 
1931, it is now considered almost useless.2 In any case, from what is 
stated in this quotation we learn that tropes are abstract particulars. 
This is confirmed several times. Unfortunately, it turns out that the 
notion of abstract particular is rather complicated. That complexity 
rubs off on the notion of trope. We find proof of that in the 
paragraph in which it is introduced. What follows is approximately 
the first half of that paragraph.  
I propose now that entities like our fine parts or abstract 
components are the primary constituents of this or any 
possible world, the very alphabet of being. They not only 
                                                     
1 Williams 1953a, p. 7. 
2 In the main text I have shortened the quotation a bit. In full it reads: 
Santayana, however, used “trope” to stand for the essence of an 
occurrence; and I shall divert the word, which is almost useless in 
either his or its dictionary sense, to stand for the abstract 
particular which is, so to speak, the occurrence of an essence. 
The dictionary sense of ‘trope’ is of course that of rhetoric. Why it is 
condemned as being almost useless is a complete mystery to me. 
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are actual but are the only actualities, in just this sense, that 
whereas entities of all other categories are literally 
composed of them, they are not in general composed of 
any other sort of entity. That such a crucial category has 
no regular name is quite characteristic of first principles 
and is part of what makes the latter worth pursuing. A 
description of it in good old phraseology has a paradoxical 
ring: our thin parts are “abstract particulars.”1 
This expresses a view on what are the building blocks of reality. 
Moreover, a careful reading of it proves that two rather different 
tendencies can be discerned. One of these is suggested by the 
metaphor the alphabet of being. The description of the abstract 
components as being the primary constituents of this or any possible 
world makes the same suggestion. Both indicate that the entities 
referred to are fundamental in some sense. One aspect of that is the 
picture of them that is conjured by the metaphor being the letters, 
rather than the syllables, of being. As the letters of being, one would 
expect them to be simple entities. The sundry complex entities 
constituted from them would be the syllables of being. The same 
tendency is enhanced by the message of the first two-thirds of the 
second sentence that states that the entities of the other categories are 
                                                     
1 Williams 1953a, p. 7. In a footnote, placed where the quotation ends, a 
reference is made to Williams 1931: 
I argued the general legitimacy of such a category [i.e., that of the 
abstract particular] in “The Nature of Universals and of 
Abstractions” […]. 
As pointed out earlier, the term ‘abstract particular’ is also used by Stout for a 
key notion of his ontology. In Williams 1953a, p. 12n, we are informed that 
Stout’s ontology and his own are almost identical. The difference between the 
two concerns the notion of class. 
[I]f there is a difference it is in his obscure idea of the class as a 
unique form of unity not reducible to similarity. 
Stout’s class nominalism is vaguely hinted at here. Being elements of the 
same class is the basis for being similar. What Williams asserts, interpreted e 
contrario, implies that his view is quite the opposite: entities are elements of 
the same class because of their similarity. Cf. Seargent 1985 for an excellent 
account of Stout’s ontology.  
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composed of entities of this category. This first tendency can be 
paraphrased using a metaphor: each entity which is not a letter of the 
alphabet of being is composed of entities which are such letters.  
There are also traces of a second tendency. The last one-third of 
the second sentence of the quotation makes the assertion, “they are 
not in general composed of any other sort of entity.” In context, the 
phrase ‘in general’ indicates that some of the primary constituents of 
being are composed of entities of other sorts. Strangely enough, these 
latter letters of being look more like syllables of being. Naturally 
enough, the metaphor suggests that any complex entity prima facie 
deserves the description of being a syllable. This would be particularly 
accurate for categorially mixed entities. Judging from the actual 
wording, these latter letters are thought of as having other sorts of 
entities as parts. In reason, ‘sort’ is an alternative for ‘category’ here.  
A notion of category is explicitly made use of twice in the last 
quotation. It is quite clear that Williams considers there to be more 
than just one category. This is particularly clear from the saying, 
“whereas entities of all other categories are literally composed of 
them”. I take it that the thin parts of things are what are meant by 
‘them’ here. They are also referred to as being abstract particulars. A 
crucial question is whether the other categories are supposed to be 
reducible to that of abstract particularity. Perhaps that is something 
which is supposed to follow from the claim that the entities of the 
other categories are literally composed of abstract particulars. 
I think we are ready to acquaint ourselves with the definition of 
trope. From now on I will use ‘the definition of trope’, ‘the trope 
definition’ and similar phrases when I am referring to the following 
formulation: 
A trope then is a particular entity either abstract or con-
sisting of one or more concreta in combination with an 
abstractum.1 
The first half of this definition shows vestiges of what is referred to 
above as the first tendency. The same holds with regard to its second 
                                                     
1 Williams 1953a, p. 7.  
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half and the second tendency. The notion that tropes are abstract 
particulars is corroborated in the first half of the definition; not so in 
the second half. We can safely assume though that all tropes are 
considered to be abstract particulars. I venture to claim that, of these 
two tendencies, it is primarily the first one which has caught the 
attention of those who have been inspired by Williams’ ontological 
writing.1 
In another article there is a slightly different determination of 
the notion of trope. 
Tropes include both the primitive qualia and the primitive 
relations and also all the sundry compounds thereof, up to, 
but of course not including, those thorough totalities 
which are by definition not abstract but ‘concrete’.2 
Do not let the term ‘qualia’ muddle things here. It should not be 
taken as a pretext for tropes exclusively belonging to the phenomenal 
sphere. Instead, it should be looked upon as an alternative for 
‘qualities’. With that terminological matter out of the way, it is still not 
evident what the import of ‘primitive’ is. It might be that of 
                                                     
1 An example is Keith Campbell. The following are from Campbell 2002, p. 
151. 
A trope metaphysics gets its importance from the primacy it 
accords to unit properties. Its bite comes from the claim that 
these are basic elements, the ‘alphabet of being,’ as Donald 
Williams has it. 
The same message is enhanced when he says: 
[T]rope theory affirms that Reality consists in nothing but 
(monadic or polyadic) [unit] properties.  
Note also the following, on the face of it, paradoxical assertion: 
Nor does trope theory deny the existence of simple or complex 
individuals. It does not admit substances as a distinct category, 
but individual basic tropes are substances in the Humean sense 
— they are capable of independent existence.  
The term ‘substance’ is used here in two different senses. In its first sense it 
denotes concrete particulars. In its other sense it denotes independently 
existing entities. Tropes are supposed to be substances in the latter sense. 
This is also Williams’ opinion. 
2 Williams 1986, p. 4.  
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‘irreducible’. In another of his later articles Williams discusses three 
relations which are said to be irreducible. Another description of 
these is that of being fundamental types or determinables. The three 
are: location, partition and comparison.1 The suggestion is then that 
these three are the primitive relations referred to in the quotation. 
The primitive qualities would be simple quality tropes. Unfortunately, 
the content of the trope definition, to some extent, seems to be in 
conflict with that of the present determination. The conflict is due to 
the latter seemingly excluding concrete entities from being con-
stituents of tropes. This contradicts what is stipulated in the second 
half of the definition. If there indeed is a clash here, it would be 
reasonable to give priority to the wording of the definition. It will be 
seen below that this notion gets decisive support from what is stated 
in direct connection with the trope definition. But apart from that, 
the last quotation supplies us with the information that relations also 
appear as tropes,2 which of course is what was to be expected. It is 
confirmed in the next, somewhat cryptic, quotation.  
Location and similarity (or whatever else there is) provide 
all the relations,3 as the tropes provide the terms, but the 
total of the relations is not something over and above the 
total of the terms, for a relation R between tropes a and b 
is a constitutive trope of the complex r' (a, b), while con-
versely the terms a and b will be in general composed of 
constituents in relation — though perhaps no more than 
the spread of a smooth or “homoeomorous” quale such as 
a color.4 
                                                     
1 Cf. Williams 1963, p. 609. Why the epistemologically sounding term 
‘comparison’ is used, instead of ‘similarity, I do not know. 
2 In spite of that, the way ‘trope’ is frequently used indicates something of a 
resistance to letting ‘trope’ denote instances of relations. A case in point is the 
next quotation in the main text.  
3 In this article, location and similarity are thought to exhaust the class of 
relations. In Williams 1963, partition is added as a third independent, 
primitive relation.  
4 Williams 1953a, pp. 8-9. The formalism is a bit opaque. The capital ‘R’ and 
the lower case ‘r’ may indicate that a distinction is made between a universal 
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I reiterate some of what is said in the paragraph containing the 
definition of trope: “they1 are not in general composed of any other 
sort of entity.”2 According to the latest news, tropes are composed of 
constituents in relation in general; however, an imminent contra-
diction might be lurking here. After all, tropes cannot both be and 
not be composed of other sorts of entities in general. A way out is 
that the constituents of complex tropes, in general, are qualities and 
relations and that these belong to the same sort, or category; the sort 
being that of trope, or abstract particular. This would imply that 
Williams is not insisting that every trope is absolutely simple.3 A trope 
may have other tropes as constituents, among these, one or more 
relation tropes. Remember also that, according to the second half of 
the trope definition, concrete particulars may also be among the 
constituents of a trope. 
An important issue is whether abstractness and concreteness are 
thought of as properties. If that is indeed the case, one would expect 
them to exist in the form of tropes. Williams seems a bit uncertain on 
what his view on this matter is. 
A philosophy of tropes calls for completion in a dozen 
directions at once. Some of these I must ignore for the 
present because the questions would take us too far, some 
because I do not know the answers. Of the first sort 
would be a refinement and completion of our account of 
substances and of the similarity manifold. Of the second 
sort would be an assimilation of the very categories of our 
theory — concurrence, similarity, abstractness, and so 
forth — to the theory itself, as tropes like the rest, instead 
                                                                                                   
and a particular. As for the ‘'’ (of ‘r'’) it might be a misprint. These niceties 
have little relevance for the present issue though. 
1 Evidently, ‘they’ refers to what are described as the primary constituents of 
the world. 
2 Williams 1953a, p. 7. 
3 Though perhaps far-fetched, one thought is that he is contemplating there 
being atomic tropes, i.e., entities which are absolutely simple, as well as tropes 
which are bottomless. The latter would be atomless gunk à la Lewis. Cf. 
Lewis 1990, p. 20. 
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of relegating them to the anomalous immunities of 
“transcendentals” (as the old Scholastics said) and “meta-
language” (as the new scholastics say).1 
Concurrence, similarity and abstractness are explicitly said to be 
amongst the categories. The ‘and so forth’ indicates that there are 
others as well. It is not maintained here that the very categories of the 
theory should be assimilated to the theory itself; though it is not 
waved aside either. With regard to concurrence and similarity we saw 
the assimilation being made in the quotation before the last one. 
What about abstractness and concreteness then? Well, some support 
can be found for the suspicion that even these are thought of as being 
properties. 
That there is an x which is gray and square and concrete 
means the fact about the universals Gray and Square (and 
Concretion) that they concur […].2 
Here, Williams seems to be caught red-handed treating concreteness 
as a universal. That does not mean that he is a realist all of a sudden.3 
Though it does mean that he takes concreteness to be a property; 
being a property, it should appear in the form of tropes. He 
apparently places concreteness on a par with grayness and squareness. 
The two latter are surely considered to occur as tropes. What holds 
for concreteness supposedly also does so for abstractness.  
Now we turn to tropes, which as indicated in the second half of 
the trope definition, have concrete entities as constituents. A short 
list, presented immediately after the definition, supplies an example of 
these. 
                                                     
1 Williams 1953a, p. 13. 
2 Williams 1963, p. 621.  
3 More will be said below about what might be the intended meaning of 
‘universal’. 
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Thus a cat and the cat’s tail are not tropes, but a cat’s smile 
is a trope, and so is the whole whose constituents are the 
cat’s smile plus her ears and the aridity of the moon.1 
We see here that the smile of a cat plus its ears plus the aridity of the 
moon make up a trope.2 Let us not fail to note a certain implication 
of this: the constituents of a trope need not be located at the same 
spot. Although one would expect to find the smile and ears of one 
and the same cat quite near each other, the aridity of the moon is, as a 
rule, far away from both of them.3 How are these three entities 
supposed to form a trope? The actual wording used suggests that 
what we have here is a mereological sum of them. In at least two 
earlier quotations it has been implied that complex tropes have con-
stitutive relations. The relation in this particular case would appear to 
be mereological summation. I remind readers of the phrase used in 
the trope definition: ‘in combination with’. We have also come across 
yet another word: ‘cum’. 
The color-cum-shape is less abstract or more concrete or 
more nearly concrete than the color alone but it is more 
abstract or less concrete than color-plus-shape-plus-
flavor.4 
Since ‘plus’ and ‘cum’ obviously are used here as alternatives to each 
other and the latter is Latin for ‘combined with’, I presume all three 
are used as synonyms.  
                                                     
1 William 1953a, p. 7. Perhaps he is still thinking on the Cheshire cat. Cf. 
Williams 1931, p. 589. Anyhow, this make-believe of a smiling cat seems 
quite harmless. 
2 Never mind that this is, very strictly speaking, in conflict with the actual 
wording of the second half of the trope definition. It is stipulated there that a 
combination of any number of concreta together with one abstractum makes 
up a trope. The mixed trope on the list consists of two abstracta and one 
concretum — or, perhaps two concreta, since the ears are two in number. It 
is safe to assume though that this objection is too finicky. 
3 There is no indication that this particular cat is effectuating a successful trip 
to the moon. 
4 Williams 1953a, p. 6. 
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In Williams 1953a there is a reference made to the calculus of 
individuals, as it is developed in Leonard & Goodman 1940.1 There is 
also a reference to it in Williams 1986. This strengthens the 
impression that mereological principles are considered to be relevant. 
The latter reference occurs in connection with the mention of the 
sum of a thread on a bolt and the Queen of Sheba.2 Although this 
sum is explicitly said to be a particular, it is not evident whether it is a 
trope or not. It depends on the status of the thread. Either way the 
implication is that the constituents of a particular need not be simul-
taneous. The passage referring to mereology reads: 
That the category of abstract particulars thus indicated 
conforms to the logic of whole and part, or the so-called 
calculus of individuals, that they have logical sums and 
products, and so forth, and that being by definition finer 
or lesser parts than the concreta in which they occur they 
are in an important sense the ‘elements of being’, I once 
argued in print in the Review of Metaphysics,3 where I called 
them ‘tropes’, which has a nice historical connection with 
the Latin ‘modes’.4  
Unfortunately, not much is said explicitly here about the actual 
formation of tropes. We are just informed that abstract particulars 
have logical sums, products, and so forth, but not that tropes can be 
sums. I think the latter is implied by the collected indicia. James van 
Cleve proposes the name ‘mereological conjunctivism’ for a doctrine 
according to which any entities can form a mereological sum.5 To the 
extent Williams concurs with this, he is a mereological conjunctivist.  
From what has been brought forward so far, it certainly looks 
like mereology is part of Williams’ conception of trope theory. In 
                                                     
1 Cf. Williams 1953a, p. 9n. 
2 Cf. Williams 1986, p. 3. 
3 Williams 1953a and 1953b. 
4 Williams 1986, p. 4. Nothing further is said regarding the alleged historical 
connection between the two terms. To me it seems primarily onomatopoetic.  
5 Cf. van Cleve 1986, p. 3. 
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section 2.3.4 this is given additional support. It will also be evident 
though that his affair with mereology is somewhat ambiguous.  
I would like to end this section with the following statement. 
I have found that, like most fundamental ideas, the idea of 
the trope is alternately treated by the professors as 
insignificantly obvious and as unintelligibly paradoxical. All 
the while, however, […] it has been implicitly admitted by 
most philosophers and by common sense, in as much as 
they constantly speak of entities which in fact can be 
categorized only as tropes (events, sensations, processes, 
and so forth) and has been explicitly admitted by many 
(including G. F. Stout, Professor Wilfrid Sellars, and the 
Aristotle depicted by him and neo-Thomists).1 
The enumeration made here does not explicitly mention instances of 
qualities and relations, though I assume that they are among the 
entities referred to by ‘and so forth’.  
2.3.4 Concrete Particulars 
An objection frequently made against mereology as an analytical tool 
of ontology, is that it is too blunt. The specific charge is that it leaves 
out relations and the roles they play in structured entities. Williams 
also puts forward an objection of that kind. To that purpose he 
presents an example, with a hammer and some hammer parts as 
props. Imagine a hammer named ‘Hamlin’, which has a head and a 
handle named ‘Hedder’ and ‘Hannel’ respectively as its parts. Imagine 
also another head, named ‘Hud’ and another handle, named ‘Hon’. 
Hedder and Hud are exactly similar to each other, as are Hannel and 
Hon. While Hedder and Hannel form a hammer together, Hud and 
Hon do not. Instead of being on Hon, in the appropriate way to form 
a hammer, Hud is cemented along the side of Hon. Williams now 
says: 
[A]lthough the mere sum of Hud and Hon is inherently 
exactly similar to the mere sum of Hedder and Hannel, the 
                                                     
1 Williams 1986, p. 4. 
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queer object which Hud and Hon compose — call it 
‘Himmler’ — is inherently very unlike Hamlin, and is 
indeed not even a hammer. This situation, I suggest, 
represents one possible meaning and justification for the 
common formula, “A whole is more than the (mere) sum 
of its parts.”1 
From this it is concluded that a thing, for example a hammer, does 
not consist solely of its non-relational elements. At least some of the 
relations it involves are also important. However, it is not sufficient 
to just add what in fact are relevant relations in a situation.  
Though in a certain sense we may properly say that 
Hamlin “consists of” Hedder, Hannel, and such and such 
relations, we have not specified its constitution, have not 
given its analysis, till we append that the relation holds 
from Hedder to Hannel. This, I take it, is the second of 
the truths which somewhat justify “The whole is more 
than the sum of its parts (and more, even, than the sum of 
its parts with their relations).” What one normally means 
by “the whole of parts a and b,” I think, is the object 
which thus combines a and b and their relations, bonded, as 
it were, by the fact that the relations are theirs; and such 
wholes, and not mere sums at all, are what pass as “sums” 
in the calculus of individuals, whose laws are in fact not 
true of mere sums.2 
The actual relating of a constituting relation is essential when 
analysing a whole. If it is left out, the result of the analysis is just 
another mere sum. The actual relatings of the relevant relations are 
not sufficient either. This appears from the following intellectual 
experiment. Imagine the sum of Hud, Hon and the relations holding 
between Hedder and Hannel. The relations of this sum are obviously 
of the right sort. However, these do not actually hold between Hud 
                                                     
1 Williams 1963, p. 604. 
2 Williams 1963, p. 605. 
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and Hon. Since they do not hold, this sum does not constitute a 
hammer.1  
Note that the sense in which the term ‘whole’ is commonly used 
allegedly involves the relations actually holding between the other 
parts of the whole. Furthermore, in the last sentence of the last 
quotation it is declared that the laws of mereology, as formulated in 
the calculus of individuals, are true only of such wholes. Williams is 
wrong about the latter though.2 Apart from that, it is important to 
note that he insists on including relations and their relating in the 
analysis of wholes as well. Applied to the trope mentioned above — 
the one having the smile and ears of a cat as its parts as well as the 
aridity of the moon — it includes the relations holding between the 
enumerated constituents too. Thus, the structure formed by the latter 
together with all or some of the relations holding between them form 
the trope in question. This should be the case given that the trope is 
not just a mere sum of its constituent parts.  
Williams also says things which might express another view. 
Ponder upon the following statement about the squares, rows and 
columns of a certain whole: 
In the accompanying figure […] the class of six squares, 
the class of three rows, and the class of two columns are 
different from each other and from the one figure; but the 
sum of squares, the sum of rows, and the sum of columns 
are identical with one another and with the whole.3 
                                                     
1 Cf. Williams 1963, p. 605. 
2 In Williams 1963 no explicit reference is made to the calculus of individuals 
of Leonard & Goodman 1940. On the basis of the reference made to it in 
Williams 1953a, p. 9n, and that there is no other mereological calculus called 
by that name, I presume it is what is referred to also in Williams 1963. 
According to postulate I.1 of that calculus the individuals of a set always 
form a sum. Although this postulate does not stipulate that this sum is 
unique, the latter is indeed a theorem of the calculus. Furthermore, a sum of 
the parts of a genuine whole has no articulated structure which mirrors that 
of the whole. In Williams’ example the whole is a hammer. 
3 Williams 1953a, p. 9. The three keywords used here — i.e., ‘square’, ‘row’ 
and ‘column’ — make it possible to divide the figure in still more ways than 
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Here, it is asserted that the whole, i.e. the figure, is not only identical 
to the sum of the squares, but also with the sum of the rows as well 
as with the sum of the columns. Due to identity being transitive, the 
three sums are identical with each other. Nothing is said, at least not 
explicitly, about the spatial relations holding between the squares as 
well as those between the rows and those between the columns. This 
suggests that a whole is supposed to be a unique sum of its parts no 
matter how the whole is divided into parts.  
Williams’ use of the metaphor ‘the alphabet of being’ is not an 
isolated incident. Another metaphor like it is ‘the syllabary of being’. 
What is said in connection with the introduction of this part of the 
ontological grammar also presents information hitherto not revealed. 
Turning now briefly from the alphabet of being to a 
glimpse of its syllabary, we observe two fundamental ways 
in which tropes may be connected with one another: the 
way of location and the way of similarity. These are 
categorially different and indeed systematic counterparts of 
one another — mirror images, as it were. Location is 
external in the sense that a trope per se does not entail or 
necessitate or determine its location with respect to any 
other trope, while similarity is internal in the sense that, 
given two tropes, there are entailed or necessitated or 
determined whether and how they are similar.1 
The role assigned to spatio-temporal location in the constitution of 
objects is of particular interest here.2 More exactly, the role assigned 
                                                                                                   
the ones intended by Williams. It is quite obvious though which squares, 
rows and columns he is referring to. 
1 Williams 1953a, p. 7. 
2 Besides spatial and temporal locations there are others, which are hinted at 
like this: 
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to the limiting value of location in space and time is worthy of note. 
This relation Williams finds in other philosophers. Some of them are 
mentioned, as well as the names they propose for the relation in 
question. 
[T]he collocation, or peculiar interpenetration, the unique 
congress in the same volume, which we call “belonging to 
(or inhering in, or characterizing) the same thing.” With 
various interests and intentions, this nexus has been 
mentioned by Russell as “compresence,” by Mill as “co-
inherence,” by G. F. Stout as “concrescence,” by Pro-
fessor Goodman as “togetherness,” and by Whitehead, 
Keynes, and Mill again as “concurrence.”1 
The term Williams prefers is ‘concurrence’. A description of it in 
action reads: 
Speaking roughly, […] the set or sum of tropes concurrent 
with a trope, such as our color component Harlac, is the 
concrete particular or “thing” which it may be said to 
“characterize,” in our example the lollipop Heraplem, or, 
to simplify the affair, the knob of the lollipop at a 
moment.2 
The doctrine, stated in part here, is a bit more complicated than it 
may appear at first. Recall what was said in a footnote earlier 
regarding degrees of concreteness: the concreteness of a lollipop 
involves time, not just space.3 Describing Heraplem as the sum of a 
                                                                                                   
Location is easiest thought of as position in physical space-time, 
but I intend the notion to include also all the analogous spreads 
and arrangements which we find in different conscious fields and 
indeed in any realm of existence which we can conceive — the 
whole interior stretch and structure of a Leibnizian monad, for 
example. (Williams 1953a, pp. 7-8) 
1 Williams 1953a, p. 8. Cf. Russell 1948, pp. 294-7; Stout 1930, p. 389; 
Goodman 1951, p. 178; Whitehead 1926, pp. 157-8; Keynes 1921, p. 385; 
Mill 1856, p. 67. 
2 Williams 1953a, p. 9. 
3 Cf. Williams 1953b, pp. 173-4.  
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number of tropes concurrent with each other, two of these being 
Harlac and Hamis, is simplistic. This is indicated by the remark made 
at the end of the last quotation and corroborated by what is stated in 
the next. 
[T]he actual events which comprise the existence of the 
watch wheel now before me on the table are numerically 
as distinct from those which comprise the wheel inside the 
watch ten minutes ago, or back inside the watch again two 
hours from now, as any of these is from my fingers or 
from Jupiter. Their community consists logically of only a 
continuity of similar events or similar states strung 
between.1 
Evidently, the implication here is that the tropes which make up the 
watch wheel at one moment are not the same ones which do so at 
another moment. Applied to Heraplem, this means that Harlac and 
Hamis are constituents of it all right, but only for a moment of its 
existence. In the last sentence of the last quotation we learn that the 
watch wheel is a continuity of similar entities strung together. This 
also applies to Heraplem. I take it that a moment is the limiting 
period of time; i.e., it is not more than a temporal point. 
From what has been reported so far one might suspect that 
Williams is a four-dimensionalist. That this is in fact so is evident 
from his assertion in another article: 
I believe that the universe consists, without residue, of the 
spread of events in space-time, and that if we thus accept 
realistically the four-dimensional fabric of juxtaposed 
actualities we can dispense with all those dim-factual 
categories which have so bedevilled our race: the potential, 
the subsistential, and the influential, the noumenal, the 
numinous, and the non-natural.2 
I will not make any in-depth study of the view expressed here since it 
is not worked out in any detail by Williams; I mention it as a point of 
                                                     
1 Williams 1953b, p. 178. 
2 Williams 1951, p. 458. 
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information. Note though that four-dimensionalism combined with 
the trope definition makes things a bit messy with regard to the 
temporal duration of a trope. Although some tropes — such as 
Harlac, Hamis, Bantic, Borcas etc. — have an extremely short life-
time, not more than instantaneous, other entities which are tropes by 
Williams’ standards may be as long-lived as the Universe itself.  
A bit of reasoning on logical type brings about the conclusion 
that concrete particulars are sums, rather than sets or classes of 
concurrent tropes.1 For the sake of safety, I let Williams speak for 
himself: 
What a difference of logical “type” amounts to, parti-
cularly in the philosophy of tropes, is far from clear, but 
everybody agrees that a sum is of the same type with its 
terms, as a whole is of the same type with its parts, a man 
of the same type with his arms and legs. The concept of a 
class or set, on the other hand, is notably more complex 
and questionable. A class is surely not, in any clear sense, 
what it is often called, “an abstract entity,” but there is 
some excuse for considering it of a different “type” from 
its members. Convinced that tropes compose a concretum 
in a manner logically no different from that in which any 
other exhaustive batch of parts compose it, we have every 
incentive to say that the concretum is not the set but the 
sum of the tropes; and let us so describe it.2 
This confirms what was claimed earlier: abstract particulars are 
thought of as being parts of things in the same sense that concrete 
entities are parts of things. We also learn here that since a concrete 
particular is a concurrence sum of tropes, each constituting trope is of 
the same logical type as the including whole. Tropes’ being abstract 
entities does not make them a different type of entities than concrete 
entities. Very little is said though about the notion of logical type 
itself. Among what is said is that the whole matter is unclear when it 
comes to tropes. This does not stop Williams from being certain that 
                                                     
1 In this context an explicit reference is made to Leonard & Goodman 1940. 
2 Williams 1953a, pp. 9-10. 
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concrete particulars are sums of their parts, though, or that amongst 
these parts are tropes.1 Below it will be seen that he also believes 
there are substance, or substantial, tropes. Unfortunately, very few 
examples of such substantial tropes are mentioned explicitly. Among 
the ones which are mentioned are the humanity tropes. 
                                                     
1 It might be of interest to hear what Peter Simons, a fellow trope theorist of 
Williams, says regarding mereological composition.  
[Mereological] [c]omposition is always intracategorial. Provided 
we are entitled in some way to consider all objects as belonging 
to a single universe of discourse, the Universe, then assuming 
there is more than one category, there are limitations on the 
universality of composition. The principal motivation for this 
restriction is that otherwise there would be objects which them-
selves straddle categories, hybrid monsters like a thing which is 
part substance, part event, part universal, part state of affairs, and 
so on. Against such monsters, the chimeras, gryphons, wyverns, 
and so on, of myth and heraldry pale into insignificance. If there 
are such monsters, they violate the separateness of categories. 
While they are not as a whole in two or more mutually exclusive 
categories, they are almost as bad, since they are entities but they 
do not belong in either. At the very least they would require us to 
set up a ramified system of additional hermaphrodite categories. 
It is far better for classification to simply deny the existence of 
monsters, and provided it is metaphysically acceptable and 
semantically congruous to talk in one phrase of things from 
different categories, this entails denying universal composition. 
(Simons 2006, p. 605) 
When this is applied to trope theory, in its bundle form, he claims that the 
result is the following. 
If, as I do, one accepts a trope-bundle theory of substance […] 
then it would appear that an object composed wholly of things 
from one category, namely the category of TROPE, can be of 
another category SUBSTANCE. If that is right, then there is at 
least one kind of category-crossing composition, and the Verbot 
on category-crossing composition is wrong. This is a good 
argument, but for a different conclusion. It is a good reason to 
deny that there is a categorial distinction between tropes and 
substances. Tropes and substances both belong together in a 
single category, that of individual THING. Without going into 
details here, there are a number of solid metaphysical advantages 
to down-grading the substance/trope distinction to an intra-
categorial one. (Simons 2006, p. 605, footnote 29) 
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We saw earlier that a whole is considered to be something other 
than just a mere sum of its parts. When making an ontological assay 
of a whole, interior relations1 are as relevant as non-relational con-
stituents. It would seem then that concurrence is such an interior 
relation. Therefore, to start with, Heraplem is a concurrence sum of 
Harlac, Hamis and a number of other quality tropes as well as rela-
tional and substantial tropes — instead of a mere sum of them. Being 
temporally extended, Heraplem can also be described as a sequence 
of concurrence sums of tropes; this sequence in itself also being a 
sum. Spatio-temporal continuity should therefore be a constituting 
relation as well. Perhaps, mereological summation is another, though 
it is hard to say for sure since Williams is silent on this matter. 
Before I move on to the issue of surrogates for universals, I 
would like to return to something which was said in passing earlier. I 
am referring to the thesis that tropes are existentially independent of 
each other as well as of their including wholes.  
The real question then is whether an entity which is 
“abstract” in the sense that it is conjoined in a certain con-
cretum with other abstracta, as the shape of a watch is, for 
example, may be duplicated elsewhere by an entity 
precisely similar internally but not thus conjoined with2 
anything. Our instincts say “No,” that there is a sort of 
cosmic standard of concreteness, a certain degree of 
richness or thickness, which perhaps is a general maximum 
that nothing can exceed, but which at any rate is a general 
maximum that an entity must attain in order, as the 
Scholastics say, “to be apt for existence,” or that, in 
Aristotle’s phrase, it “can exist apart.” Plausible though it 
be, however, that a color or a shape cannot exist by itself, I 
think we have to reject the notion of a standard concrete-
ness. For it means that from the awareness of even the 
thinnest abstraction, and indeed the thinner the better, we 
could deduce the presence of the rest of a concretum, if 
not its specific character then at least that there is a 
                                                     
1 The term ‘interior relation’ is introduced in Williams 1963, p. 610. 
2 ‘Conjoined with’ is used here as a synonym of ‘concurrent with’.  
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concretum there, as Descartes deduced from a conscious 
state the existence of a spiritual substance in which it 
inhered. It seems to me an analytic principle that all deduc-
tion must be analytic, so that while any proper component 
is deducible from its compositum, no compositum is 
deducible from any of its proper components, and hence 
that abstracta must in principle be as independent of their 
contexts as concreta are.1 
Williams invokes the principle saying that the parts of an including 
whole are deducible from the whole, while the whole cannot be 
deduced from its parts. This seems all right. But, does it rule out the 
possibility that existential dependence holds between the parts of a 
whole? I would say that the notion of existential dependence is 
intimately related to that of universality. Therefore, if two entities are 
existentially dependent on each other, this is due to their universal 
contents. The nominalist Williams does not recognise (real) uni-
versals; he must therefore deny any such dependence between parti-
culars, at least between entities which do not have any parts in 
common.  
2.3.5 Surrogates for Universals 
Since Williams is a nominalist, he renounces (real) universals. He 
requires something to do the work of universals, though. From an 
earlier quotation we know that similarity is considered to be one of a 
few fundamental ways in which tropes may be connected to each 
other. It is also a key notion in his construal of “universality”. Its role 
in this respect is indicated thus. 
Speaking roughly, […], the set or sum of tropes precisely 
similar to a given trope, say Harlac […], is the abstract 
universal or “essence” which it may be said to exemplify, 
in our illustration a definite shade of Redness.2 
                                                     
1 Williams 1953b, pp. 179-80. 
2 Williams 1953a, p. 9. 
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The proposal is to take similarity sets as surrogates for universals. In 
the particular case presented here the elements of the set are the 
tropes exactly similar to Harlac. This set is described as being an 
abstract universal. Note that this is not due to the set itself being 
abstract. It has already been shown that Williams does not consider 
sets to be abstract entities. I repeat the relevant sentence where this is 
stated: 
A class is surely not, in any clear sense, what it is often 
called, “an abstract entity,” but there is some excuse for 
considering it of a different “type” from its members.1 
The term actually used here is ‘class’ — not ‘set’. I dare say that even 
if he considers there to be a distinction between set and class, it is not 
likely that one of them is thought of as being abstract and the other 
not. The conclusion to draw from this then is that sets are not 
abstract entities. Incidentally, this suggests that they are concrete 
entities. If being abstract and being concrete form an exhaustive 
dichotomy, they must be. But, in what sense is a set of tropes which 
are exactly similar to each other a concrete entity?  
Since a set is not abstract in itself, the adjective ‘abstract’, in 
‘abstract universal’, is used on the basis of something else due to its 
elements being abstract entities.  
The alternative hinted at in a previous quotation concerning 
treating sums of exactly similar tropes as abstract universals, is in fact 
rejected by Williams. This happens shortly after it has been presented:  
Whether the […] concept of the universal can be defined 
as the sum of similars — all merely grammatical difficulties 
aside — is not so clear. There is little doubt that the set or 
class will do the job. For all the paradoxes which attend 
the fashionable effort to equate the universal Humanity, 
for example, with the class of concrete men (including 
such absurdities as that being a featherless biped is then 
the same as having a sense of humor) disappear when we 
equate it rather with our new set, the class of abstract 
                                                     
1 Williams 1953a, p. 10. 
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humanities — the class whose members are not Socrates, 
Napoleon, and so forth, but the human trope in Socrates, 
the one in Napoleon, and so forth.1 
Besides the so-called abstract universal there is the concrete universal. 
The relevant difference between them is the status of their elements. 
Concrete particulars are the elements of concrete universals. Williams 
calls attention to what he calls ‘Socratesity’ as being an example of the 
latter.  
Socrates is a concrete particular; the component of him 
which is his wisdom is an abstract particular or “trope”; 
the total Wisdom of which all such wisdoms are com-
ponents or members is an abstract universal; and the total 
Socratesity of which all creatures exactly like him are parts 
or members is a “concrete universal,” not in the idealistic 
but in a strictly accurate sense.2 
If ‘Socrates’ refers to the Socrates known from Plato’s dialogues, 
chances are that Socratesity is a unit set.3 One may wonder what the 
usefulness of this so-called universal is supposed to be. Perhaps, 
Williams just wants to see the matrix — introduced in Williams 1931 
in a realistic version — completed. Here, the matrix is interpreted 
nominalistically.   
The abstract humanities are to be found among the abstract 
particulars. We get a glimpse of them in the quotation before the last 
one. Since they are exactly similar to each other, they cannot be 
constituted by the other tropes of (concrete) human beings. For 
example, the trope or tropes constituting Napoleon’s haircut cannot 
be components of the humanity trope in Napoleon which constitute 
him when combined with other tropes. The simple reason for this is 
                                                     
1 Williams 1953a, p. 10. It is confirmed here that no distinction is made 
between set and class.  
2 Williams 1953a, p. 11. ‘Component’ and ’part’ are used here according to 
the stipulation made earlier in the article.  
3 A modal realist, of David Lewis’ sort, would of course disagree. According 
to him or her, the Socrates of our world has infinitely many exactly similar 
counterparts in other possible worlds. 
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that his haircut does not exactly resemble, among others, the haircut 
of the Queen of Sheba. The same holds for any arbitrary trait of a 
concrete particular.  
In earlier sections we have touched upon instances of sub-
stantial forms. I very much suspect that the humanity tropes, 
explicitly recognized in Williams 1953a,1 are thought of as being such 
instances. Each concrete particular, which is a human being, must 
have its own exemplar cases of this surrogate universal. The plural is 
motivated by the assumption that humanity tropes are instantaneous 
entities.  
Williams takes the set having all the tropes of a definite shade of 
redness as elements and the set whose elements are all the humanity 
tropes to be abstract universals. The elements of sets such as these 
are thought of as exemplifying the set in question. Correspondingly, 
this holds for sets having exactly similar concrete particulars as 
elements; if there are any such non-unit sets. In other words, exempli-
fication is identified with being an element of a similarity set. Williams 
also expands on characterisation, which may be regarded as the 
converse of exemplification. 
The particular wisdom in Socrates [i] is in one sense a 
“characteristic,” i.e., it is a component, of him — this is 
the sense in which Stout held, quite properly to my way of 
thinking, that “characters are abstract particulars which are 
predicable of concrete particulars.” The universal Wisdom 
[ii] is in the second sense the “characteristic” of each such 
wisdom — this is the sense in which Moore could hold 
plausibly that even an event such as a sneeze, has 
characteristics and is not one. [iii] In the third or ordinary 
sense, however, the universal Wisdom “characterizes” the 
whole Socrates. From this imbroglio emerge at least two 
senses of “instance,” the sense in which Socrates is a 
(concrete) “instance” of Wisdom and that in which his 
wisdom component is an (abstract) “instance” of it, and 
the two notions of class, the ordinary concreta class 
consisting of Socrates, Plato, and all other whole wise 
                                                     
1 They are also mentioned in Williams 1986, p. 7. 
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creatures, and the abstracta class of their wisdoms, our 
similarity set.1 
I have inserted the Roman numerals here to accentuate the use of 
‘characteristic’ — and ‘characterise’ — in three different ways.2 Thus: 
(i) The particular wisdom wise1 is a characteristic of Socrates. wise1 is 
predicable of Socrates.  
(ii) The universal wisdom is a characteristic of wise1. The universal 
wisdom is also a characteristic of wise2,…,wisen. 
(iii) The universal wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates.  
If the meaning of ‘the universal wisdom’, as it is used here, is made 
explicit in terms of exact similarity sets, the result is as follows. That 
the universal wisdom is a characteristic of wise1 means that 
Sim{wise1,…,wisen} is a characteristic of wise1. That the universal 
wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates means that Sim{wise1,…,wisen} 
is a characteristic of Socrates. On the face of it, this seems ludicrous. I 
suppose that, given the nominalistic presuppositions of Williams’ 
trope theory, it should be reinterpreted as follows. That 
Sim{wise1,…,wisen} is a characteristic of wise1 means that wise1 is an 
element of Sim{wise1, wisen}. As stated earlier, this is Williams’ 
analysis of exemplification. The trope wise1 exemplifies Sim{wise1, 
wisen}. Sim{wise1,…,wisen} being a characteristic of Socrates means 
that Socrates has a component which is an element of 
Sim{wise1,…,wisen}. Some of the content of the proposed inter-
pretation can be found immediately before the last quotation: 
“Socrates is wise,” or generically “a is φ,” means that the 
concurrence sum (Socrates) includes a trope which is a 
member of the similarity set (Wisdom).3 
In an earlier quotation similarity was declared to be a fundamental 
way of being connected.1 The choice of the word ‘fundamental’ here 
                                                     
1 Williams 1953a, p. 12. 
2 I take the liberty of transforming the noun ‘characteristic’ into the verb 
‘characterise’. 
3 Williams 1953a, p. 11. 
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signals that similarity has a special significance. It is not just any 
relation. This is supported by what he asserts in the two following 
quotations. Similarity is ascribed a founding capacity.  
At this stage we conjecture that we are much less likely to 
explain similarity as due to the presence of a common or 
general constituent than to explain the notion of a 
common or general constituent as somehow a resultant of 
similarity — a procedure to which, in fact, I was 
committed as soon as I laid it down that similarity is an 
irreducible and categorical element.2 
Similarity as the result of a common constituent in relata is explicitly 
rejected here. Instead, similarity is declared to be a prerequisite for 
their having a common constituent. This suggests that resemblance 
nominalism is the presupposed doctrine. In fact, Williams comments 
on the matter of his being a (resemblance) nominalist. According to 
his own standards he is a realist. 
[I]f ‘Nominalism’ is the view for which the notion of 
universals is composed of or displaced by the applicability 
of the same name to each of similar objects, the trope-kind 
theory is very near to a sort of nominalism. Perhaps the 
real issue here turns into one between those who think 
resemblance is an irreducible and objective ontological 
category and those who believe that it is not objective or 
fundamental but a creature of our comparisons. The latter 
view is the distilled attar of Nominalism, the former, is the 
head and fount of Realism. I have pledged us to the 
objective theory, and I believe in fact that the subjective or 
creationist theory of resemblance is itself a fantastic fiction 
which cannot bear the weight of any considerable philo-
sophy, but I cannot forgo remarking that the superiority of 
the trope-kind theory would not be immediately affected 
                                                                                                   
1 Cf. Williams 1953a, p. 7. 
2 Williams 1986, p. 6. 
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by a shift from an objective to a subjective doctrine of 
resemblance.1 
The reasoning here circuits resemblance and its status. The so-called 
realism he professes consists in taking resemblance to be objective 
and irreducible. Evidently, if he wants to be a real realist, not just in 
name, he must consider it to be a universal as well. He will of course 
decline to do that.  
What does the irreducibility of resemblance amount to? Well, 
literally it means that of not being reducible to anything else. In line 
with that would be to consider resemblance to be an entity in itself — 
an increase of being. Alluding to a certain sacerdotal word of wisdom, 
it can be said then that it is what it is and not something else. The 
latter part of this statement, that it is not something else, is parti-
cularly significant since it quite clearly indicates that it is not reducible 
to something else. 
There are also traces of another view though. Similarity is said 
to be nothing in addition to its relata. I take it that this implies that it 
is not an increase of being. The following quotation is where this 
view is most clearly expressed. In the accompanying figure, W, we see 
the entities referred to in the text by the letters ‘A’ and ‘B’.2 
Some relations, the intrinsic3 ones like the resemblance of 
A and B, are not additional to but involved in or given with 
them and their sum, though there are other relations, the 
extrinsic ones, like the distance between A and B, their 
dash connection; and their whole relation rope,4 which in 
                                                     
1 Williams 1986, pp. 10-1. 
2 Also in this example Williams’ delight at names exposes itself. ‘Sqay’ and 
‘Rectanga’ are the names of the squareness and rectangularity respectively of 
A; ‘Grabe’, ‘Squabe’ and ‘Rectamba’ name the squareness, rectangularity and 
grayness respectively of B; ‘Grace’ is the name of the grayness of C; ‘Whide’ 
is the name of the whiteness of D. No names are given to any instances of 
relations which are involved.   
3 In Williams 1963 ‘intrinsic’ is used instead of ‘internal’. ‘Extrinsic’ is likewise 
used instead of ‘external’. 
4 ‘Relation rope’ denotes the totality of relations holding between the relata in 
question. 
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the same sense are additional to A and B and their sum 
[…].1 
 W 
   A  B 
   C D 
 
 
The message here seems to be that the internal relations between A 
and B are nothing in themselves.2 An internal relation would then not 
be an increase of being. This should apply to similarity as well. This is 
incompatible with its being fundamental and irreducible.  
A variation on the theme that internal relations are not addi-
tional to their relata is frequently used nowadays to describe them as 
supervening on relata.3 There is also a culinary metaphor: internal 
relations are ontologically free lunches.4 A justified comment on that 
                                                     
1 Williams 1963, p. 608. 
2 I have noticed that Anna-Sofia Maurin, whose moderate nominalism is 
discussed in the following chapter, also interprets the message of the last 
quotation as I do. She uses it as a motto for section 3.8 of Maurin 2002, in 
which she argues for an account of similarity as being pseudo-additional to its 
relata. 
3 E.g. David Armstrong is fond of using the term ‘supervenience’, and its 
cognates, in this connection. A representative assertion coming from him is 
the following. 
It will be used as a premiss in this work that whatever supervenes 
or, as we can also say, is entailed or necessitated, in this way, is 
not something ontologically additional to the subvenient, or 
necessitating, entity or entities. What supervenes is no addition of 
being. Thus, internal relations are not ontologically additional to 
their terms. (Armstrong 1997, p.12) 
Since the dictionary sense of ‘supervenient’ is that of ‘coming as something 
additional or extraneous’, this use of the word is a bit bewildering.  
4 An example of this is Maurin 2005, p. 138, where it is stated: 
Resemblance may be understood in one of two ways: either as a 
pseudo-addition or as a genuine relation-trope. Understood as 
pseudo-addition, resemblance is seen as a “free lunch”, i.e. it is 
considered as something we need not add to our ontological 
inventory.  
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seems to be that since no food is served, the low price is not much 
comfort. 
I move on to another issue concerning similarity. Williams 
might be contemplating a view which is in conflict with the similarity 
principle. 
With respect to similarity […] we are comparatively 
familiar with the notion of its limiting value, the precise, or 
almost precise, similarity such as obtained between the 
colors of our first and third lollipops, less familiar with the 
idea of the lesser similarity which obtains between a red 
and a purple, and rather uncertain, unless we are psycholo-
gists or phenomenologists, about such elaborate similarity 
distances and directions as are mapped on the color cone.1 
In connection with the introduction of the notions of partial simi-
larity and that of property case it was declared that the more subtle 
similarities, of colour, shape and flavour, should be treated in exactly 
the same way as those between other parts of things. Let us assume 
for a moment that the similarity principle is applicable to the example 
of a red and a purple.2 Since the two are not exactly similar, each of 
these has a component which is exactly similar to a component of the 
other. Since Williams does not mind tropes being complex entities, 
what he is contemplating might be that each one of these tropes has 
an instance of a certain determinable as a component. That would 
explain why they are partially similar. Now, the phrase actually used in 
the quotation is ‘lesser similarity, not ‘partial similarity’. Perhaps these 
denominations do not denote the same notion of similarity. If that is 
indeed so, how is the lesser similarity between a red and a purple to 
be interpreted? Before I try to approach an answer to that question, 
let me present another two quotations.  
Speaking roughly […] the set or sum of tropes precisely 
similar to a given trope, say Harlac […], is the abstract 
                                                     
1 Williams 1953a, p. 8. 
2 Evidently, what is referred to here by ‘a red’ and ‘a purple’ are two colour 
tropes. 
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universal or “essence” it may say to exemplify, in our 
illustration a definite shade of Redness. (The tropes 
approximately similar to the given one compose a less 
definite universal.)1 
In the last sentence, the one put in parentheses, we find another 
similarity term: ‘approximately similar’. In the following quotation 
there is yet another: ‘lesser resemblance’. 
If new modal observations are required for universals, they 
are of two closely analogous varieties. One is the relation 
between a relatively definite universal like Crimson and the 
“determinable” or less definite universal like Redness 
under which it falls. We must say, I believe, that Crimson 
“entails” Redness, not because Redness is a component of 
Crimson, but because the kind by which we define “Red-
ness” is constituted by a lesser resemblance, and hence a 
broader similarity stretch, or segment of the spectrum, 
than is the kind which defines “Crimson,” and the former 
stretch, in an obvious analogical sense, “includes” the 
latter.2 
What are we to make of this? Well, the last quotation seems to 
express a view on colours which is incompatible with the similarity 
principle. I base that on the combination of the assertion that redness 
is a determinable and the waving aside of the idea that it is a com-
ponent of crimson.  
What about the lesser similarity between a red and a purple? In 
the light of the last quotation, the suggestion is that the former is an 
                                                     
1 Williams 1953a, p. 9. 
2 Williams 1963, p. 617. I would like to make the following remark, which I 
think is at least worthy enough to appear in a footnote. If redness has 
crimson as a part (in any relevant sense), we seem to have here an example of 
a part “entailing” its including whole. This seems to be in conflict with the 
principle stated earlier: 
Part does not depend on part, nor whole on whole, nor part on 
whole, and that whole does depend on part is for the trivial 
reason that the whole is at least the sum of its parts. (Williams 
1953b, p. 189) 
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instance of a determinable.1 Another possibility is that redness is not 
considered to be a determinable in Williams 1953a, which is where 
the red and the purple are mentioned. It may very well be that ‘red-
ness’ is used there to refer to a lowest determinate. The essential 
question still remains: what would be an instance of a determinable? 
Is every instance of a lowest determinate also an instance of a number 
of determinables,2 without actually having the latter as constituents? 
This would mean that lesser similarity is not the same as partial 
similarity. If we let similarity be a (truly) primitive relation, founding 
the qualitative content of its relata, the relata need not have any inter-
nal structures. Then, the relata would be nodes in a similarity pattern.  
The picture might be more complicated. An alternative 
possibility is that there are entities, concrete particulars, which have 
internal qualitative structures. The content of the components which 
make up the structure of each entity would be due to their being 
nodes in similarity patterns though. These might be considered to be 
two possible versions of resemblance nominalism. According to one 
leading resemblance nominalist, resemblance nominalism is incom-
patible with the existence of tropes.3 Apart from that, we have seen 
that Williams shows a tendency towards a position which might at 
least be described as a resemblance nominalism in a wide sense. I am 
referring to his assertion that the presence of a common or general 
constituent is to be explained as a resultant of similarity. In connec-
tion with this, he also informs us that this is something he was 
committed to as soon as he laid it down that similarity is an irredu-
cible and categorical element.4 It would be in line with this view to 
consider sets of tropes where the elements have their qualitative 
content due to exact similarity holding between them, as surrogates 
for (real) abstract universals. Note that this would require a vast 
number of similarity relations. Given that these relations are (real) 
                                                     
1 According to the assertion in the quotation redness is a determinable in 
relation to crimson. Purple would then be a determinate in relation to red-
ness. 
2 This number can be expected to be large; perhaps infinite even. 
3 Cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002. 
4 Cf. Williams 1986, p. 6. 
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universals, there would in fact be one such relation for each exact 
similarity set. This is ruled out by Williams’ being a nominalist 
though. There must instead be as many instances of each specific 
exact similarity as there are pairs in each exact similarity set.1 This 
doctrine, applied to lesser similarity, stipulates one set of instances of 
each unspecific similarity relation per lesser similarity set. Many, if not 
all of the elements of exact similarity sets will also be elements of 
quite a few lesser similarity sets.  
So far, everything in the garden may appear to be lovely. How-
ever, there are some difficulties, which the outlined view will come up 
against as soon as the similarity relations are scrutinised. Since, 
according to the nominalistic confession, everything which exists is 
particular, each and every similarity is so as well. The other parti-
culars, those which are not similarity instances, have their qualitative 
contents due to their being nodes in similarity patterns. Reasonably, 
the same should apply to the similarity instances. If that is not so, one 
wonders why. After all, they too are abstract particulars — tropes. 
There is an obvious need for an account of their qualitative contents. 
What the doctrine must prescribe are more similarity instances. Since 
the direction of this regress is from the right to the left,2 the proposed 
mechanism will not succeed in delivering any qualitative content.  
The difficulty hinted at is well known. This may account for 
what I take to be Williams’ oscillating between different views. One 
of these being that similarity is no addition to its relata. He does not 
say much about it though. I think that we must leave this issue as far 
as he is concerned. However, Anna-Sofia Maurin advocates a view on 
similarity which is closely akin to that which we find traces of in 
Williams. Maurin’s ontology is discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 
                                                     
1 I assume here that exact similarity is dyadic. If its adicity is unlimited, the 
necessary number would, at least in the first time round, be reduced to one 
instance per exact similarity set.  
2 An alternative description is to say that the regress is analytical, which 
indicates that the analysis aimed for is postponed. Cf. Russell 1903, pp. 50-1. 
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2.3.6 Painless Realism 
I will say something about Williams’ so-called painless realism. I do not 
know if he ever called it by that name himself.1 However that may be, 
this “realism” takes universals to be the results of a relaxation of 
identity conditions.2 Here, it is particularly wise to let him speak for 
himself. 
That universals are not made nor discovered but are, as it 
were, ‘acknowledged’ by a relaxation of identity conditions 
of thought and language, will become attractive as we 
notice, for example, that similar relaxations occur in our 
treatment of ordinary proper names of concrete parti-
culars, especially in the common idiom which, innocent of 
the notion of temporal parts of a thing, finds the whole 
enduring object, a man or a stone, in each momentary 
stage of its history. For here and now, we say, is the person 
called ‘John’, not just part but all of him, and now again 
here is the same ‘John’, all present at another instant, 
though in strict ontology the ‘John’ of today is a batch of 
being as discrete from the ‘John’ of yesterday as he is from 
the moon. The relaxation of conditions which acknow-
ledges universals, however, and which I shall call ‘generiz-
ing’ (because ‘generalizing’ is commonly used not for con-
ceiving universals but for conceiving or asserting laws), is 
much more firmly seated in the facts of language and its 
object than any other I know.3 
There has been little indication of what is more or less explicitly 
expressed here with respect to the indication that a watch wheel at 
one moment in time is as numerically different from those that 
comprise it at later times. The watch wheel is said to be a continuity 
of similar events4 or states which are strung together.1 This sketches 
                                                     
1 Keith Campbell might be the inventor of it. Cf. Campbell 1990, pp. 43-5.  
2 A similar view is maintained by Ivar Segelberg.  
3 Williams 1986, pp. 8-9. 
4 Most likely, these events are thought of as slices of the “tube” which space 
and time supposedly together form.  
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out a temporal parts approach to concrete particulars. It is not more 
than a sketch though.  
I move on to what Williams says concerning “universals”. 
That universals are determined by a ‘weaker’ identity con-
dition than particulars does not even mean that they have 
an inferior or diluted reality. A tabulation of universals is 
just one way of counting, as it were, the same world which 
is counted, in a legitimately different and more discrimi-
nating way, in a tabulation of particulars. I stress this and 
the word ‘counting’ because they warn us off the delusion 
involved in the common use of the phrase ‘numerical 
identity’ and ‘numerical distinctness’ for particular identity 
and distinctness, respectively. The fact is rather that 
universals, including Numbers, are no less numerable than 
particulars — as when the interior decorator, for example, 
says ‘I used just four colors in this room’. For a similar 
reason, it was deceptive in my first pages above to contrast 
the case with the kind by contrasting the ‘this’ with the 
‘such’, because we can and do, as we say with ‘This is 
Whiteness’, use all the demonstratives, including ‘This’, for 
universals no less than for particulars, so that only the 
context will tell us, when a person refers to ‘that’ sound, 
whether he is talking particular-wise or universal-wise.2 
Disregarding most of the torrent of words here, my interpretation is 
that we are supposed to obtain a universal by identifying exactly simi-
lar entities. In other words, we are pretending that indiscernibles are 
identical. What might be called a ‘painless universal’ would then be 
any of the indiscernible entities of a certain set. Evidently, this does 
not in any way alter the fact that these indiscernible entities are not 
identical with each other in any strict sense. Strict identity would 
mean that there is just one single entity. It would be a (real) universal.  
Painless realism is obviously not the same doctrine as that 
according to which a universal is a set of (exactly) similar tropes. They 
are related though, which explains why Williams so easily oscillates 
                                                                                                   
1 Cf. Williams 1953b, p. 178.  
2 Williams 1986, pp. 8-9. 
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between them. Furthermore, he wants to describe his own onto-
logical position, the trope theory,1 as being an immanent realism. I 
take it that the amalgamation of painless realism and the other 
doctrine is what in effect is supposed to fit the description. 
As there is nothing in anything which is not either a trope 
or resoluble into tropes, so every trope, of whatever level 
of complexity, manifests its universal or kind. Generiza-
tion, moreover, does not even stop short of concreteness, 
and does not therefore in the least depend upon de facto 
similarity or the recurrence of kinds. That is, having a 
general readiness to contemplate, by the right quirk of 
attention or description, either the case or the kind of any 
given occasion, we can identify a universal once for all in a 
single instance, only conceiving ipso facto that it is capable 
of other instances. 
 The trope-kind theory is a logical realism in as much as 
it holds that universals are real entities, and it is an 
immanent realism in as much as it holds them to exist in 
rebus — to be present in, and in fact components of, their 
instances. To make plain the sense in which it holds that 
an abstract universal is ‘in’ a concrete particular we need 
only make explicit the analysis of predication, characteriza-
tion, or instantiation which has been barely implicit here 
all along. That Socrates is wise, i.e., that he is an instance 
of Wisdom, which is an ‘instantiation’ or ‘characterization’ 
in the full sense, is sufficiently expanded in the formula 
that the concrete particular Socrates ‘embraces’ an abstract 
particular (trope) which ‘manifests’ Wisdom. This 
describes predication for inherent characters; only a little 
less obvious is the adjustment which accommodates 
adherent characters, as in the proposition that Socrates is 
pupil of Plato. Here Pupil-of is the generization of a 
complex relation of which Socrates is referent, while 
‘Plato’, granted it is a true proper name, still stands for an 
ungenerized concretum — so that, rather oddly but not 
                                                     
1 In the article where the doctrine of painless realism is presented the name 
used is ‘trope-kind theory’. 
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objectionably, a character which as a whole is an abstract 
universal may include a concrete particular as a con-
stituent. No merely adherent universal, of course, is 
‘immanent’ in the sense that it inheres in its subject, but it 
still is ‘immanent’ and ‘in rebus’ in the cardinal metaphysical 
sense that it is among the things it qualifies.1 
Williams has his doubts whether immanent realists would recognise 
his doctrine as being an immanent realism.   
Whether previous immanent realists would recognize their 
view in this opinion that universals are immanent because 
they are, to speak crudely, the similarity roles (or ‘adjectival 
identities’) of abstract occurrences, I have some doubt. I 
am sure, from experience with myself,2 that an immanent 
realist begins by thinking he means more, but can bring 
himself to see, or think he sees, that he couldn’t mean more 
— that every attempt to state an alternative results in 
something verbally but not significantly different from just 
redefining ‘identity’ by resemblance.3 
Is he even a whole-hearted advocate of this so-called immanent 
realism? A few pages earlier in the same article it looks as if it is 
actually rejected. The context of this rejection makes it somewhat 
paradoxical. 
There remains the possibility, given the ideas of abstract 
and of concrete and of sum and of set, that Humanness be 
equated with, or supplanted by, the set of humanity tropes, 
and this I think is demonstratively adequate. […] Never-
theless, having dallied with it briefly, I reject it on the 
presently unfashionable ground that the set of tropes is 
not what I or any of the rest of us mean by ‘the universal 
character Humanness’, and it could not have been meant 
by persons who had no conception of trope sets, not by 
anyone who speaks of the universal being ‘in’ its instances, 
                                                     
1 Williams 1986, p. 10. 
2 Cf. the doctrines of Williams 1931. 
3 Williams 1986, p. 10. 
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nor by one who declares […] that universals (‘essences’, 
‘neutral entities’) both are the constituents of things and 
the data of perception. When I deny that any of these 
constructs is what we have ‘meant’, therefore, I put us to 
looking, in the light of the apparatus of tropes, at what 
does happen, and must always have happened, when we 
perceive or conceive the abstract universal in the concrete 
particular.1 
In this remarkable passage universals are first equated with, or 
supplanted by, sets of tropes, and this is alleged to be an adequate 
definition, then the whole thing is rejected on the grounds that it is 
psychologically inadequate.  
We saw it being asserted earlier that a universal can be identified 
once for all in a single instance. Evidently, the universal thought of 
here cannot be a class of exactly similar tropes. The simple reason for 
this is that sets are extensionally defined. So, what is the universal, if it 
is not a set? The alternatives seem to be either that it is a real 
universal or a painless universal. Among the indicia for the former 
alternative is the message of a somewhat obscure sentence:  
Thus Squabe2 entails Squareness and necessarily is square, 
because what we mean by “squareness,” though not 
strictly a part of Squabe, is just what remains, so to speak, 
when we have left out of account the so-called “numerical 
difference” of the tropes.3 
A distinction is made here between two “parts” of the trope Squabe. 
One of these is its numerical difference from other entities, or what 
accounts for it. The implication seems to be that the other part is 
squareness. Squareness would appear to be a real universal, since it 
cannot reasonably be a set of exactly similar tropes or any of the 
elements of such a set. So, it must be a real universal. There is no 
other alternative left, is there?   
                                                     
1 Williams 1986, p. 7. 
2 The name ‘Squabe’ is introduced in connection with the figure W. It refers 
to the instance of squareness inherent in B. Cf. figure W. 
3 Williams 1963, p. 617. 
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2.3.7 Predicativity 
Lastly, a bit more will be said about predicativity. Up to now it has 
been implicitly touched upon repeatedly. The first question to ask is 
the following: Which entities are predicative? I believe that Williams’ 
most explicit answer to that question is found here: 
Whereas relations, particular or universal, are the only 
entities intrinsically and irreducibly predicative, we can 
count relational properties as derivatively predicates of 
their terms, most notably those interior properties which 
constitute the “inherence” traditionally taken as typical.1 
The most important piece of information here is that only relations 
are intrinsically and irreducibly predicative. One implication evidently 
is that qualities are not predicative. Though they may appear to be so, 
this appearance is due to their being constituents of relational 
properties. Thus, when a quality is inherent in something, it is so in 
collaboration with a relation. This is confirmed in the next quotation 
below. Incidentally, to the extent that a relation has properties of its 
own, the latter inhere in it by means of mediating relations.  
That relations constitute terminal points as regards predicativity 
is stated in another place. The context is a discussion on there being 
ties connecting relations to their relata. 
Can we say anything more about intrinsicness and 
extrinsicness? We might hope, for instance, to discover a 
peculiar and more intimate sort of “tie” between an intrin-
sic relation and its terms than between an extrinsic relation 
and (let us say) the same terms. But except as a mere 
circumlocution for what we have much circumlocuted 
already, I think this is illicit because I think, for various 
reasons, including the ones famously purveyed by F. H. 
Bradley (as well as our own relational physiology), that 
there is no essential tie. There doubtless are plenty of 
relations between relations and their terms, and it will 
appear that when we ascribe a quality to something we do 
                                                     
1 Williams 1963, p. 616. 
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affirm a relation from one to the other; but when we 
affirm a relation of two terms we are at the end of that 
line, up against the one ultimate sort of predicative fact. 
To say that resemblance characterizes A and B, for 
example, is only to say stammeringly that A resembles B. 
Since there are no ties, either for intrinsic or for extrinsic 
relations, there can’t be different sorts of ties for them — 
which is as well, since it saves us the embarrassment of 
having to sort out intrinsic from extrinsic ties, and so 
forth.1 
Williams explicitly states that a lot of relations hold between a relation 
and its relata. Supposedly, there are still more holding between the 
latter and the ones holding between it and its relata, and so on. In 
spite of that, he maintains that relations are ultimately predicative. 
This is a bit puzzling.  
Considering that relations appear in the form of tropes, just as 
qualities do, I believe it is appropriate to once again mention a certain 
principle that has been referred to several times above.  
Part does not depend on part, nor whole on whole, nor 
part on whole, and that whole does depend on part is for 
the trivial reason that the whole is at least the sum of its 
parts.2 
The principle does not distinguish between different kinds of parts. 
Thus, even a predicative entity, i.e., a relation trope, is supposed to 
have the capacity of existing in splendid isolation.  
 
                                                     
1 Williams 1963, pp. 608-9. 
2 Williams 1953b, p. 189. 
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Examination of A-S. Maurin’s Ontology 
3.1 Introduction 
Anna-Sofia Maurin presents a version of moderate nominalism in her 
writing under the name ‘trope theory’. Her stated enterprise is of an 
explorative nature, which is reflected in the title of her dissertation: ‘If 
Tropes’. The key notion of trope theory, discussed mainly in the 
second chapter of that book, is of course that of trope itself. In the 
first chapter, she pronounces an ideal involving tropes. Depending on 
how one chooses to interpret it, this ideal gives expression to a claim 
or an expectation. 
(ii) A theoretical ideal: there are only tropes 
In saying that tropes are the only entities that exist we are 
not saying that there are no tables or that there is no 
universal colour redness. All we are saying is that all 
entities that exist besides tropes are constructed from 
tropes. Another way of saying that there is nothing but 
tropes is to say that tropes are the only metaphysically 
fundamental entities.1 
Starting out from this theoretical ideal she finds herself confronted 
with two main problems. They are referred to under the designations 
‘the problem of universalisation’ and ‘the problem of thing-
construction’, respectively. Much of Maurin 2002 is devoted to these 
two problems. 
Truth-maker theory and the notion of truth-making are other 
essential issues discussed in Maurin. Truth-making is thought of as 
accounting for the connection between thoughts about the world and 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 5. Besides this theoretical ideal, there are also (i) An onto-
logical assumption: there are tropes; and (iii) A methodological framework: tropes 
are truthmakers. Cf. Maurin 2002, pp. 5-6.  
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the world itself or its structure.1 The problem of universalisation is 
interpreted from the point of view of truth-making. This appears in 
the quest for the truth-makers for true propositions which seemingly 
presuppose universals. 
A fair amount of ambiguity is inherent in Maurin’s use of the 
denomination ‘trope theory’. Sometimes when alleged fellow trope 
theorists are referred to, the stipulated conditions for being a trope 
theorist are not particularly demanding. It suffices to “believe that at 
least some of the basic constituents of the world are particular 
properties.”2 This is sufficiently wide to incorporate moderate realists 
among trope theorists. Aristotle and Edmund Husserl, among others, 
are explicitly said to belong to the family of trope theorists, in spite of 
the fact that both of them recognise (real) universals. The Swedish 
philosopher Ivar Segelberg is also explicitly included. Even though he 
recognises universal relations. Conversely, ‘trope theory’ is also used 
by Maurin in a more strict sense. It excludes (real) universals of any 
kind. Substrates, or bare particulars, are also repudiated. When the 
denomination is used in this latter, narrower sense, the number of 
trope theorists dwindles considerably. 
3.2 The Notion of Trope 
3.2.1 Overview 
Maurin’s notion of trope is presented in section 3.2. In the two 
remaining sections of the chapter, sections 3.3. and 3.4, the two 
problems of universalisation and thing-construction are dealt with 
respectively. If Maurin’s solution of the former problem turns out to 
be abortive, her rejection of (real) universals is set rocking. In the 
proposed solution of the problem of thing-construction the relation 
of compresence is given a key part. It brings to the fore a few 
                                                           
1 Cf. Maurin 2002, p. 39. The stated direction of the connection suggests that 
what is in fact aimed at is the converse of truth-making: ontological commit-
ment.  
2 Maurin 2002, p. 4. 
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problems which are also of relevance when evaluating the trope 
theoretical approach. 
In section 3.2.2, Maurin’s notion of trope is presented and 
discussed along with a few problems that are attached to it. Since it is 
the key notion of moderate nominalism, it must be made sufficiently 
transparent. Otherwise, it may very well be a carpet under which 
various premises are swept. Among these hidden premises might be 
unmistakably realistic ones. 
3.2.2 The Single Category: Trope 
According to the theoretical ideal mentioned in the introduction, the 
category1 of trope is the only fundamental one there is. Any other 
categories that exist are formed out of that one.2 Two reasons for 
developing a one-category ontology are indicated, one of these is that 
many-category ontologies have met with various difficulties. This 
raises the hope that trope theory, in its one-categorial form, might 
fare better. The other reason is that a one-category version of trope 
theory would be very economical.3 A modified version of Ockham’s 
razor is pleaded, prescribing that it is always better to postulate as few 
fundamental entities as possible; ‘few’ refers here to the number of 
kinds of entities.4 Furthermore, it is suggested that Maurin’s trope 
theory may have some advantages, which other one-category onto-
logies lack. The other ontologies are the classical forms of nomina-
                                                           
1 Although the term ‘category’ is not used in the formulation of the ideal, it is 
used in direct connection to it.  
2 We are informed that most trope theorists share the theoretical ideal. C. B. 
Martin, who recognises irreducible substrates as well as tropes, is mentioned 
as an exception. This makes him (at least) a two-category trope theorist. Cf. 
Martin 1980. Aristotle is also mentioned. I suppose that he should be 
classified as being (at least) a three-category trope theorist.   
3 It would not come as a surprise if some post-modern thinker has come up 
with a none-category theory. In spite of its being maximally economical, the 
chances are though that it would have some vexing failings. 
4 Cf. Maurin 2002, pp. 5-6. Although the modified version of the razor is 
ascribed to David Lewis, it can be found already in Bertrand Russell. Cf. 
Lewis 1986b, p. 87, and Russell 1922, p. 112. 
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lism: class, predicate and resemblance nominalism. In addition, there 
is universalism which, though it only postulates universals, belongs to 
the one-category theories. Trope theory might turn out to fill a gap 
between classical nominalism and universalism.  
The trope is particular and thus suitable for dealing with 
concrete objects, but it is also qualitative and thus suitable 
for dealing with properties. All of this indicates that the 
prospects of a one-category trope theory are unusually 
good.1 
As it turns out, the alleged qualitativeness of tropes is a linchpin of 
Maurin’s ontology.  
What is a trope then? Well, each trope has three traits: 
simplicity, particularity and abstractness. A complication here is of 
course that these traits also cry out for a characterisation. In the 
previous chapter, we saw that Williams flirts with the idea that 
concreteness and abstractness exist as tropes. Simplicity leads a rather 
obscure life in his version of trope theory; he doesn’t say much on its 
behalf. In contrast, Maurin considers simplicity to be essential. 
Neither of them thinks that simplicity in itself appears in the form of 
tropes though. 
(i) Simplicity 
In the following discussion the three traits will be dealt with in the 
same order as they are enumerated above. First out is simplicity. 
According to Maurin, many of the objections raised against trope 
theory involve simplicity. Either the objection has rested on a failure 
to appreciate the simplicity of a trope or the claim has been that any 
meaningful characterisation of it implies that it is complex.2 One of 
Maurin’s stated reasons for treating simplicity as an essential trait of 
tropes, and I suspect that it is also the principal one, is that “an 
interesting, original and novel theory of tropes representing a true 
alternative to other metaphysical theories could not be developed 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 6.  
2 Cf. Maurin 2002, p. 11. 
EXAMINATION OF MAURIN’S ONTOLOGY               81 
unless the trope was taken to be simple.”1 What does the simplicity of 
tropes amount to then?  
To begin with, note the following discouraging information: 
Notions such as ‘simplicity’ (and, for that matter, ‘parti-
cularity’ and ‘qualitativeness’ etc.) are basic and as such 
they pose great difficulty as soon as we try to spell out in 
more detail exactly what they mean. Normally, notions 
such as these tend to be left unexplained or more or less 
taken for granted in the literature. Here the notions will be 
given some analysis, mainly of a negative kind. That is, in 
the following I will try to exclude some of the meanings 
that we might want to attach to the notions in question in 
the hope that this will at least begin to suggest the positive 
meaning that is here intended.2 
Although the expectations may be lowered a bit by this, it should be 
remembered that being basic does not exclude an idea from having 
positive content. Furthermore, the proposed determination of sim-
plicity is not exclusively negative.  
One of the first comments concerns the relation between the 
senses of ‘being simple’ and ‘having no parts’. She is reluctant to 
consider the latter as bringing in anything new. An explanation of 
what it means to be simple in terms of having no parts is just a 
rephrasing of the query.  
Just as we could ask of simplicity, we can now ask of the 
no-parts-suggestion: what does it mean to say of the trope 
that it is something without parts? Our answer to this 
question will depend, in particular, on exactly what we 
mean by ‘part’ here.3 
So, what could be meant by ‘part’ here? Could it be the synonymous 
with ‘property’? Maurin thinks not, though one wonders why. Her 
answer is: 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 12. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 14. 
3 Maurin 2002, p. 15. 
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One reason for this is that the sense in which the trope is 
simple is, I believe, directly comparable to the sense in 
which many have claimed that entities such as the uni-
versal are simple. And from the simplicity of the universal 
it does not seem to follow that the universal cannot (in 
some sense of the word) instantiate other, second-order 
universals. Analogously, it does not seem to me that an 
acceptance of, say, the existence of second-order tropes 
would necessarily have to threaten the simplicity of the 
trope. Rather, the notion of simplicity here involved is 
such that the trope could have properties and still be a 
simple entity.1 
In a footnote2 Maurin says that she is suspicious of second-order 
tropes, but for reasons other than simplicity. In the light of what she 
says in other places, I find this remark puzzling. More will be said 
about this in a moment. For now, the presumption must be that 
second-order properties would be tropes. The idea that a trope could 
have second-order tropes as properties and still be simple implies that 
the relevant simplicity is not absolute. This is confirmed in the next 
quotation. In it we also find Maurin’s last word on what kind of 
simplicity she has in mind.  
So what is simplicity? Let us go back to Daly3 and the 
distinction he draws between the simple and the complex 
trope. Complex tropes are, according to Daly, substrates 
instantiating universals (states of affairs). The difference 
between the complex substrate-universal and the simple 
trope seems to be this: the substrate-universal is con-
stituted by two kinds of fundamental entities — the kind 
substrate, and the kind universal (and their connection). 
The sense in which the trope is not complex is, from this 
perspective, best put as follows: it does not contain (it is 
not constituted of) more than one kind of entity. As we 
shall see, this means, among other things that the parti-
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 15. 
2 Cf. Maurin 2002, p. 15n. 
3 The reference is to Daly 1997. 
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cularity and the abstractness of the trope cannot have 
separate grounds ‘in’ the trope. There is simply no room 
for such distinctions.1 
Thus, the intended simplicity is categorial simplicity. A combination of 
a substrate and a universal would be categorially complex. However, 
as suggested elsewhere, this might not be the whole truth. Within the 
context of an argument against class-nominalism, presented in Arm-
strong 1989 we find implications with regard to tropes. 
But if the properties in question are tropes, we simply 
cannot have a case where each F-trope is made up of G-
tropes in the required sense. Tropes are simple entities, 
and so there are no such tropes. This means that the argu-
ment’s first two assumptions — assumptions that in fact 
get the argument going — cannot possibly be true within 
our trope-theoretical framework. No trope is ‘made up’ of 
other tropes. No tropes are ‘proper parts’ of other tropes.2 
The message of the last sentence, that no tropes are proper parts of 
other tropes, and of the sentence before it, that no trope is made up 
of other tropes, might imply that tropes do not have properties. If 
being part of a trope and being a property of it amount to the same 
thing, the simplicity of a trope excludes it from having any second-
order properties.  
Another place where a similar line of reasoning is found is in 
Maurin 2005, in answer to a question asked by Eric Funkhouser. He 
actually puts forward two questions. To the extent that the second of 
these is answered it is done en passant. 
Why can’t tropes have qualitative parts — e.g., color-tropes 
have hue-parts, saturation-parts, and brightness-parts? […] 
This seems plausible, though the possibility would raise 
problems like those for thing-construction that she dis-
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 15. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 71. 
84                                          CHAPTER III 
cusses at great length. Namely, what accounts for the unity 
of such qualitatively complex tropes?1 
Maurin’s answer reads: 
[I]f tropes are qualitatively complex in the sense imagined 
by Funkhouser they must, as I argue above,2 be regarded 
as complexes of more fundamental tropes. Of course, 
complexes of this kind we may call tropes — but they are 
tropes only in a secondary sense. I therefore prefer to call 
them complexes of tropes (or compresent tropes) although I do 
not think much hinges on our choice of terms here.3 
The important information here is that fundamental entities, which 
are qualitatively simple, are reckoned with. Such entities are what 
Maurin has in view when using the term ‘trope’. The rest are 
complexes of tropes. Perhaps then, the three qualitative parts of 
colours mentioned by Funkhouser are fundamental entities. In other 
words, perhaps they are tropes. Note that this is not the official view 
found in Maurin 2002. 
There is an imminent consequence of the theoretical ideal that 
there are only tropes in combination with the notion that categorial 
simplicity is the relevant kind of simplicity: there is practically no 
upper limit for how complex a trope may be, in an intuitive sense, 
while still being simple, in the adopted sense. This strongly suggests 
that categorial simplicity is not the only thing Maurin has in mind 
when claiming that tropes are simple entities.  
(ii) Particularity 
I move on to the two other alleged trope traits — particularity and 
abstractness. These have been touched upon already; in an earlier 
quotation we saw that neither of them can have a separate ground in 
a trope due to its simplicity. This is stated once more: 
                                                           
1 Funkhouser 2004, fourth paragraph.  
2 The argumentation referred does not bring in anything new which is not 
found in Maurin 2002. 
3 Maurin 2005, p. 136. 
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Given the simplicity of the trope, the way in which the 
trope is particular (and, as we shall see, the way in which it 
is abstract) cannot be due to the existence of some separate 
particularising and/or qualitative element in the trope. We 
cannot say of the trope that it is particular as a result of x 
and that it is abstract as a result of y. We must accept that 
the trope simply is particular and abstract and leave it at 
that. The particularity of the trope must be regarded as 
primitive.1 
Thus, tropes are assumed to be primitively particular. A traditional 
proposal as regards particularity is put in terms of substrates. Since 
substrates belong to another (fundamental) category, they are of no 
use to Maurin. Two other proposals are more interesting. 
[1] one which tries to explicate the notion of particularity 
with reference to how numerical distinction stands to 
qualitative nature and [2] one which tries to spell out the 
particularity of the trope in terms of spatio-temporal 
position.2  
According to the first account, some entities, the particulars, do not 
obey the principle of the identity of indiscernibles.3 Maurin concurs 
with this, though she does not think that it tells us very much about 
particularity in itself.  
The observation that tropes cannot be entities that 
succumb to the principle of the identity of indiscernibles is 
very important. Tropes are entities that can be exactly 
similar and yet numerically distinct, but pointing this out 
does not really tell us anything about the particularity of the 
trope — or at least, it does not tell us very much. Rather, 
accounts such as that given by Williams are accounts of 
what will follow given that the trope is not only qualitative 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 16. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 16. 
3 This principle is also known as Leibniz’s Principle. In formalised version: 
∀x∀y[∀P(P(x) ↔ P(y)) → (x = y)]. Here the lower-case letters range over 
(concrete) particulars; the upper-case letters range over attributes. 
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(abstract)1 but also particular. Particular qualities are 
entities that “may be exactly similar and yet not only 
distinct but discrete”2 but in asking about what is meant by 
particularity it seems that we are looking for something 
more than this simple truth. We want to know what it is 
about the trope that makes this combination into a 
possibility.3 
Since this first suggestion does not deliver the goods, we go on to the 
next one, according to which the particularity of tropes comes from 
their being localised in space and time. Like many others, Maurin 
finds this attractive. Merely being localised need not immediately 
distinguish it from universality though. After all, immanent realists 
maintain that universals have position in space and time. Notwith-
standing that, particulars and universals can be distinguished in terms 
of spatio-temporal position. A remark of Keith Campbell is quoted to 
show that: 
Universals are promiscuous about space-time: they can be 
completely present at indefinitely many places at once. But 
particulars, and in our case this includes above all the 
tropes, all have a local habitation, a single, circumscribed 
place in space-time.4 
To this, Maurin hastens to add that concrete particulars monopolise 
spatio-temporal positions in a way that tropes do not. A trope 
occupying a unique position in space and time only monopolises it in 
relation to tropes which belong to the same determinable as itself.5 
For instance, an existing colour trope prevents every other colour 
trope from having that particular spatiotemporal position. Tropes of 
different determinables such as form, weight, taste etc. may very well 
                                                           
1 As is perhaps already evident, Maurin is not using ‘abstract’ in the same 
sense as Williams. 
2 Cf. Williams 1986, p. 3. 
3 Maurin 2002, p. 17. 
4 Campbell 1990, p. 53. 
5 There are a few obvious complications with this characterisation. It will do 
for now though.  
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share their position with each other. As will be seen below, sharing 
position in this way is being compresent with each other.  
It might be proposed that having a unique position in space and 
time gives an entity its particularity. A trope may even be described as 
being a nature-at-a-place. If this means that the trope has a nature and 
a position as constituents, Maurin’s objection is that this would be in 
conflict with the simplicity of the trope.1  
James P. Moreland has criticised the account of particularity in 
terms of spatiotemporal position.2 According to one interpretation, a 
quality-at-a-place amounts to a simple reality. Moreland objects to 
this. One of his objections concerns tropes which are elements of the 
same (exact) similarity set. It asks how the elements of such a set 
should be distinguished. Two exactly similar red-tropes can be used 
to illustrate this. Maurin quotes Moreland saying: 
[If] location is the principle of individuation […] [then] it 
doesn’t seem that the two red tropes can be individuated 
by their red nature, for this is what they have in common. 
And if their nature differs from their location only by a 
distinction of reason, then they would be one and not 
two.3 
Maurin objects to this on the ground that it confuses particularity, or 
individuality, with individuation. Part of her rendering of Moreland’s 
argument reads as follows. 
If the particularity of the trope is given by its occupying a 
certain spatio-temporal position, then, Moreland argues, 
there will be trouble when we attempt to individuate distinct 
                                                           
1 Cf. Maurin 2002, p. 18. An obvious comment on this objection is that it 
presupposes that location is not qualitative in nature. If it is, the categorial 
simplicity of the trope would not be tampered with, would it? 
2 Maurin only refers to Moreland 1985. He has repeated and, to some extent, 
varied his objections in several works written after Moreland 1985. One is 
Moreland 2001. 
3 Moreland 1985, p. 41. It is evident from the rendering of this quotation that 
Maurin has edited what Moreland says. Unfortunately, this distorts his 
message to some extent.  
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tropes from the same similarity-set. There will be trouble 
because, in belonging to the same similarity-set, the tropes 
will be the same1 and so incapable of being individuated on 
the basis of their qualitative nature. But as their respective 
qualitative nature is only separated from their respective 
position by a ‘distinction of reason’ they cannot really have 
different positions either. If their qualitative nature is the 
same, so is their position.2 
In this account it may seem as if Moreland is talking about an issue of 
an epistemological nature, rather than an ontological one. If we 
disregard that, his point is the one indicated in the last sentence of the 
quotation: if their qualitative nature is identical, so is their position.3 
Interpreted in this way, Maurin still rejects it. She even does so after 
having stated that Moreland’s problem is the more general one of 
grounding the numerical difference between entities sharing all their 
pure properties.4  
[T]his metaphysical problem of individuation [i.e., that of 
grounding the numerical difference between entities which 
share all their pure properties] seems only to arise if we do 
not accept the basic tenets of trope theory. That is, it only 
arises if we refuse to accept that two different basic facts 
may be true of one and the same simple entity. A refusal 
to accept this is surely both permissible and, to some, quite 
natural. But it is not an objection to some particular 
development of trope theory; it is an argument directed 
against the very possibility of the entire trope-theoretical 
enterprise. As such it is of no interest in the discussions 
                                                           
1 It puzzles me that Maurin is using ‘the same’ so frequently in connection 
with Moreland since she tends to use it as synonymous with ‘exactly like’. 
Moreland is a realist and intends strict identity. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 19. 
3 If we start with the two red-tropes having different locations and that they 
therefore are not identical with each other, we reach the conclusion that they 
have separate natures. This arrangement of the premises is ignored by 
Moreland. 
4 A reference is made to Moreland 1985, pp. 64-5, which shows that to be the 
case. 
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being conducted here (where the possible existence of 
tropes is assumed).1 
We see here that Maurin wants to disregard an objection which calls 
into question the stipulated premises of (her) trope theory. The 
particular premise here is that tropes are simple entities. This kind of 
argumentation may of course be called in question. 
Maurin intimates that another of Moreland’s objections is more 
serious. Since it has more or less the same pattern as the previous 
one, it is not completely clear to me what her reason for that might 
be. For safety’s sake, I let her speak for herself. 
If the trope is simple its qualitative nature and its position 
will be one. But as tropes do not generally monopolise 
their places, this means that several tropes may have 
numerically the same position. But how can one and the 
same position be one with many distinct qualitative 
natures? It simply cannot, says Moreland. And “[t]o avoid 
this consequence,” he continues, “it is easy to think that 
location or place is an entity in the trope, a co-ordinate 
quality perhaps, which individuates the two tropes.” But, 
again, this would contradict the supposition that tropes are 
simple entities.2 
While the tropes starring in the former argument shared nature, the 
ones in this one share position. We see in the last sentence that 
Moreland’s proposed revision, which takes location to be an entity in 
itself, is rejected. Once again, the simplicity of tropes is invoked. 
Maurin’s summarised response to the two proposals is stated in 
the following quotation. 
It seems […] that we cannot explain what it means to say 
of the trope that it is particular by characterising the trope 
as a singular unity of quality and place. For even if it is true 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 19. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 20. The insertions are said to come from Moreland 1985, p. 
41. 
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that we individuate1 distinct but exactly similar tropes via 
their distinct spatio-temporal positions, and even if it is 
true that one and the same trope cannot exist but in one 
unique region in space and time, we may still ask why 
distinct tropes occupy such distinct spatio-temporal posi-
tions, or why one single trope cannot exist but at one place 
at one time. What is it about the trope that ensures that 
these claims are true? The answer seems to be that these 
claims are true of tropes because tropes are particulars. This 
turns explanation on its head. It treats particularity as what 
explains certain spatio-temporal truths, rather than the 
reverse.2 
The message here is the same as it was from the start: particularity 
must be accepted as something primitive. In connection with this it is 
added that being primitive is the same as not being based in anything 
at all.3  
(iii) Abstractness 
The third trope trait is abstractness. The notion that tropes are 
abstract particulars is a common description. The sense Maurin has in 
mind for ‘abstract’ may be quite peculiar to herself though. In a 
prefatory remark she contrasts being abstract with being bare.  
Apart from being simple and particular, the trope is also 
abstract. It is indeed its being abstract that distinguishes the 
trope from another classical kind of ontological entity: the 
bare particular. Just like the trope, the bare particular is (as 
its name suggests) particular and simple. But unlike the 
trope, the bare particular is (as its name also suggests) bare, 
whereas the trope is, in a certain sense, ‘clothed’: the trope 
is qualitative; the bare particular is not.4 
                                                           
1 Here ‘individuate’ is an epistemological term. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 20. 
3 Cf. Maurin 2002, p. 20. 
4 Maurin 2002, p. 21. 
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The essential message here is that being abstract is in a sense being 
clothed. This way of expressing the thesis suggests that abstractness is 
something a trope is “wearing”. Therefore she hastens to add that 
this is an inference we should resist. The abstractness of a trope is not 
something which has a separate ground in it; a trope cannot have a 
separate ground. The reason invoked for this is its simplicity. Not 
very surprisingly, tropes are declared to be primitively abstract.  
Why use ‘abstract’ in this sense? The stated reason for using it at 
all is that it is so entrenched in its usage in the literature. However, in 
spite of its being well established, there is not much of a consensus 
on what its sense is. Take, for example, the sense stipulated by 
Williams: an abstract entity is one which, in a special sense, is less 
than the whole including it.1 This special sense is indicated by 
examples, in which the abstract entities are tropes. Maurin is not 
satisfied with this: 
The trouble with this specification is that it now seems 
that we have gained nothing by adding that the trope is 
abstract. All we can say about what it means for a trope to 
be abstract is that it is to be ‘like the colour of the lolli-
pop’. But it was to characterise such things as the colour 
of the lollipop that the term was originally introduced. It 
was the ‘thinness’ of the trope (in contrast with the 
‘grossness’ of the concrete stick-part of the lollipop) that 
our use of the term ‘abstract’ was originally meant to 
explicate. Given the way Williams chooses to spell out the 
notion, the characterisation of the trope as abstract is 
more or less empty and uninformative.2 
Williams’s characterisation of abstractness is pronounced to be 
empty. Campbell’s characterisation is rejected as well, more or less 
accused of the same sin. It reads: 
The colour of this pea, the temperature of that wire, the 
solidity of this bell, are abstract in this sense only: that they 
(ordinarily) occur in conjunction with many other 
                                                           
1 Cf. Williams 1953a, p. 15. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 22. 
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instances of qualities (all the other features of the pea, the 
piece of wire or the bell), and that, therefore, they can be 
brought before the mind only by a process of selection, of 
systematic setting aside, of these other qualities of which 
we are aware. Such an act of selective ignoring is an act of 
abstraction. Its result is that we have before the mind an 
item which (as a matter of fact, in general) occurs in 
company with many others.  
 But the pea’s colour, the wire’s temperature, the bell’s 
solidity, are not in any sense products of the discriminating 
mind. They exist out there, waiting to be recognized for 
the independent, individual items, that they have been all 
along.1 
Being the object of a process of selective attention called ‘abstraction’ 
is not much of a characterisation. Anything can be such an object. 
Maurin does not think it makes anything abstract.  
Something which adds to the conceptual confusion is that, in 
the terminology of some philosophers, tropes are said to be concrete 
entities. Peter Simons and Guido Küng are mentioned as exponents 
of this. 
Simons, for instance, notes two mutually incompatible 
ways (more or less the same as those distinguished by 
Williams) of regarding the distinction between abstract and 
concrete: on the first account of the distinction an entity is 
abstract if it has neither spatial nor temporal location. On 
the second, an entity is abstract if it is incapable of in-
dependent existence.2 According to Simons, since the 
trope is an entity with location, it is concrete in the first 
sense of the distinction, but since it is also (according to 
his theory) necessarily dependent for its existence on the 
existence of other tropes, it is simultaneously abstract in 
the second sense. To avoid calling the trope a concrete 
abstract entity, Simons chooses to characterise it as a 
                                                           
1 Campbell 1990, pp. 2-3. 
2 This is partly wrong. It is part of Williams’s own official doctrine that tropes 
are existentially independent entities. 
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“dependent concrete particular.”1 For similar reasons, G. 
Küng characterises his trope-like entities as concrete. 
‘Abstract’, for him, means non-spatio-temporal, and since 
tropes both have “some definite place in space and time” 
and since they are “not eternal, and they may change 
through time”,2 he calls them concrete properties.3 
Thus, the terminology in circulation is somewhat chaotic, to say the 
least. According to Maurin, much of the discussion could have been 
avoided if the term ‘abstract’ had not been used. In spite of that, she 
contributes to the chaos by using it herself.  
In what might be described as common usage, ‘abstract’ and 
‘concrete’ have opposite senses. What about Maurin’s use of these 
terms? I guess that at least her official sense of ‘concrete’ is the same 
as that of ‘monopolising a spatio-temporal volume’. If that is indeed 
the case, she does not use them as opposites of each other.4  
3.3 The Problem of Universalisation and Its Solution 
3.3.1 Overview 
The problem of universalisation is a main subject in this rather 
lengthy section. The outcome of the discussion on it is in section 
3.3.6, dealing with Maurin’s preferred account of the notion of inter-
nal relation. Another problem, the problem of universals, marches 
past before that. While the former problem is inherent to moderate 
nominalism, the latter is more general.  
The notions of external and internal relations play principal 
parts in Maurin’s ontology. Her version of trope theory differs 
somewhat from the mainstream of moderate nominalism in that it 
recognises irreducible tropes of external relations. Some of the details 
                                                           
1 Cf. Simons 1994, p. 557.  
2 Cf. Küng 1964, p. 33. Since Maurin stipulates that tropes cannot change, 
Küng’s concrete properties are no more than trope-like entities. 
3 Maurin 2002, p. 23. 
4 We just saw that neither does Simons. 
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of the distinction between the two kinds of relations are discussed in 
sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5. In the latter section, the notion of internal 
relation is applied to tropes. After Maurin’s preferred account of 
internal relations is discussed, there is a short section, section 3.3.7, 
dealing with the problematic claim that resemblances of various 
degrees hold between simple tropes. 
3.3.2 Another Problem: The Problem of Universals 
Maurin is anxious to distinguish between a problem which she calls 
‘the problem of universals’ and another problem, ‘the problem of 
universalisation’, which is her primary interest.1 Before discussing it, it 
might be rewarding to dwell upon the former problem for a moment. 
The classical problem of universals is due to a phenome-
non found in both language and experience, at times 
referred to as that of the ‘One over Many’. The phenome-
non of the One over Many is this: experience and thought 
unfold to us, not only particular things or particular cases 
of qualities, but also samenesses or even identities that 
seem to exist, so to speak, over and above these distinct 
and particular entities. The world, that is, not only appears 
particularised (as many) but also, in some sense of the 
word, generalised or classified (as one). Language mirrors 
this phenomenon in providing us with a distinction 
between a kind of word — the singular term — whose 
function it seems to be to point to, or refer to, particular 
individuals; and another kind of word — the predicate — 
whose function it seems to be to point to, or refer to, 
those communal things that particular individuals share. It 
is this ‘unity in manifold’ which gives rise to the classical 
problem of universals. The problem is this: how can 
distinct particulars all have what appears to be the same 
nature?2 
                                                           
1 The question “How can there be anything universal when tropes are all that 
exist?” gives a hint at what is meant.  
2 Maurin 2002, p. 60.  
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In the second sentence a distinction is obviously made between same-
ness and identity. This distinction is given a more detailed account 
later in the book.1 It states that the phrase ‘have the same nature’ can 
have either of two senses. One of these is that of ‘sharing an identical 
feature’.2 Maurin remarks that this is what a realist would say. She 
adds that it cannot be accommodated within a trope-theoretical 
framework. The other possible meaning is that of ‘have exactly 
resembling natures’. The latter sense can be accommodated within 
her trope-theoretical framework. Now, given the context of the 
occurrence of the phrase ‘the same nature’ in the last quotation,3 one 
would expect its intended sense to be that of ‘exactly resembling 
nature’. If that is indeed so, the answer which she has to offer within 
the framework of her own trope theory is a rather empty one: distinct 
particulars all have what appear to be exactly resembling natures 
because they have exactly resembling natures. This seems to turn the 
alleged problem of universals into something of a mockery. It would 
be more accurate to formulate the question and answer like this: How 
can distinct particulars all have what appear to be an identical nature? 
It is because they have exactly resembling natures.  
The previous quotation continues: 
There is of course a fundamental sense in which the 
classical problem of universals and the problem of 
universalisation deal with the same issue. They are both 
problems that emerge from a need to explain, or ground, 
the phenomenon of universality. Yet the problems remain 
distinct, and their distinctness is due mainly to two factors: 
(1) the problem’s origin, or that which gives rise to the 
queries, is different in each case. (2) That for which a 
solution to these problems may reasonably be expected to 
be able to account is likewise different. 
                                                           
1 Cf. Maurin 2002, pp. 77-8. 
2 Cf. Maurin 2002, p. 77. Presumably, the motive for using ‘feature’ here is 
purely stylistic.  
3 Part of this context is that a distinction is made between sameness and 
identity.  
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 That the two problems differ in origin is demonstrated 
by the fact that the problem of universalisation does not 
immediately arise when the phenomenon of apparent 
identity in difference, in language and experience, has been 
detected. Yet, it is this very phenomenon which 
constitutes the problem of universals.1 In fact it is possible 
that the existence of sameness in difference — of apparent 
universality — in no case requires universality to be 
constructed from tropes, at least as long as trope theory is 
developed within truth-maker theoretical framework. As 
will be argued later for instance, simple predications such 
as ‘a is F’ do not give rise to the problem of universalisa-
tion, whereas it may be (and has been) argued that in 
including both singular and general terms, these predica-
tions are part of what gives rise to the classical problem of 
universals.2 
That apparent identity in difference in no case requires universality to 
be constructed from tropes is a rather surprising thesis. It is easy to 
get the impression that the opposite is what actually is claimed in 
another place.  
In the following two chapters of this book I will attempt 
to construct, first the required universality, and then the 
required concreteness from tropes. I begin here with the 
first of these constructive tasks: that of constructing 
universality from tropes. I label this problem the ‘problem 
of universalisation’ […].3 
Anyhow, we have been told at the end of the quotation before the 
last one that simple predications are not in need of universals. Nor do 
they presuppose a solution of the problem of universalisation. This is 
                                                           
1 These two sentences seem to corroborate that (apparent) identity, not 
sameness, of nature is what Maurin considers to be connected with the 
problem of universals. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 60. 
3 Maurin 2002, p. 59. 
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in spite of the fact that simple predications involve general terms — 
i.e., predicates.  
3.3.3 The Problem of Universalisation 
An appropriate introduction of the problem of universalisation seems 
to be that the world is the ultimate ground for the truth of proposi-
tions. The world, or something about its structure, is what makes 
propositions true. According to Maurin, there are some true proposi-
tions which apparently have universals as truth-makers. Being a nomi-
nalist, she sees a need for something to replace the universals. The 
problem has its place in this context. A formulation of it is: how can 
there be anything universal when all that exists is particular?1 The task 
in connection with this formulated question applies to all versions of 
nominalism. However, as far as trope theory is concerned, the 
question should be reformulated: How can there be anything univer-
sal when tropes are all that exist? 
In the quotation which follows we see some of the main ideas 
behind Maurin’s notion of truth-making passing by.  
According to truth-maker theory any true proposition is 
made true. That is, for a proposition to be true the 
existence, in the world, of this or that entity is required. It 
is a basic assumption in this work that tropes exist. It 
follows from the adoption of truth-maker theory that 
tropes should be able to fulfil this truth-making function.2 
Thus the theory of truth-making will provide us with both 
a starting point and a checkpoint for our theory. If truths 
are made true in the intended sense, then we might, from 
known truths, conclude something about that which 
makes them true. We might conclude, in particular, some-
thing about how our tropes, if they are to succeed in their 
truth-making function, must be structured. Truth-maker 
theory thus works ‘top-down’. It provides us with access 
to the world and it prescribes which configurations of 
                                                           
1 Cf. Maurin 2002, p. 59. 
2 An additional premise of course is the stipulated theoretical ideal. 
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tropes our theory must be able to provide for. Investi-
gating whether a one-category theory of tropes can supply 
the configurations prescribed by truth-maker theory will, 
therefore, help us to determine if a one-category theory of 
tropes is at all feasible.1 
This being said, it is added that truth-maker theory is assumed in 
substance, not defended. It is part of the theoretical framework 
within which her version of trope theory is developed.2 As indicated 
earlier, ontological commitment, rather than truth-making, seems to 
be what she actually has in view. After all, the enterprise is described 
as starting with known truths in order to figure out what the world is 
like. A self-imposed constraint is that only tropes exist. The catch-
phrase, used in the last quotation, is that truth-maker theory works 
top-down.  
A number of proposition types are enumerated.3 At least some 
of these apparently presuppose universals. Two of these types are 
discussed in particular.  The first of these is called simple predication. 
Its form is:  
a is F. 
The second type is the comparative predication. It appears in two 
versions, whose respective forms are: 
a and b are the same F 
and 
a is the same F as b. 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 38.  
2 Her sources for truth-maker theory are mentioned: Mulligan, Simons & 
Smith 1984, Simons 1992 and 1998, Restall 1996 and Read 2000. 
3 In all there are seven types. Besides the two presented in the main text the 
remaining five are: (i) Identity-propositions, e.g., ‘Mary = Mary’; (ii) Kind-
predications, e.g., ‘Mary is a woman’; (iii) Singular existentials, e.g., ‘Mary exists’; 
(iv) Propositions ostensibly about universals, e.g., ‘brown is a colour’; (v) Second-order 
predications, e.g., ‘redness is a colour’ and ‘redness resembles pink more than 
green’. Cf. Maurin 2002, pp. 54ff.  
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The lower-case letters may in all three formulas refer either to con-
crete particulars or to tropes.  
The comparative predicative propositions are the ones from 
which Maurin takes here departure when attempting a solution to the 
problem of universalisation. They are therefore strategically impor-
tant. What is the relationship between simple and comparative pre-
dicative propositions? These are her beginning remarks on the 
subject: 
While simple predications do not in general necessarily 
require the existence of something amounting to the 
realist’s universal for their truth, the same does not hold 
for a special variant of the simple predicative proposition: 
what I shall call the ‘comparative’ predicative proposition. 
These are propositions of the kind ‘a and b are the same 
F’. One might think that propositions of this form are 
really hidden complex propositions of the form ‘a is F and 
b is F’. If this were so, the truth of such propositions 
would be a consequence of whatever makes true their 
constituent propositions ‘a is F’ and ‘b is F’. But as long as 
we agree that simple predications need nothing more than 
the existence of some particular trope for their truth, I do 
not think that we can say that propositions such as ‘a is the 
same F as b’ have their truth determined merely by what-
ever makes ‘a is F’ and ‘b is F’ true — at least, not without 
some qualifications. The reason why is that, in contrast 
with the case of simple predications, comparative predica-
tions seem to require not only the existence of, say, a 
particular red-trope a1 and a particular red-trope a2, but 
also some account of how come we can truly say that 
these tropes are the same. Comparative predications, there-
fore, suggest that the trope theorist with sympathy for 
truth-makers needs to construct something amounting to 
the realist’s universal in order for his or her tropes to be 
able to fulfil their truth-making function.1 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, pp. 57-8. 
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In the first sentence we are informed that comparative proposition is 
a special variant of the simple proposition. In the light of what is said 
in the rest of the quotation, this might be interpreted as meaning that 
the former proposition is a combination of two of the latter kind plus 
something additional; the additional something being the clause that 
the subjects of the two included propositions are the same. I suppose 
this can be generalised for an arbitrary number of included simple 
propositions and their subjects.  
With the purpose of making it credible that universals may be 
unnecessary for truth-making in the case of simple predications, 
truth-making is contrasted with meaning. This happens in the next 
quotation, which starts out using a red apple to illustrate the example. 
Pretty soon, the subject becomes a red-trope instead.  
From the perspective of meaning, it does seem that the 
claim that the apple is red not only tells us something 
about the inner constitution of the apple, but also relates 
the apple to various other things, things with the same 
colour: in this perspective, the proposition seems to 
involve universality, then. Yet from the perspective of 
truth-making, it is less evident that the existence of 
anything universal is really required for truth. For truth it is 
arguably sufficient that this particular redness exists. That is, 
even if this particular redness is in fact related by similarity 
to numerous other particular instances of redness, it is not 
necessarily this relationship that constitutes this instance’s 
being red. If you are a trope theorist it is surely not. To the 
trope theorist, the particular redness (the trope) is red as a 
consequence of its being the way it is, and so are all other red 
tropes. To a trope theorist, therefore, the fact that each 
particular redness (each trope) is such that it resembles 
every other particular redness is a consequence of the fact 
that each particular redness is what it is and nothing else. 
Therefore, the trope theorist can argue that the truth of a 
simple predicative proposition need not require the 
existence of more than the particular redness (in this case 
instantiated in the apple). So although simple predicative 
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sentences initially seem to require universals as truth-
makers, a believer in tropes can in fact deny this.1 
A central credo of Maurin is expressed here: a trope is what it is 
independently of everything else. Neither a universal, similarity, class, 
predicate nor sum, or what have you, bestow it with a qualitative 
nature. It is self-sufficient in that respect.  
That a concrete particular a is F is due to its instantiating an F-
trope. Instantiating a trope amounts to having it as part. Things are 
supposedly different when a is a trope itself. In that case, a itself is the 
F-trope. Whatever a may be, whether it is a concrete particular or a 
trope, the proposition a is F is classified as a simple predication. An 
F-trope is supposed to take care of truth-making in either case. 
A containment model for predication2 is suggested in the 
previous paragraph. Applied to the proposition ‘a is F’, when a is an 
F-trope, is perhaps that a is contained in itself in the sense that it is a 
part, although not a proper part, of itself. If that is indeed the case, 
then given that a is a trope which is F, though not itself an F-trope, 
the model implies that an F-trope is a proper part of it. As indicated 
earlier, the idea that a trope can have another trope as a part of it is 
rejected. So, what denomination should be used then of an entity 
which consists of more than one trope but which is still not a 
concrete particular? In another work Maurin calls entities of that kind 
‘complexes of tropes’ or ‘compresent tropes’.3  
Keith Campbell distinguishes between two questions: the A 
question and the B question, respectively. Maurin is impressed by this 
distinction. It is intimately related to the distinction she makes 
between single and comparative predications. Let us acquaint our-
selves with some of what Campbell says with regard to his distinction. 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 57. 
2 Cf. Maurin 2002, p. 62, where it is confirmed that her trope theory involves 
a containment model for predication. 
3 Cf. Maurin 2005, p. 136, which is where it is explicitly asserted that hue-, 
saturation- and brightness-parts of colour tropes must be regarded as more 
fundamental tropes. The phrase ‘more fundamental tropes’ is of course a 
misnomer.  
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[W]e can pose two very different questions about, say, red 
things. We can take one single red object and ask of it: what 
is it about this thing in virtue of which it is red? We shall 
call that the A question. 
 Secondly, we can ask of any two red things: what is it 
about these two things in virtue of which they are both 
red? Let that be the B question. 
 Discussions of the problem of universals invariably 
take it for granted that the two questions are to be given 
parallel answers. Indeed, realists about universals have 
their answers ready. The A question’s answer is: it is in 
virtue of the presence in the object of the universal red-
ness, that the thing is red. And the B question’s answer is 
parallel: it is in virtue of the presence in each of them of 
the universal redness, that they are both red. 
 The conflation of the A and B questions is responsible 
for making the realist position seem much more inevitable 
than it really is.1 
In Campbell’s formulations there are no traces of a role for truth-
making to play. In Maurin’s reformulations, in which Campbell’s 
original names are kept, truth-making has a role. Her versions read: 
The A-question: What makes it true that ‘a is F’? 
The B-question: What makes it true that ‘a and b are  
    the same F’?2 
It is the B-question which an account of universalisation attempts to 
answer. The basic universalisation-requiring question is declared to be 
the B-question with a and b as tropes.3 So, what is her answer to that 
question, when a and b are tropes? Since Maurin’s answer pre-
supposes an account of universalisation in terms of (exact) resemb-
lance, an examination the latter is called for.  
Resemblance is said to be objective as well as primitive. Its 
being objective means that it is comparison-independent; i.e., it holds 
                                                           
1 Campbell 1990, p. 29. 
2 Cf. Maurin 2002, p. 61. 
3 Cf. Maurin 2002, p. 63. 
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between relata independently of any observer. What is there to be 
said about its being primitive? Well, ponder upon the following 
statements. 
Just as some believe that resemblance is obviously not 
objective, others believe that resemblance is obviously not 
primitive. It may even be suggested that any such refusal 
to accept the primitiveness would raise a very serious 
objection to the entire resemblance approach to universa-
lisation, and indeed to trope theory as a whole, since the 
assertion that resemblance is primitive can be construed as 
begging the question against the universal realist (who 
believes that resemblance is analysable in terms of partial 
identity). But first of all, the main theme of this book is 
not an overall comparison of trope theory with universal 
realism — a search for the best theory. Instead, we are 
attempting to develop trope theory within a very particular 
theoretical framework. As such it is an investigation that 
needs to be made, as far as possible, independently of any 
comparison with rival views such as universal realism. And 
even if such comparison were the main theme of this 
book, we would need to remember that the trope 
theorist’s claim that resemblance is one of the basic 
differences between trope theory and universal realism. 
Comparison is therefore impossible unless both primitive 
(for trope theory) and non-primitive (for realism) resemb-
lance is allowed for. No intrinsic value attaches primitive 
or non-primitive notions of resemblance. What matters is 
whether, and how, resemblance helps to achieve our 
theoretical aims. 
 Let us assume from now on, therefore, that unless 
otherwise indicated, the resemblance we are dealing with is 
objective and primitive.1 
It may be safely concluded that the primitiveness of resemblance at 
least amounts to not being analysable in terms of universals, accord-
ing to the quote above. This is not much of a characterisation though. 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, pp. 79-80.  
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As for the rest, the message here is that the primitiveness of 
resemblance is something which is assumed. It is assumed in order to 
achieve the theoretical aims of trope theory.  
Resemblance is said to exist in degrees. This holds true also 
when the relata are tropes. Each trope resembles countless other 
tropes to countless degrees.1 However, only exact resemblance is 
thought of as being relevant to the solution of the problem of uni-
versalisation. That is made clear in the following:  
Here are the bare bones of what will, I hope, become a full 
account of universalisation in terms of exact resemblance: 
atomic propositions that require universalised truth-
makers are made true by classes of tropes. Not just any 
class of tropes will be able to provide us with the truth-
makers we need […]. Only those classes of tropes formed 
by the equivalence or exact resemblance of the included tropes 
will do.2 
Nothing less than exact resemblance will do as a tool for forming a 
surrogate universal. More is said in section 3.3.7 about degrees of 
similarity. 
3.3.4 Internal and External Relations 
The predominant description of resemblance is that it is an internal 
relation. Various determinations of internality have been presented. 
Maurin discusses four of these and makes no claim that this inventory 
is exhaustive.3 Her discussion makes preparations for a modal 
characterisation of exact resemblance. That characterisation will be 
followed here by an ontological characterisation.  
The first determination of internality is ascribed to David 
Armstrong. The following indicates what he considers to be the 
distinction between internal and external relations: 
                                                           
1 Cf. Maurin 2002, p. 80. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 79. 
3 Maurin’s four senses of ‘internal relation’ are found among the ten that are 
distinguished in Ewing 1934, chapter IV. 
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I propose the following definitions: 
 (1) Two or more particulars are internally related if and only 
if there exist properties of the particulars which 
logically necessitate1 that the relation holds.2 
 (2) Two or more particulars are externally related if and 
only if there are no properties of the particulars which 
logically necessitate that the relation, or any other 
relation which is part of the relation, holds.3 
                                                           
1 Earlier in the same work Armstrong asserts: 
If logically equivalent predicates which are not logically empty 
apply in virtue of the very same universals, and logically equiva-
lent propositions which are not themselves logically necessary are 
true in virtue of the very same state of affairs, then some de dicto 
account of logical necessity must be correct. The logical necessity 
of propositions must, in some way, derive from the words or 
concepts in which the propositions are expressed. (Armstrong 
1978b, p. 42) 
This indicates that logical necessity is thought of as being of a conceptual 
nature.   
2 This determination is, or approximates, the “logical part” of the sixth sense 
on Ewing’s list: an internal relation is grounded, either logically or causally, in 
the nature of the related terms. Similarity is said to be internal in this sense. 
Cf. Ewing 1934, p. 126. 
3 Armstrong 1978b, p. 85. A reduction principle for internal relations is 
introduced on the next page: 
If two or more particulars are internally related, then the relation 
is nothing more than the possession by the particulars of the 
properties which necessitate the relation.  
Armstrong comments on it: 
In § 1 it was argued that although relational properties are real, 
they are reducible (to non-relational properties and relations). It 
is now being argued that internal relations are reducible to 
properties of the related terms. […] External relations, on the 
other hand, involve irreducible relations holding between the 
externally related particulars. (Monads could have internal, but 
not external, relations.) (Armstrong 1978b, p. 86) 
There are similar passages in other works of Armstrong. The following is an 
example. 
An internal relation is one where the existence of the terms 
entails the existence of the relation. Given our definition of 
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Statement (1) is quoted by Maurin. Her interpretation of it is that an 
internal relation is founded in the nature of that which it relates.1 We 
can safely assume that Armstrong, in the quoted passage, does not 
consider tropes as being the relata of either internal or external 
relations. However, Maurin thinks that his determination can be 
applied to tropes if need be, slightly modified.  
It is the particulars’ being the way they are that logically 
necessitates their standing in an internal relation. Trans-
lated into trope language, Armstrong’s take on the distinc-
tion implies that tropes, since they are simple entities, will 
be such that any internal relation holding between two 
tropes must do so, not as a consequence of certain proper-
ties the related tropes exemplify, but rather because the 
related tropes are what they are. And, since there is 
nothing more to a particular trope than its particular and 
simple nature, this also means that the mere existence of 
two internally related tropes is enough to ensure that their 
internal relations necessarily hold.2 
Here, it is indicated once again that tropes do not have any proper-
ties. The nature of each trope is simple as is the trope “as well”. Note 
                                                                                                             
supervenience, it follows that the relation supervenes on the 
existence of the terms. Using the picturesque extensional model 
provided by possible worlds, in every world in which all the 
terms exist, the relation holds between them. If, as I further 
contend, what supervenes is not something ontologically more 
than what it supervenes upon, then, once given their terms, 
internal relations are not an addition to the world’s furniture. 
External relations are those that are not internal, and are there-
fore the ontologically important relations. It should not be over-
looked, however, that given this purely negative definition of 
‘external’, some external relations, on analysis, resolve into a 
mixture of internal and purely external components. (Armstrong 
1997, p. 87) 
The view expressed here, ignoring that Armstrong considers properties and 
relations to be universals, comes near to what is Maurin’s own view.  
1 Maurin 2002, p. 88. 
2 Maurin 2002, pp. 88-9. 
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also that several internal relations, supposedly not identical with each 
other, may hold between two tropes.  
Armstrong’s distinction between internal and external relations 
is summarised by Maurin in the following “figure”.1 In it, the word 
‘foundation’ is used, which Armstrong himself does not use in the 
work quoted. I do not think that this misrepresents his view though, 
since he uses the same term in later works.2 
 
 Internal relations  External relations 
 
Relations have foundations in 
the terms they relate. (For 
tropes: a is internally related to b 
iff given the existence of a and b 
— their ‘being what they are’ — 
their being related is ‘entailed’.) 
Relations do not have 
foundations in the terms they 
relate. (For tropes: a is 
externally related to b iff given 
the existence of a and b it is 
contingent whether or not the 
relation holds.) 
 
 
There is a potential ambiguity in Armstrong’s determination. One of 
its specifications has some affinity with the sense ascribed to George 
Edward Moore below; even more so with the sense in which Keith 
Campbell uses ‘internal relation’. It can be expressed this way: ‘an 
internal relation between relata is founded in the identities of the 
relata’.3 Another specification is expressed by the phrase, ‘an internal 
relation between relata is founded in their natures, but not necessarily 
in their identities’.  
Maurin ascribes the second determination of internality to 
George Edward Moore.  
According to Moore, if R is an internal relation holding 
between a and b, it will be the case that, had a and b not 
                                                           
1 Cf. Maurin 2002, p. 89. 
2 Cf. for example Armstrong 1989, p. 44. The corresponding word in Ewing 
is ‘grounded’. 
3 The following is perhaps more true to Armstrong’s own formulation in the 
quoted passage: ‘an internal relation between relata is founded in properties 
which are essential to the identities of the relata’. 
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been related by R, then necessarily a and b would not have 
been the self-same a and b. To Moore, then, the distinction 
between internal and external relations should be under-
stood in terms of what is and what is not essential to the 
identity of the related terms.1 
This determination is also summarised in a figure:2 
 
 Internal relations                                  External relations 
 
Relations are essential to the 
identity of the related terms. 
Relations are not essential to 
the identity of the related 
terms. 
 
 
It is mentioned that Moore puts the matter in terms of relational 
properties, not relations, and that this may be significant. Moore does 
indeed do so.3 I would say that it is significant, not least of all for 
reasons of intelligibility. After all, what does it mean to say that a 
relation is essential to the identity of its subject and the identity of its 
relatum? It seems to be a misleading way of saying that a certain 
relational property is essential to the identity of the subject and that 
this holds mutatis mutandis for the relatum. Put differently, that the 
relational property Rb is essential to the identity of a is taken as a 
pretext for R’s being essential to the identity of a. The same applies, 
mutatis mutandis, to b and the relational property aR.  Of course, the 
formula ‘aR’ is unorthodox. What is more, if R is asymmetric, or even 
non-symmetric, it is inaccurate as well. It should instead be R*a, 
where ‘R*’ names the converse of R. Though, if the latter rendering is 
used, the point of my remark is more easily missed.  
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 89. This is Ewing’s second sense. Cf. Ewing 1934, p. 121. 
2 Cf. Maurin 2002, p. 89. 
3 It is stated in Moore 1922, p. 282: 
[T]he fundamental proposition, which is meant by the assertion 
that all relations are internal, is, I think, a proposition with regard 
to relational properties, and not with regard to relations properly 
so-called. 
EXAMINATION OF MAURIN’S ONTOLOGY               109 
Maurin ventures to assert that Moore and Armstrong’s deter-
minations do not differ from each other in any significant way.  
There is some evidence to suggest that, for Moore, ‘being 
founded in’ does mean the same as ‘being essential to the 
identity of’. He does not always characterise the internal 
relation as one that is essential to the identity of its terms, but 
also talks of it as a relation, R, such that “given a and b, R 
is entailed” and such that “a and b could not have existed 
in any possible world without standing in R to each 
other.”1 Moore seems to consider these propositions equi-
valent ways of expressing the same point and when this 
point is put in terms of logical necessitation and entail-
ment, even his verbal differences with Armstrong seem to 
disappear.2 
I remind the reader that Moore is explicitly discussing internal rela-
tional properties. His view on internal relations must be derived from 
that. For my own part I doubt that the conclusions in the last quota-
tion can be drawn.  
Moore’s considered view on internal relational properties is 
stated in the following quotation. The letter ‘P’ represents a relational 
property.   
We can say that AP is itself a necessary truth, if and only if 
the universal proposition “(x = A) entails xP” (which we 
have seen follows from AP) is a necessary truth: that is to 
say, if and only if (x = A) entails xP. With this definition, 
what the dogma of internal relations asserts is that in every 
case in which a given thing actually has a given relational 
property, the fact that it has that property is a necessary 
truth; whereas what I am asserting is that, if the property 
in question is an “internal” property, then the fact in ques-
tion will be a necessary truth, whereas if the property in 
                                                           
1 My impression is that this is meant to be a quotation from Moore 1922, pp. 
291-2. It cannot be though, since Moore does not use the “formalism” ‘a and 
b’ there — or anywhere else in Moore 1922.  
2 Maurin 2002, p. 90.  
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question is “external,” then the fact in question will be a 
mere “matter of fact.”1 
Thus, an internal relational property of a thing is one which the thing 
has by necessity. According to what Moore calls ‘the dogma of 
internal relations’, which he rejects, every relational property a thing 
has it has of necessity. He supplies examples of internal and non-
internal relational properties respectively.  
It seems quite clear that, though the whole [which is a 
coloured patch half of which is red and half yellow] could 
not have existed without having the red patch for a part, 
the red patch might perfectly well have existed without 
being part of that particular whole. In other words, though 
every relational property of the form “having this for a 
spatial part” is “internal” in our sense, it seems equally 
clear that every property of the form “is a spatial part of 
this whole” is not internal, but purely external. Yet this last, 
according to me, is one of the things which the dogma of 
internal relations denies.2 
I strongly suspect that Maurin is influenced by what Campbell 
considers Moore’s doctrine to be. Unfortunately, he does not specify 
which pages of Moore 1922 support his interpretation. However, the 
following is presented as the result of his examination of the text. 
The examination reveals that as Moore uses the term 
‘internal relation’ not only does the existence of an internal 
relation aRb imply that its terms possess suitable 
foundations in virtue of which the relation holds, but 
further, it implies that those foundations are critical to the 
identity of the terms to which they belong. Were the 
relation to change, should aRb cease to obtain, the terms 
would cease to exist, i.e. cease to be the terms they are.3 
                                                           
1 Moore 1922, pp. 302-3. 
2 Moore 1922, p. 288. 
3 Campbell 1990, p. 111. 
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A phrase such as ‘were the relation to change the terms would cease 
to exist’ suggests that the terms are dependent on the relation. This is 
of course something different from the relation being founded in the 
terms, irrespective of whether the properties constituting the founda-
tion are essential to the identities of the terms or not.  
Moore supplies another example of an internal relational pro-
perty. Campbell refers to it, but he misrepresents it. The relational 
property Moore actually uses as an example is: being intermediate in 
shade between the qualities yellow and red. In Campbell’s rendering 
of it only the relation remains. 
Being intermediate in colour, for example, as a relation among 
colour patches, is internal in this sense. If a patch of 
colour begins by being intermediate in colour between two 
others, and then ceases to be so, this requires that at least 
one of the patches must have lost its identity, that is, must 
have ceased to be the colour patch it was.1 
Does Campbell assert that a specific colour patch loses its identity if 
it loses a particular relational property it has to another patch and that 
this is due to the fact that the latter changes in colour? Probably not. 
The patch which loses its identity is the latter one, not the former.  
In Moore’s original example, the quality orange is intermediate 
between the two qualities yellow and red. Since a quality which lacks 
the relational property in question would necessarily be another one it 
would not be orange; therefore, the relational property is internal. 
Moore says: 
[I]f any quality other than orange must be qualitatively 
different from orange, then it follows that “intermediate 
between yellow and red” is internal to “orange.” That is to 
say, the absence of the relational property “intermediate 
between yellow and red,” entails the property “difference in 
quality from orange.”2  
                                                           
1 Campbell 1990, p. 111. 
2 Moore 1922, p. 287. Entailment is the converse of following. Cf. Moore 1922, 
p. 291. Two illustrating examples of the latter are given: 
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This relationship can perhaps be described accordingly: since none of 
the three qualities can change, or disappear; the relational property of 
being intermediate between yellow and red is internal to orange.  
Maurin bases her third determination of internality in Campbell. 
Internal relations are founded in the natures of their relata. Addi-
tionally, the foundations must also be essential to the identities of 
relata. A relation founded in the natures of its relata, but not in what 
is essential to their identities, is said to be external and founded. If 
neither of these conditions is met, the relation is external — and of 
course unfounded. Thus, the external and founded relations cover a 
sort of middle ground between internal and external and unfounded 
relations. The example of a relation which is external and founded is 
one that exists between two shoes.  
Shoe C is not equally dirty in all possible worlds in which it 
exists, nor is shoe D. None the less, C’s being a cleaner 
shoe than D depends only on how dirty C and D are. 
Furthermore, this is a necessary truth: if X1 and X2 are 
equally dirty, and Y1 and Y2 are equally dirty, then if X1 is 
cleaner than Y1 then X2 is cleaner than Y2.1 
Thus, since being dirty is not essential to a shoe, it need not be dirty. 
The colour of a certain patch is essential to it. Without it, the patch 
loses its identity; or ceases to be.2 Contemplate upon there being an 
                                                                                                             
To say of a pair of properties P and Q, that any term which had 
had P would necessarily have had Q, is equivalent to saying that, 
in every case, from the proposition with regard to any given term 
that it has P, it follows that that term has Q: follows being under-
stood in the sense in which from the proposition with regard to 
any term, that it is a right angle, it follows that it is an angle, and in 
which from the proposition with regard to any term that it is red 
it follows that it is coloured. (Moore 1922, pp. 284-5) 
1 Campbell 1990, p. 112.  
2 This reminds of something Moore says: 
[T]hose who say that all relations are internal do sometimes tend 
to speak as if what they meant could be put in the form: In the 
case of every relational property which a thing has, it is always 
true that the thing which has it would have been different if it 
had not had that property; they sometimes say even: If P be a 
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essentially dirty entity, a smudge, which is cleaner than another entity, 
which is extremely dirty though this is accidental. Is the relation of 
being cleaner than, that exists between these two entities internal or is it 
external and founded? Is it perhaps internal while its converse is 
external and founded? And what about a smudge, could it be acci-
dentally dirty? I suppose not. 
Campbell’s tristinction summarised:1,2 
 
Internal relations External relations 
Founded Founded Unfounded 
 
Relations have 
foundations in the 
terms that are 
essential to the 
identity of those 
terms. 
 
Relations have 
foundations in the 
terms, but these are 
not essential to the 
identity of those 
terms. 
A relation’s holding 
or not has no con-
sequence for the 
existence, or mona-
dic characteristics of 
the terms. 
 
 
Maurin does not recognise any external, founded relations between 
tropes. Their simplicity is supposed to exclude that. What about 
Campbell? Well, it is evident that he does not reject complex tropes. 
                                                                                                             
relational property and A a term which has it, then it is always 
true that A would not have been A if it had not had P. This is, I 
think, obviously a clumsy way of expressing anything which 
could possibly be true, since, taken strictly, it implies the self-
contradictory proposition that if A had not had P, it would not 
have been true that A did not have P. (Moore 1922, p. 283) 
1 Cf. Maurin 2002, p. 91. A similar summary appears in Campbell 1990, p. 
112, where three examples are presented. Internal relation: is a darker colour 
than; external and founded relation: is a cleaner shoe than: external and un-
founded relation: is to the left of. 
2 This summary does not show, and neither does the account given in the 
main text, that Campbell considers all internal relations — in fact, all relations 
— to, as he says, supervene on their relata. He calls this doctrine 
‘foundationism’. As the name, to some extent, suggests, internal relations are 
supposed to be reducible to its foundations in relata. Cf. Campbell 1990, p. 
101. Maurin to some extent concurs with this. More is said about this below.  
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At the core of the trope ontology is this thought: the basic 
items, the ‘alphabet of being’, in Williams’ phrase, are cases 
of kinds. They are entities that are particulars, but not bare 
particulars. Each of them, if truly basic, has a simple 
nature. (There are complex derivative tropes. But the basic 
ones are single in character.)1 
A reasonable hypothesis is that Campbell also accepts non-concrete 
complexes of tropes as tropes since they are not concrete entities. 
Whether he also considers there to be external and founded relations 
between them depends on what he thinks of their capacity to contain 
accidental elements. Unfortunately, there is not enough information 
provided to settle this matter. 
The fourth, and last, determination of internality is hinted at in 
the following way. 
[T]wo entities are, on this view, internally related if they 
could not have existed independently of one another (or of the 
relation). To our surprise, regarding the distinction in this 
way — that is, regarding it in terms of the existential 
dependence of the related entities — renders the internal 
relations of at least Armstrong and Campbell external.2 
In this version of internality, internally related entities are existentially 
dependent on each other. If one ceases to exist, so does the other. 
Thus, internally related entities only exist in pairs or groups.  
                                                           
1 Campbell 1990, p. 20. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 91. Maurin refers to Ingvar Johansson as her source for this 
determination of internality. He is inspired by Ewing’s tenth sense. Cf. 
Johansson 1989, p. 113, and Ewing 1934, p. 136. The following is his 
determination in Johansson 1989, p. 117. 
A is internally related to B if and only if it is logically impossible for 
A to exist if B does not exist, and vice versa. 
The terminology used in the main text differs from Johansson’s. He makes a 
tristinction between internal, grounded and external relations. Thus, the 
grounded relations are not classified as being external. Cf. Johansson 1986, p. 
219, and 1989, pp. 117-20. 
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In this determination there is also a tristinction made between 
relations. These are summarised by Maurin:1,2 
 
  Internal relations    External relations 
  Terms are existentially         Terms are existentially independent 
  Dependent 
 
 Relation is 
founded in the 
terms it relates. 
Relation is not 
founded in the 
terms it relates. 
 
 
This concludes the preparations made by Maurin for her modal 
characterisation of exact resemblance. When carrying out the charac-
terisation, she starts with the fourth determination of internality.  
We can begin where we left off and ask, first, whether ER 
[=exact resemblance] is internal in the strong sense of 
                                                           
1 Cf. Maurin 2002, p. 91. 
2 In Johansson 1989 the middle form is called ‘grounded relation’.  
Rxy is a grounded relation if and only if it is logically impossible for 
there to exist a z and a w with exactly the same qualities as x and 
y, respectively, but between which the relation R does not hold. 
(Johansson 1989, p. 120) 
Johansson’s notion of internal relation can be found also in Armstrong, who 
asserts, in Armstrong 1978b, p. 3: 
[A]lthough particularity and universality are inseparable aspects 
of all existence, they are neither reducible to each other nor are 
they related. Though distinct, their union is closer than relation. 
Scotus talked of a mere “formal distinction” between the thisness 
and the nature of particulars. The situation is admittedly pro-
foundly puzzling, but, it is suggested, the Scotist view is the most 
satisfactory one which can be found. A comparison which may 
be useful is the way in which shape and size are united in a parti-
cular. 
Johansson makes the following apposite comment: “[I]f Armstrong had not 
already used up the term ‘internal relation’ he would not have been forced to 
say that ‘their union is closer than relation’, but could have written: ‘Though 
distinct, their union is so close that there is an internal relation between 
them.’” (Johansson 1989, p. 126)  
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being such that two exactly resembling tropes are also 
existentially dependent on one another. That is, is it the case 
that distinct tropes standing in the relation in question 
necessarily exist? Does the very resemblance of two tropes 
in this way restrict the contingent existence of each 
individual trope? To give an example: if tropes red1, red2 
and red3 are exactly similar, does this imply that the 
existence of each one of the resembling tropes necessitates, 
not only the existence of the relation of exact resemblance 
holding between them, but also the existence of each one 
of the other tropes with which it is in fact related?1 
All these questions are answered with a ‘no’. There seems to be no 
reason why one red-trope should necessitate another red-trope. The 
same holds with regard to all other tropes related by exact resemb-
lance. However this relation is regarded, the relata of each exact 
resemblance pair should be existentially independent of each other. 
What about the three other determinations of exact resemb-
lance? Since tropes are not entities which are normally thought of, but 
ordinary things are, Maurin starts with ordinary things. After intuit-
tions have been tested on them, she will move on to tropes. 
The first thing we can ask ourselves is whether these very 
objects [i.e., the exactly resembling concrete particulars a 
and b] could have existed without exactly resembling one 
another. We can ask, that is: is the exact resemblance of a 
and b essential to the identity if a and b? I think that the 
answer to this question is quite obviously ‘no’. Imagine 
that the two objects change, i.e., imagine that they are still 
a and b, that they retain their respective self-identity, but 
that they are now different. They have each perhaps lost or 
gained some of their properties. It is quite possible, given 
this change in circumstance, that they no longer exactly 
resemble one another. It is possible for a and b to exist 
without being related by exact resemblance. a and b are not 
necessarily related by exact resemblance, and so exact 
resemblance is not essential to the identity of a and b. But 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 92. 
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let us go back a moment in time when the object in fact 
exactly resembled one another. Although we have already 
decided that the objects are not necessarily related by exact 
resemblance, there is a sense in which at that very moment in 
time they had to exactly resemble one another. So: granted 
the way the objects are at a given moment of time, if they exactly 
resemble one another, then they — the objects in that 
particular state — could not have been the same (i.e. could 
not have been in that same particular state) and yet not exactly 
resemble one another. But does this mean that exact 
resemblance both is and is not a relation that is essential to 
the identity of a and b? I think not. Exact resemblance is, 
in this case, founded in a and b (at t), but it is not essential to 
the identity of a and b, since a and b may change, may 
cease to resemble, and yet continue to exist. In Campbell’s 
terms, it seems that exact resemblance is external/founded 
with respect to the concrete particulars a and b.1 
Here we see a review of the remaining determinations. The idea that 
the concrete particulars a and b exactly resemble each other is not 
essential to either of them. The reason is that either of them can 
change and still be itself, even though the exact resemblance between 
them no longer holds. Another way of saying this is in terms of a 
relational property that has exact resemblance as its relational part: 
the identity of a is not dependent on its being exactly similar to b. The 
same of course holds, mutatis mutandis, for b.  
The exact resemblance between concrete particulars is not 
considered internal in Campbell’s sense either. The reason for that is 
that its foundation is not exclusively the identity determining parts of 
the natures of its relata. It seems to be taken for granted here that 
there is no concrete particular whose qualitative content is exhausted 
by what is essential to its identity. 
This brings us to the conclusion that an exact resemblance 
which is held between concrete particulars is, in Campbell’s sense, 
external and founded. Although Maurin does not mention it, I 
wonder about the exact resemblance holding between two very short-
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, pp. 92-3. 
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lived, in fact instantaneous entities, but complex entities. Would it be 
internal in Campbell’s sense? I suppose the answer depends on 
whether the short life-span is accidental or essential. 
3.3.5 Internal Relations between Tropes 
After having trimmed her intuitions on concrete particulars, Maurin 
goes on to the resemblances that hold between tropes.  
Tropes […] are nothing but their nature and their nature 
— which, incidentally, they ‘are’ and do not merely ‘have’ 
— is simple. For a trope, […] it would, given this 
characterisation of what it is to be a trope, be impossible to 
have been different. For if a trope a1 were to change, the 
trope emerging from this change would not be a1. As 
tropes are nothing but their particular nature they cannot 
change. They can only begin and cease to exist (and 
perhaps move through space and time, but that is a topic 
for another discussion). Consequently, if tropes a1 and a2 
exactly resemble one another, it is impossible for them (these 
very tropes) not to be related by exact resemblance. For 
tropes, therefore, exact resemblance appears to be a founded 
relation that is essential to the identity of its related terms. In fact, 
for the special case of tropes, saying of a relation that it is 
founded in the tropes it relates and saying of it that it is 
essential to the identity of the tropes it relates will 
necessarily amount to the same thing.1 
Judging from the actual wording of the last sentence it seems to be 
essential to the identities of tropes that they resemble certain other 
tropes. This would mean that if one of them ceases to exist, that 
affects the identity of the other tropes. However, I do not think that 
this is the considered view. Instead, the notion is that since tropes 
cannot be different from what they are, the resemblances holding 
between them are due to their essences. This is internality in Camp-
bell’s sense. 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 93. 
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The purpose of making a modal characterisation of exact 
resemblance is to gain insights for successfully making an adequate 
ontological characterisation of it. Three attempts at such an onto-
logical characterisation are discussed. Although no decisive argument 
in favour of any one in particular is offered, Maurin prefers the third 
alternative.1 According to the third alternative, exact resemblance is a 
pseudo-addition to the basic trope theoretical scheme. The term 
‘pseudo-addition’ indicates that exact resemblance is non-existent. 
This of course gives cause for a comment. 
Although the invocation of ‘unreal’ additions to solve 
philosophical problems may seem nothing short of magic, 
I will try to show that this last resort is not as desperate as 
it may initially seem. It is the already established internality 
of exact resemblance that makes the move to ‘pseudo-
additions’ not only acceptable but attractive to the trope 
theorist.2 
In what follows I will discuss the first and the third accounts but skip 
the second one.3  
According to the first account, exact resemblance is an un-
derived relation. The introduction of it reads: 
An underived relation is an entity ‘in its own right’, i.e. the 
kind of entity that needs to be given a place of its own 
within the basic metaphysical scheme. The metaphysical 
scheme so far considered contains tropes and nothing 
else.4 
Since the project is to investigate whether a one-category ontology of 
tropes is sufficiently rich to account for what needs to be accounted 
for, exact resemblance should also be a trope, given that it is an entity 
in its own right. Two potentially serious objections against its being a 
trope are discerned. Both take the form of regresses.  
                                                           
1 Cf. Maurin 2002, p. 94. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 94. 
3 It takes exact resemblance to be a non-relational tie. 
4 Maurin 2002, p. 94. 
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The first regress is the so-called ‘Bradley’s regress’.1 It targets 
the connection between exact similarity and its relata. 
The idea is now that the exact resemblance which thus 
unifies tropes that are ‘the same’ is, in turn, to be onto-
logically characterised as yet another trope. For exactly 
similar tropes a1 and a2, their exact similarity is, in other 
words, accounted for by the postulation of another trope, 
r1, holding between a1 and a2. But if the union of tropes a1 
and a2 requires r1, what accounts for the union of tropes 
a1, a2 and r1? If the answer to the question is of what 
unified a1 and a2 was r1, why should not the answer to the 
question of what unifies a1, a2 and r1 be yet another trope 
r2? Yet conceding this, it seems that we embark on an 
endless regress […], and this seems to stand in the way of 
our ever really connecting the original a1 and a2.2 
This regress might be a threat to any relation which is an entity in its 
own right. In Maurin’s proposal of how to solve the problem of 
thing-construction, the relation of compresence is the key notion. As 
it will turn out, she considers it to be an entity in its own right and, 
for that reason, wants to deal with this argument in connection with 
the problem of thing-construction. I will agree with her in that and 
simply go on. 
At this point, we will take a look on the other regress argument. 
The source of it is Bertrand Russell. He intended it to show that 
                                                           
1 Despite its entrenched name, Bradley is not the inventor or discoverer of 
this regress. A version of it can be found in Aristotle, who uses it to show the 
necessity of form as an organising constituent of a whole. Cf. Metaphysics, 
1041b11ff. The regress is also pleaded by the early mediaeval Muslim school 
Mutakallimun, according to which it shows the notion of (polyadic) relation 
to be incoherent. In explicit opposition to this, Avicenna maintains that the 
infinite line of relations is purely conceptual. Things are of course compli-
cated by his reductionist view on polyadic unit relations. Cf. Avicenna 1495, 
tract iii, chap. 10. Cf. also Weinberg 1965, pp. 78, 89-93, and Mertz 1996, pp. 
132-4. 
2 Maurin 2002, pp. 95-6. 
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particulars are not enough for constructing properties. Versions of 
the argument are found in several of his works.1  
[W]e explain the likeness of two terms as consisting in the 
likeness which their likeness bears to the likeness of two 
other terms, and such a regress is plainly vicious.2 
According to the view against which the argument is directed, entities 
have their properties due to their being similar to each other. For 
example, all the entities which are blue resemble each other and that 
is why they are blue, not the other way round. Since no universals are 
recognised, the resemblances themselves are particulars. But, what 
about the resemblances which exist between pairs of blue things? 
Well, their potency is due to their resembling each other. Thus, there 
must be yet another set of particular resemblances that hold between 
resemblances. The original question reappears though, calling for a 
third set of particular resemblances. The pattern is then that to 
explain the unity of the resemblances holding on the nth level, 
resemblances holding on the n+1th level must be postulated.  
The regress Russell has in view can be described as analytical. 
Analytical regresses are vicious. There is also a virtuous kind of 
regress. Regresses of the latter kind are implicative. These characterisa-
tions are inspired by Russell, who in one of his works writes: 
An infinite regress may be of two kinds. In the objection-
able kind, two or more propositions join to constitute the 
meaning of some proposition; of these constituents, there is 
one at least whose meaning is similarly compounded; and 
so on ad infinitum. This form of regress commonly results 
from circular definitions. Such definitions may be ex-
panded in a manner analogues to that in which continued 
fractions are developed from quadratic equations. But at 
every stage the term to be defined will reappear, and no 
definition will result. Take for example the following: 
“Two people are said to have the same idea when they have 
                                                           
1 Cf. for example Russell 1912, p. 55. The argument is also found in Mill 
1843, p. 117n.  
2 Russell 1911, p. 9. 
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ideas which are similar; and ideas are similar when they 
contain an identical part.” If an idea may have a part which 
is not an idea, such a definition is not logically objection-
able; but if part of an idea is an idea, then, in the second 
place where identity of ideas occurs, the definition must be 
substituted; and so on. Thus wherever the meaning of a 
proposition is in question, an infinite regress is objection-
able, since we never reach a proposition which has a 
definite meaning. But many infinite regresses are not of 
this form. If A be a proposition whose meaning is 
perfectly definite, and A implies B, B implies C, and so on, 
we have an infinite regress of a quite unobjectionable kind. 
This depends upon the fact that implication is a synthetic 
relation, and that, although, if A be an aggregate of 
propositions, A implies any proposition which is part of 
A, it by no means follows that any proposition which A 
implies is part of A. Thus there is no logical necessity, as 
there was in the previous case, to complete the infinite 
regress before A acquires a meaning.1 
Here, the regresses mentioned concern meaning. In the case of the 
resemblance regress meaning is not the issue though. According to 
Maurin it concerns existence instead. Therefore, she characterises the 
difference between vicious and virtuous regresses in terms of existen-
tial dependence. 
A regress is (modified) Russell-virtuous if the ‘later’ terms 
in the regress-hierarchy depend for their existence on the 
existence of its ‘earlier’ terms. 
A regress is (modified) Russell-vicious if the ‘earlier’ terms 
of the regress-hierarchy cannot exist unless the ‘later’ 
terms of the regress-hierarchy exist. That is, it is vicious if 
the ‘earlier’ terms depend for their existence on the ‘later’ 
terms.2  
                                                           
1 Russell 1903, pp. 348-9. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 101. 
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While a modified Russell-virtuous regress is implicative, a modified 
Russell-vicious regress is analytic. If we return to the quotation from 
Russell 1911, it looks as if the earlier resemblances need the later ones 
in order to fulfil their task. The later ones, in turn, need the even later 
ones in order to fulfil their task, etc. It would appear therefore that 
earlier resemblances are existentially dependent on the later ones. 
Though, this is not Maurin’s view of the matter of tropes.  
Is the resemblance regress vicious in this modified 
Russellian sense? To answer this question we need to 
invoke the already established internality of exact resemb-
lance. On the present account, simply given the existence 
of tropes a1 and a2, their exact resemblance, r1, must follow 
necessarily. Exact resemblance is an internal relation, and 
this means that it is strongly existentially dependent on the 
existence of that which it relates. Given the existence of 
the exact resemblance-trope r1, moreover, its exact resemb-
lance to other exact resemblance-tropes must likewise 
follow by necessity; and so on. From the internality of the 
exact resemblance relation it seems to follow, to use 
Russellian terms, that the earlier terms of the regress imply 
the later terms — they do not presuppose them. On a 
modified version of the Russellian distinction put in terms 
of ‘direction of existential dependence’, therefore, there is 
reason to think that the metaphysical regress of resemblance 
is not vicious. This is good news for anyone who wishes to 
characterise exact resemblance ontologically as underived 
relation.1 
   a1 
    
 
 
 a2 a3 
 
In the figure above, every line represents a resemblance trope which 
is holding between what is at its ends. The line between a1 and a2 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, pp. 101-2. 
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represents r1; the line between a1 and a3 represents yet another exact 
resemblance trope, r2; the line between r1 and r2 represents a third 
resemblance trope r3; etc.1 There is an infinite number of triangles in-
side the first one. 
If the regress is implicative, there must be something at the start 
which implies what comes later. Remember that Maurin’s charac-
terisation of tropes is that they are simple, abstract particulars. Here 
‘abstract’ has the sense of ‘qualitative’. This gives a hint of why she 
considers the regress to be implicative, instead of analytical. The 
abstractness of tropes is no doubt taken as a pretext for that. The 
point of departure for Russell’s regress argument, if applied to tropes, 
is that resemblance tropes are what furnish their relata with qualita-
tive content. That premise is denied by Maurin. It is incompatible 
with the assumptions of (her) trope theory. 
We know from an earlier quotation that resemblance is assumed 
to be objective as well as primitive. In the present context, where 
Russell’s regress argument is claimed to be abortive if used against 
trope theory, what does this primitiveness amount to? Since the 
resemblance which holds between two relata allegedly is strongly 
existentially dependent on the two latter ones, does not that imply 
that the former is non-primitive in a relevant sense? And what about 
its own qualitative content, is it not dependent on the relata? After all, 
a resemblance trope holding between a pair of blue-tropes is it not 
qualitatively different from a resemblance trope between a pair of 
red-tropes? Or, even more so, from a resemblance trope which holds 
between a pair of square-tropes?2 The differences will be reproduced 
as the implicative regress propagates, will they not? 
                                                           
1 A far as I know, this figure originates from Küng 1967, p. 69. 
2 Cf. Campbell 1990, p. 72, where this seems to be denied:  
[T]he only difference (apart from irrelevances like place and time) 
between an exactly resembling pair of reds and an exactly 
resembling pair of greens lies in the fact that the first pair are 
reds and the second greens. The resemblings do not have any 
added distinguishing character. 
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Perhaps the resemblance regress is analytical after all? The 
nearest an admission of that Maurin comes is in her summary of the 
results of the discussion about the first proposal. She says: 
[A]s long as the exact resemblance between tropes is 
founded on the existence of yet another (resemblance) 
trope, we will have to accept some kind of endless regress, 
in this Russell was surely right. Yet as the regress in ques-
tion will be of what I call a ‘metaphysical’ kind, the 
viciousness of the regress remains an open question. If the 
regress is impossible, then obviously yes, the resemblance 
regress will be vicious. But if, instead, it is the ‘direction of 
existential dependence’ of the necessarily induced resemb-
lances which turns out to be what decides whether the 
regress is vicious or not, then perhaps, no, we do not have 
to regard the regress as vicious.1 
What the first sentence describes is a regress pattern of the analytical 
kind since an exact resemblance trope is said to be founded on 
another exact resemblance trope. In an implicative regress this 
description does not apply to the first exact resemblance trope. 
Whether or not the regress is metaphysical2 does not change that.  
In the last sentence of the above quotation the regress is no 
longer considered to be analytical. Before that happens, a reference is 
made to impossibility as a criterion of viciousness. It is hinted at in 
the second paragraph of the following quotation from Küng 1967. 
[T]he concrete relations [i.e., relation tropes], which are 
“the same” inasmuch as they are all equality relations, must 
also be related to one another — probably by an equality 
relation of higher order; and we can continue asking about 
the status of this equality of higher order; and so on in 
infinitum. […]  
 The nominalists, especially, who regard with suspicion 
the “teaming” infinity of abstract entities, will be very 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 103. 
2 I take it that its being metaphysical in kind means that it concerns existence, 
not meaning. Cf. Maurin 2002, pp. 100-1. 
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reluctant to end up in this way with another infinity of 
concrete entities. However, it seems not at all impossible 
that our concrete world should include an infinity of 
concrete entities of different levels, an infinity which our 
limited intellect will never be able to exhaust explicitly.1 
When Küng talks about equality, we can interpret it as being on a par 
with exact resemblance. The phrase ‘and we can continue asking 
about the status of this equality of higher order’ indicates that Küng is 
referring to an analytical regress.2 The regress in question would be 
impossible if our concrete world could not include an infinite number 
of concrete entities. Among the concrete entities are the tropes.3 
Evidently, the concrete world can include an infinite number of such 
entities. Küng considers an infinite number of them to be enough to 
fulfil the needs. What he misses, though, is that the point of the 
                                                           
1 Küng 1967, p. 168. 
2 In support of this Küng 1967, pp. 68-9, can be quoted: 
In Russell’s view identically the same entity must correspond to 
this word [i.e., ‘similar’, which is short for ‘exactly similar’] in all 
instances, i.e., the entity must be a platonistic universal. His argu-
ment is that otherwise an infinite regress would result. Suppose 
[…] that it is true of individuals a, b, and c, that a and b are similar 
to one another, that b and c are similar to one another. If the 
word ‘similar’ does not stand for identically the same entity in all 
three instances, but for three numerically different entities, then 
there must be another reason why the same word ‘similar’ is used 
in all three instances. It must be because these three numerically 
different relational entities designated by the word ‘similar’ are 
somehow similar to one another. In describing how these rela-
tional entities are similar to one another we again use the word 
‘similar’ several times. (Or perhaps in place of ‘similar’ we might 
use ‘similar2’, since we are talking now of a similarity of a higher 
order.) And again in all these new instances either the word 
‘similar’ (i.e., ‘similar2’) stands for identically the same entity, 
namely for a platonistic universal, or else it stands for numerically 
different entities, i.e., for entities which in turn have to be similar 
(similar3) to one another; and so on ad infinitum. 
There is no doubt that the regress described here is analytical in nature. 
3 Küng’s trope-like entities are concrete, which means that they exist in space 
and time. 
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(analytical) regress argument is that there will not be enough of them 
for all that.  
As pointed out above in the last sentence of the quotation from 
the summary, Maurin takes the regress to be implicative. Differently 
put, the direction of existential dependence is supposed to occur 
from right to left, which means that the entities to the left are the 
existential ground for the entities to the right. 
The first proposal, which is that exact resemblance occurs as 
tropes, is rejected by Maurin though. Why is that? Campbell seems to 
provide her with the reason. To see what this reason is, a fragment of 
his argumentation is accounted for.  
The things Campbell asserts regarding regress arguments has 
bearing only on the implicative kind. 
Russell’s argument1 was that, to revert to Küng’s diagram,2 
a, b and c are certainly particulars, but there must be the 
same resemblance between a and b as there is between a and c, 
since a, b and c are all, ex hypothesi, of just the same shade of 
red. But then if we have the same resemblance between 
these two pairs of items, this is a multiply-instantiated 
entity, in short, a universal. 
 The only reply this calls for is strongmindedness. We 
must reject the claim that, in the sense that matters, there 
is the same resemblance between a and b and between a 
and c. These are two different, but very similar, even 
exactly similar, resemblances. And the resemblances be-
tween the resemblances are likewise matching particulars, 
not universals. In Küng’s regress, the items are particulars 
all the way down. If we insist on this, then Russell’s objection 
can find no purchase.3 
Campbell’s strong-mindedness causes him to miss the whole point of 
the regress argument. All he sees in the regress is its alleged impli-
cativeness and he is completely untroubled by it. This becomes 
                                                           
1 He refers to the version of Russell 1912. 
2 Küng’s diagram is the triangle presented earlier. 
3 Campbell 1990, p. 38.  
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apparent when he discusses what he calls ‘Küng’s objection’. Three 
reasons are put forward to show that the regress is not vicious. The 
first one is that “it proceeds in a direction of greater and greater 
formality and less and less substance.”1  
The second reason is that realists do not escape it either. Let the 
first level of resemblances of Küng’s figure be instances of 
resemblance with respect to redness. These three instantiate the same 
universal; therefore they must resemble each other. The conclusion 
drawn from this is: “[I]f the regress is a serious problem for 
resemblance theory [i.e., Campbell’s own doctrine], the parallel 
regress of instantiated universals is an equally serious problem for 
realism.”2 
The third reason is that “it is no real trouble for either [trope 
theory or realism].”3 This is so since everything after the first trio — 
a, b and c in the last quotation — follows automatically. This phenol-
menon is what he calls ‘supervenience’. The following is a somewhat 
contradictory description of it: 
On the resemblance theory, if resemblance is truly primi-
tive and ungrounded, the terms d, e and f [which are exact 
resemblance tropes]4 will be the starting point from which 
all subsequent supervenient terms flow. If, as this work 
favours, resemblance is an internal relation grounded in 
particular natures in the terms, then the red tropes a, b and 
c will generate the whole edifice of supervening resemb-
lance triples. 
 Either way, there is a manifestly finite base for this 
efflorescence of dependencies. And I take it as a cardinal 
principle in ontology that supervenient ‘additions’ to ontology are 
pseudo-additions. No new being is involved. In the Creation 
metaphor, to bring supervenients into being calls for no 
                                                           
1 Campbell 1990, p. 35. 
2 Campbell 1990, p. 36.  
3 Campbell 1990, p. 37. 
4 One page earlier — i.e., in Campbell 1990, p. 36 — the three letters ‘d’, ‘e’ 
and ‘f’ are used as names of the first three exact resemblance tropes in a 
diagram à la Küng. 
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separate and additional act on God’s part. Let Him create 
the three red items a, b and c. That by itself will suffice to 
generate Küng’s regress.1 
What supervenes on already recognised entities constitutes no real 
ontological expansion. It is an ontological free lunch.2 From this it is 
concluded: “[…] Küng’s regress has no power to damage a theory 
that proposes to deal with Question B by appeal to resemblance 
among tropes.”3  
Although Campbell himself seems satisfied with this rejection of 
what he takes to be the regress argument, Maurin is not. This is her 
judgement on it: 
Is the regress that follows from regarding exact resemb-
lance as yet another trope vicious or virtuous given 
Campbell’s take on the distinction? It is obviously vicious. 
It crowds the world with an infinite number of necessarily 
incurred and idle, yet ‘substantial’, tropes. It is therefore, 
on the present view, unacceptable. Given Campbell’s 
distinction, then, the strategy that consists in accepting the 
regress but denying that it is vicious will not work, and so 
we should give up our attempt at characterising exact 
resemblance ontologically as yet another trope.4 
Thus, the presumption is that the world will be over-populated with 
entities if exact resemblance is supposed to exist as an underived 
relation — i.e., as tropes. This is a misleading way of describing 
Campbell’s view though. In effect, he has the same view as Maurin. 
This will be made evident below. 
3.3.6 The Preferred Account of Internal Relations between Tropes 
The ontological characterisation of exact resemblance which Maurin 
finds most attractive is suggested like this: 
                                                           
1 Campbell 1990, p. 37. 
2 Note that no new dish will be served.  
3 Campbell 1990, p. 37. 
4 Maurin 2002, pp. 102-3. 
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The alternative according to which exact resemblance can 
be ontologically characterised as a pseudo-addition rests 
on the adoption of certain principles concerning when and 
where the existence of an entity must be assumed and when 
and where it must not. The proposal has the following 
general form: 
(i) Atomic propositions of the form ‘a and b are the 
same F’ (where a and b are tropes) are made true by 
equivalence classes of tropes. 
(ii) Two tropes belong to the same equivalence class if 
they exactly resemble one another. 
(iii) Two tropes exactly resemble one another because 
they are the way they are (i.e. a and b exactly resemble 
one another because a is the way a is, and b is the way 
b is). 
(iv) a is the way a is because a exists (i.e. a is ‘nothing but’ 
its particular nature), and the same goes for b. 
(v) Therefore, propositions of the form ‘a and b are the 
same F’ merely require the existence of a and b to 
provide for their truth.1 
This looks very much like Campbell’s doctrine; he even uses the 
phrase ‘pseudo-additions’ when characterising supervenient tropes, of 
which resemblance tropes are examples. He makes the elucidatory 
remark that no new being is involved. It sounds perhaps a bit para-
doxical to characterise these pseudo-additions as particulars.  
According to Maurin it is unnecessary to add exact resemblance 
tropes to the metaphysical scheme of trope theory. Judging from 
what she says in one place, this means that such tropes are unreal.2 In 
the next quotation they are explicitly said not to exist. Ontologically 
they can be characterised as being nothing at all. Two sources of 
justifications for this are found. One of these is the internal character 
of exact resemblance. She expresses this view in the following, some-
what paradoxical, way. 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 109. 
2 Cf. Maurin 2002, p. 94. 
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If the exact resemblance between distinct tropes can 
obtain without the addition of some relation of exact 
resemblance, it becomes important that the mere existence 
of the related tropes necessitate their exact resemblance. But 
this is just what we have taken it to mean to say of exact 
resemblance that it is internal.1 
Maurin does not want to use the term ‘supervenience’. Her stated 
reason is that it is used in many other senses. Therefore, she thinks it 
is safer to use terms such as ‘internal’, ‘pseudo-additional’ or ‘non-
additional’.  
The other source of justification used is Ockham’s razor in 
combination with the goal of making metaphysical theories as elegant 
and simple as one possibly can. These constitute guidelines for any 
metaphysical theory.  
Even if the fact that exact resemblance is necessarily 
incurred given the mere existence of the related entities 
does not force you to treat it as a pseudo-addition rather 
than as a real and substantial addition, this circumstance 
together with the above listed guidelines does more or less 
prescribe so treating it.2 
I take it that elegance and Ockham’s razor together demand that 
anything which is considered not necessary should be shaved off. 
Furthermore, the alleged pseudo-additional “nature” of exact resemb-
lance fits perfectly when solving the so-called Bradley’s regress.  
That regress ensues because relations considered as entities 
in their own right are just as distinct from that which they 
relate as the entities they are meant to relate are distinct 
from each other. Pseudo-additions can hardly be said to 
be, in the same way, distinguishable from that which they 
relate. In fact the basic idea is that, existentially speaking, 
they are nothing but that which they relate. And if they are 
nothing but that which they relate — at least, if they are 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 110. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 110. 
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only a pseudo-addition to that which they relate — there 
seems to be no reason to require that they be, in turn, 
related to that which they relate.1 
The message expressed here is: that which is nothing in itself needs 
not really be related to that which it just seemingly relates. 
What about the other regress, the one referred to Russell? It is 
supposed to be solved in either of two ways. (i) If the existence of the 
infinite number of exact resemblance tropes is taken as problematic, 
the pseudo-additional nature of these solves it, since there is no 
infinite number of such tropes. In fact, there is not even a single one. 
(ii) If the ontological status of that which is necessarily induced is not 
considered to be important, what is important is instead the necessita-
ting; it is asserted regarding the latter: 
[P]erhaps even on this alternative there will be a regress (a 
regress of ‘pseudo-additional’ exact resemblances). But the 
problem with the resemblance regress, one might argue, 
will nevertheless be solved, since we can now claim that 
this regress is not vicious. For, surely, a regress of non-
existent, pseudo-additional relations is extremely innocent 
and, therefore, obviously virtuous.2 
Chris Daly objects to the claim that something which is internal with 
regard to something else is only pseudo-additional. Why could the 
exact resemblance which is necessitated by two relata not be an ontic 
addition to them? Maurin admits that they may very well be so. 
Though, in reference to the guidelines mentioned earlier she believes 
that supervenient3 additions need not be postulated. Everything 
which needs to be accounted for can allegedly be accounted for 
without including these entities in the basic metaphysical scheme. Her 
last word on this issue seems to be:  
Yet, ultimately, whether or not one accepts that this is 
enough to justify a refusal to treat exact resemblance as 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 111. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 111. 
3 She uses the term herself in this context. 
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real boils down to faith. In truth, no knock-down argu-
ment for (or against) this refusal exists.1 
I dare say that there are at least indicia against considering resemb-
lance to be pseudo-additional. This is shown by a remark on the 
alleged importance of strictly distinguishing between the A- and B-
questions. Maurin is emphatic about the A- and B-questions not 
having parallel answers. According to what she refers to as classical 
theories of properties, they have parallel answers. Trope theory, or at 
least Maurin’s version of it, is not included. I repeat what has been 
said regarding the distinction between the two questions. 
Since tropes are inherently particular that which explains 
why, or says in virtue of what, one red object is red cannot 
be strictly the same as that which explains why, or says in 
virtue of what, another object is also red. Given trope 
theory, each particular red object is red in virtue of its very 
own particular red-trope. It is this circumstance which 
more or less forces the trope theorist to distinguish clearly 
between the question of what makes it true that ‘a is F’ 
and the question of what makes it true that ‘a and b are the 
same F’. To answer the latter (i.e. the B-question) the 
existence of distinct tropes — one belonging to a and one 
belonging to b — is surely required, but it is not enough. 
An adequate answer to the B-question also requires some 
account of the special relation in which these two tropes 
stand — something that is not required if the question is 
of the A-type. In this way the distinction between the A- 
and B-question is highly relevant by the very structure of 
trope-theory.2 
Now, what are the answers to the A- and B-questions respectively, 
according to Maurin’s trope theory? Although the objects referred to 
in this quotation are not tropes, the two questions are particularly 
relevant with regard to tropes. In fact, the questions asked with 
regard to tropes are thought of as being the fundamental ones. 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 113. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 63. 
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Remember also that ‘the same’, according to Maurin, can have either 
of two senses. One of these is accounted for in terms of numerical 
identity, the other in terms of exact resemblance. Thus, the B-
question can be rendered in two ways: 
B1. What makes it true that ‘a and b are numerically identical Fs’? 
B2. What makes it true that ‘a and b are exactly resembling Fs’? 
The A-question remains: 
A. What makes it true that ‘a is F’? 
The answer to the last question, question A, is: a. More strictly: the 
existence of a. The answer to the first question, question B1, would 
seem to be: nothing, since a and b are not numerically identical. The 
strict answer to the second question, question B2, would seem to be: 
the existence of a and b. According to the preferred account of “the 
special relation in which these two tropes stand” the relation is 
pseudo-additional to its relata. This makes it numerically identical 
with the pair of a and b. In itself it is not an increase of being.1 
In genuine resemblance theory the exact resemblance relations 
are not just increases of being, they are what provide entities with 
their qualitative contents. Thus, one exact resemblance relation is 
needed per quality. The same of course holds mutatis mutandis for 
relations. Although Maurin declares exact resemblance to be needed 
as a part of an adequate trope theory, she does not give it the role it 
should have in a genuine resemblance theory.2  
                                                           
1 That resemblance in itself does not make any contribution to truth-making 
is commented on in Maurin 2005, p. 23: 
To make true ‘a and b are both red’ the existence of a and b is 
required. From their existence, their resemblance follows necess-
arily — and so will not make a separate contribution to truth. 
This seems to confirm that the class of all tropes exactly resembling a and b is 
irrelevant for answering the B-question. If any class at all is relevant it is that 
having a and b as its only elements. The expression ‘increase of being’ is used 
in Armstrong 1997, p. 141. I do not think he is the inventor of it though. 
2 Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra advocates an analytic ontology which he 
classifies as a resemblance nominalism. In fact, his name for it is ‘resemblance 
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If a certain relation is pseudo-additional to its relata, it would 
seem to be identical with another relation which is also pseudo-
                                                                                                             
nominalism’. Since the only particulars he recognises are concrete particulars, 
the theory is not a moderate nominalism. Resemblances between particulars 
are said to be what give them their qualitative contents. So far, everything 
seems to be in line with what can be expected. It turns out though that exact 
resemblance relations in themselves are supposed to be dispensable. The 
following is what he asserts at the crucial moment. 
What then makes it true that a and b resemble each other? The 
Resemblance Nominalist’s answer is: just a and b together. In 
general any two resembling entities x and y (whether they are 
particulars or ordered n-tuples) resemble each other in virtue of 
being x and y. If a and b resemble each other then their resemb-
lance is a fact because of their being the entities they are, and so a 
and b are the sole Truthmakers of ‘a and b resemble each other’. 
There is then no need to postulate extra entities to account for 
facts of resemblance: the resembling entities suffice to account 
for them. And so no regress of resemblances arises, since there 
are only resembling particulars and no resemblances at all. 
(Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, p. 115) 
Dispensing with the resemblance relations is what makes it possible for him 
to seemingly avoid Russell’s analytical regress. This move is obviously not 
available for him though. It is not possible to found resemblances between 
relata on the relata themselves, if the latter are supposed to have their content 
by virtue of that which they found. If it could be done, it would be an 
ontological version of the Indian rope trick. Although concrete particulars are 
the relata of resemblance relations, they are in themselves nothing more than 
nodes in resemblance nets. It is its resemblance net which gives each 
particular its qualitative content. This is confirmed in a footnote in 
connection with the former quotation. 
Note that this [i.e., that resembling entities suffice to account for 
facts of resemblance] does not make Resemblance Nominalism 
collapse into Ostrich Nominalism. According to the latter a is 
sufficient to make it true that a is scarlet while according to the 
former other particulars are necessary. Also, according to Ostrich 
Nominalism a and b are sufficient to make it true that a is bigger 
than b, while according to Resemblance Nominalism other pairs 
of particulars are necessary. 
Here we see that Rodriguez-Pereyra does not allow just one entity to be 
scarlet; nor that there is just one pair in which the subject is bigger than the 
relatum. In both cases there must be others to resemble and by virtue of that 
obtain qualitative content.  
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additional to them. This line of reasoning has affinity with an object-
tion made by Herbert Hochberg. He is reported to have said in one 
of his lectures: 
[I]f, as seems probable, both ‘a and b are distinct’ and ‘a 
and b are the same’1 (where a and b are tropes) are atomic 
propositions, then these propositions must (on the current 
‘pseudo-addition view’) have the same truth-makers — 
namely, a and b. But this is impossible, because the propo-
sitions in question not only mean different things but are 
also logically independent of one another.2 
Maurin’s response to this objection is to invoke three putative obser-
vations. The first one is: 
(1) Giving the truth-maker(s) for a proposition is not as 
we have seen the same as giving its meaning. There-
fore it is entirely possible that two propositions might 
have different meanings and yet be made true by the 
same truth-maker(s).3 
Hochberg claims though that since the two propositions are atomic, 
they are also logically independent of each other. This makes it 
impossible for them to have the same truth-maker(s). In Maurin 
2005, the principle stipulating that logically independent basic propo-
sitions have distinct truth-makers is called ‘Hochberg’s principle’.4 To 
be able to reject it, a stronger “observation” must be invoked: 
                                                           
1 The two sentences are not supposed to constitute a contradiction. The 
message of the first is that a and b are numerically distinct. That of the second 
is that they exactly resemble each other.  
2 The lecture was given at the Philosophical Society in Lund, Sweden, 
20.10.1999. The quotation is from Maurin 2002, pp. 113-4. 
3 Maurin 2002, p. 114. 
4 Cf. Maurin 2005, p. 141. The principle is implied in the following statement, 
made in Hochberg 2004, p. 39.  
Let a basic proposition be one that is either atomic or the nega-
tion of an atomic proposition. Then consider tropes t and t* 
where “t is different from t*” and “t is exactly similar to t*” are 
both true. Assume you take either “diversity” or “identity” as pri-
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(2) Logically independent, atomic propositions may have 
the same truth-maker(s).1 
As support for this, an authoritative statement of three prominent 
philosophers is supplied: 
We conceive it as in principle possible that one and the 
same truth-maker may make true sentences with different 
meanings: this happens anyway if we take non-atomic 
sentences into account, and no arguments occur to us which 
suggests that this cannot happen for atomic sentences as well.2 
I suspect that the non-atomic sentences referred to here are dis-
junctive sentences.3 Disjunctions are a bit too special though to be 
suited for generalisations in this context.  
Maurin also pleads a third “observation”: 
(3) ‘a and b are the same’ and ‘a and b are distinct’ are not, 
and contrary to the hypothesis, logically independent.4 
Her commentary to this is: 
In other words, they are not both atomic. The relation 
between the propositions might be something like the 
following: a could not exactly resemble b unless a and b 
                                                                                                             
mitive. Then both propositions are basic propositions. But they 
are logically independent. Hence they cannot have the same truth 
makers. Yet, for a trope theory of the type Maurin espouses, they 
do and must have the same truth makers. Thus the theory fails.  
1 Maurin 2002, p. 114. 
2 Mulligan, Simons & Smith 1984, p. 300. The italics are Maurin’s. 
3 One page earlier in the same article it is asserted: 
The glory of logical atomism was that it showed that not every 
kind of sentence needs it own characteristic kind of truth-maker. 
Provided we can account for the truth and falsehood of atomic 
sentences, we can dispense with special truth-makers for, e.g., 
negative, conjunctive, disjunctive, and identity sentences. (Mulli-
gan, Simons & Smith 1984, p. 299) 
4 Maurin 2002, p. 114. 
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were distinct. (This also means denying that the relation of 
exact resemblance is reflexive.)1 
The suggestion here is that ‘a and b are the same’ (i.e. ‘a and b exactly 
resemble each other’) implies ‘a and b are distinct’. Thus, at least the 
former is just apparently atomic.  
Fraser MacBride has presented what perhaps is the best support 
for the thesis that (strict) logical independence is not adequate as a 
general criterion of independence. He is invoking an exhortation 
made by Russell to all his fellow ontologists.  
Russell famously exhorted us to maintain a ‘robust sense 
of reality’ when engaged in ontological enquiry. This 
attitude is evidenced here when Russell insists that it is the 
same “external fact” that makes “A is before B” and “B is 
after A” true […] [This] suggests that Russell — far from 
being guided by Hochberg’s principle that logically 
independent statements require distinct truth-makers — in 
fact rejects this conception. For the statement that “B is 
after A” no more logically follows from “A is before B” 
(without the aid of an additional meaning postulate) than 
“S(b,a)” logically follows from “S(a,b)”.2 
Hochberg’s principle does not distinguish between formal and 
material (in)dependence. This is illustrated by the sentences ‘B is after 
A’ and ‘A is before B’. Formally these two are logically independent of 
each other; materially they are not though. Neither of them can be true 
while the other at the same time is false. This is an indication that 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 115. 
2 MacBride 2004, p. 189. It might be that by not keeping apart the notions of 
sentence, proposition and statement respectively, MacBride scores some 
unmerited points at Hochberg’s expense. It is obvious that sentences might 
be in need of additional meaning postulates. But, does that hold equally for 
statements and propositions? Are they not interpreted per definitionem? That 
the statement (or proposition) “B is after A” follows from the statement (or 
proposition) “A is before B” does not seem to depend on any additional inter-
pretation rule. Such a rule is needed though, mutatis mutandis, for the sen-
tences ‘S(b,a)’ and ‘S(a,b)’.  
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Hochberg needs to argue for the assumption that sentences which are 
formally independent from each other require distinct truth-makers.  
There seems to be something to be learnt from what has 
appeared above. Whether or not one believes that a distinction 
should be made between being formally and materially (in)dependent 
of something else, one should not consider a relation as being no-
thing but a pseudo-addition to its relata. Since ‘pseudo-additional to’ 
is another word for ‘numerically identical with’, a consequence of the 
doctrine is that the exact resemblance between a and b is identical 
with the numerical distinctness of a and b since identity is transitive. 
However, exact resemblance is not the same as numerical distinct-
ness, even if ‘the same’ is being used in the sense of ‘exactly similar’. 
Thus, the two relations should be recognised as increases of being. 
This argument can be generalised. If each internal relation holding 
between two tropes is pseudo-additional to the relata, it means that it 
is identical to them; since identity is transitive all internal relations 
which are pseudo-additional to the same pairs of relata are identical 
with each other. The only resort available seems to be to claim that 
there is only one internal relation per n-tuple of relata. Applied to the 
example used, exact resemblance or numerical distinctness would then 
be something other than an ontic relation holding between its relata. 
Since tropes are all there is, one wonders what it could be, if not a 
trope.  
3.3.7 Degrees of Resemblance 
There is yet another difficulty with considering resemblance to be 
pseudo-additional. Resemblance is said to exist in degrees. As regards 
concrete objects this is explained with reference to the tropes they 
have as contents. If the concrete objects o1 and o2 resemble each other 
to degree d, this is due to their having certain natures, say N1 and N2. 
These natures are constituted by a number of tropes. However, it 
seems inaccurate to assert that their having these natures is identical 
with their resembling to degree d. If it were so, their resembling to 
degree d would imply having the natures N1 and N2. Evidently, o1 and 
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o2 may very well resemble each other to degree d due to other natures, 
say N3 and N4.1 
Furthermore, “[e]ach trope […] resembles countless others to 
countless degrees.”2 Given Maurin’s official determination of sim-
plicity, this is not in itself incompatible with the similarity principle.3 
Given what her actual determination of simplicity is, it is incompa-
tible with the same principle. If the similarity principle would apply to 
tropes and they are absolutely simple, so to speak, it would be im-
possible for them to resemble one another other than exactly or not 
at all. How does Maurin account for the alleged fact that each trope 
resembles countless others to countless degrees, without either of 
them having any tropes as parts? The exhaustive answer seems to be: 
she does not account for it at all.  
In her summary of the results new information concerning the 
primitiveness of resemblance is presented. 
We might say that, as long as truth-makers are what 
interest us, the relation of exact resemblance is ‘reducible’ 
to that which it relates. But it is also primitive in the sense 
that no eliminative definition of resemblance is available.4 
Treating exact resemblance as primitive in this latter sense 
means having to accept a host of formal characteristics as 
indefinable.5 
The formal characteristics referred to here are such as the symmetry 
and transitiveness of exact resemblance. I wonder, are these charac-
teristics second-order tropes? If they are, it would appear that that 
they are second-order tropes. Since there are no internal relations, in 
                                                           
1 A precondition for this is that the concrete objects o1 and o2 can change 
properties over time. If they are like other concrete objects, they can. This is 
part of Maurin’s fifth thing-constitutive feature. Cf. section 3.3.3.   
2 Maurin 2002, p. 80. 
3 Cf. chapter II, section 2.3.2. 
4 Cf. Campbell 1990, p. 38, where it is also asserted that there is no elimina-
tive definition of resemblance, though no hint is given of what is meant by 
that. 
5 Maurin 2002, p. 115. 
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the sense of entities in their own right, these characteristics must 
belong to n-tuples of relata. Presumably, they are not pseudo-addi-
tional to the latter.  
Maurin points out another aspect of trope theory with regard to 
exact resemblance:  
Interestingly enough, the pseudo-additional approach to 
exact resemblance can be regarded as a variant of the class 
primitivist and Stout-inspired account with which our 
investigation began1 […]. Stout was right, it seems, in 
claiming that universalisations were made true by ‘brute’ 
classes, but he failed to account for the fact that these 
classes were ‘brute necessities’ rather than ‘brute contin-
gencies’. By taking a detour over exact resemblance the 
relevant classes grounding universalisation can now be 
distinguished from the rest. Not just any classes can serve 
as a truth-maker for universalisations: the job requires 
classes formed by inevitable necessity given the mere (and 
contingent) existence of their member-tropes.2 
While in Maurin’s ontology resembling is primary to being an element 
of a similarity set, it is the other way round in Stout’s. In the former 
ontology, resemblance, in turn, is secondary to the natures of its 
relata. I suppose that is the case also in Stout. A difference between 
them though is that, according to Maurin, these natures necessitate 
certain sets, which are described as brute necessities. Since belonging 
to a set is what gives tropes their nature, in Stout’s view, sets cannot 
be necessitated by the natures of their elements. I suppose this is why 
Maurin describes them as being brute contingencies.  
It is part of the assumptions made by Maurin that there are 
tropes which are simple, abstract and particular. If either of these 
traits is taken away, she claims that trope theory will not be an 
alternative to other ontologies. Though, I would say that to assume 
away the problems which are blocked by postulating abstractness as a 
primitive is to misconstrue the subject of ontology. Given that 
                                                           
1 This part of the discussion in Maurin 2002 has not been dealt with here. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 116. 
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postulation, Russell’s analytical regress with regard to exact resemb-
lance is waved aside. Note that the implicative regress is also waved 
aside. This is done by means of declaring internal relations, including 
exact resemblance, pseudo-additional. While that might take care of 
the regress, it makes exact resemblance impotent to perform any real 
work. It is instead the abstractness of tropes which supposedly 
performs all the work.  
3.4 The Problem of Thing-Construction and its Solution 
3.4.1 Overview 
In spite of the heading of section 3.4, the problem of thing-con-
struction and its solution are not really dealt with. What is dealt with 
is the external relation of compresence. Maurin takes it to be the 
fundamental relation to start with, when attempting a solution of the 
problem of thing-construction.  
There is a problem or argument, named after F. H. Bradley, 
which is supposed to constitute a major obstacle for anyone who 
recognises external relations. Since the relation of compresence is a 
key notion of her ontological edifice, Maurin is anxious to rebut it. 
How that is done is discussed in section 4.4.4. 
3.4.2 The Problem of Thing-Construction 
One problem of thing-construction is of constructing concrete 
particulars from tropes. This is obvious enough. Another is the 
following one: 
The reason things need to be constructed from tropes is 
that the existence of things seems to be required for it to 
be possible to account for the truth of certain atomic pro-
positions. There are cases, that is, for which tropes cannot 
(at least not prima facie) fulfil their truth-making role unless 
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they are in some sense of the word ‘structured’ so as to 
constitute ‘whole’ concrete things.1 
If ordinary things are not to be postulated as a fundamental category, 
it must be constructed from tropes; trope being the single fundamen-
tal category of trope theory.  
The problems stated are difficult ones because it is not as easy 
to spell out exactly what a thing is as it may initially seem to be. 
Maurin enumerates five features of what it is to be a thing. These 
features at most are intended to be necessary for being a thing, but 
are not thought of as being jointly sufficient. Although the list does 
not supply us with a sufficient condition of thinghood, it is intended 
to be a yardstick against which proposals of what a thing is can be 
measured.  
The first feature is that things are particular: “[j]ust like a trope, 
a thing is a ‘once-for-all-occurrence’.”2 I presume this does not mean 
that a thing is instantaneous since, as we shall see, that would contra-
dict the fifth feature.  
The second feature is that things have properties. This dis-
tinguishes them from tropes. The simplicity of the latter is invoked.  
The third feature of things is that they monopolise their places. 
We are informed that another way of formulating this is to say that 
things are concrete.3  
The fourth feature of things is that they are independent; this is 
short for being existentially independent. In a certain sense things 
depend on tropes, which constitute them. This is commented on. 
[I]f things are constructions from tropes then it is clear 
that the thing cannot be existentially independent in a general 
sense. It cannot, since it can not (ex hypothesi) exist if the 
tropes constituting it do not exist. Instead it seems to me 
that issues of dependence and independence will arise 
elsewhere for trope theory. Firstly, and most importantly, 
there is the issue of the internal unity of the thing. […] [I]f 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 117. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 120. 
3 Cf. Maurin 2002, p. 121n. 
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things are indeed constructed from (as in this case) tropes, 
then these tropes must, in some sense of the word, depend 
on one another — that is, if they are really all tropes that 
belong to the same thing, then something must hold them 
together. An important issue in spelling out a theory of 
things for a theory of tropes is therefore the characteri-
sation of this dependence (or special unity). A second issue 
of dependence (which may possibly be regarded as a 
corollary to the first) concerns the external independence of 
distinct things. It seems that once we have what might be 
called a ‘maximal’ congregation of tropes (i.e. once we 
have a thing) then this congregation acquires the additional 
characteristic of independence; independence, that is, from 
other maximal congregations of tropes (other things).1 
I would say that ‘depend(ence)’ is used elusively here. On the one 
hand, the tropes constituting a thing are said to depend on each 
other. This reciprocal dependence just means that they are united. 
This does not make them existentially dependent on each other. On 
the other hand, the independence of distinct things is genuine 
existential independence from other things.  
The fifth feature of things is that they can change their 
properties over time. Things also have the ability to move through 
space. This is also commented on. 
Things, in other words, exhibit a certain amount of stability 
over time. Stability in this sense does not rule out the 
possibility of there being momentary things (i.e. things that 
exist only at an instant and that, consequently, will never 
be subject to change or movement). All that is intended is 
that, if a thing does exist over an extended period of time 
the possibility for movement and change should be 
provided for.2 
Thus, in spite of their ability to change properties and position in 
space, things are stable.  
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, pp. 121-2. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 122. 
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What is called ‘the sixth feature’ of things is in itself a list of 
features. Unlike the previous five, the ones on this list are clearly 
modelled on the notion we have of a physical thing. Maurin does not 
want to restrict the discussion solely to physical things. Therefore, the 
features gathered under this heading are not included as general 
features of all sorts of things. Three features are listed, but I suppose 
a few more could have been mentioned.1 
(i) things are temporally bounded (meaning that they come 
into existence at a time, exist for a certain stretch of time 
and finally pass out of existence at a time); (ii) things are 
contingent (meaning that they exist, but their non-
existence is possible); and (iii) things possess a determinate 
position in space at each moment of time (and, unless they 
are physical simples, they have physical parts that, likewise, 
occupy determinate regions of space at each moment of 
time).2 
These three additional features will be fulfilled by most things. 
Maurin’s theory of things is a trope-bundle theory. This is the 
majority view among trope theorists. A minority view postulates 
substrates as well. It is of course doubtful whether the latter is a trope 
theory at all, given the stipulated conditions. A substrate, in reason, is 
of another fundamental category. It is not abstract, i.e., qualitative. 
She is liberal though: 
Now, a ‘theoretical ideal’ is, as we know, something 
towards which we strive, something that we would prefer to 
be true. It is not something that necessarily is true. There-
fore, just because the trope-substrate view has, in this 
sense, been ruled out in advance this does not mean that it 
has been finally rejected. To reject the substrate view, 
arguments directed directly against it would have to be 
provided.3 
                                                           
1 The three are borrowed from Loux 1998, pp.  93-4. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 122. 
3 Maurin 2002, p. 123. 
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She makes a few comments on the substrate view. These comments 
are intended to make it likely that it is not the preferable view. I will 
not go into these specific comments here. Anyhow, the bundle view 
is the one which should be chosen.  
Instead, I move on to her version of the trope-bundle view. It is 
stated by way of introduction: 
A bundle consists of nothing but its constituent tropes. 
Yet, a bundle of tropes is not the same as a class of tropes, 
nor is it the same as an aggregate of tropes. Classes are 
both too undiscriminating (they provide us with too many 
things) and too tight put together (the things they give us 
cannot change, cease to or begin to exist). Instead, a 
bundle is a connected conglomeration of tropes. This, then, 
is the difference between a class of tropes and a bundle of 
tropes: the bundle is a tight collection of connected tropes. 
Tight enough to exclude arbitrary and gerrymandered 
collections of tropes from the domain of things, but also 
tight in the right sense so as to provide for the possibility 
of change. The main difficulty in working out a detailed 
bundle theory, naturally, is giving a plausible account of 
this essential connection.1 
As the term ‘bundle’ is used here it is not a generic term for various 
types of collections; it names a specific type. It should also be 
observed that the essential connection, referred to at the end of the 
quotation, is perhaps not the only one worth studying. There is a hint 
regarding that. 
When dealing with the bundle approach to thing-
construction it may seem that all things, on this view, 
consist of tropes which are all connected in the same way to 
one another. But, clearly, things are normally more 
complex than that. Rather, our paradigm cases of things 
consist perhaps of a number of such bundles that are, in 
turn, connected with each other etc. I will disregard all 
such complications in what follows. Not because I am 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 127. 
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convinced that they are easily dealt with once the more 
fundamental connections have been provided, but because 
the more fundamental connections must, in any case, be 
handled first.1 
What is stated here is en clair that things are not just bundles of tropes 
in which the constituting tropes are united by the same sort of 
bundling connection. A trope-bundle may very well turn out to be 
but a (very) small building-block of a thing. As is seen in the quota-
tion, all complications due to this are disregarded. It is far from being 
an insignificant detail though. It should be kept in mind that from 
now on when the phrase ‘bundling-feature’ is used, it is potentially 
ambiguous. In one of its senses it stands for the compresence rela-
tion, which is supposed to hold between the tropes of a bundle in 
that sense of ‘bundle’ that is hinted at in the last quotation. In fact, 
this is declared to be the most fundamental connection. The other 
sense is bound to be more complicated. It involves the connection 
between the bundles constituting a thing. As a name of the problem 
which is actually dealt with by Maurin, the denomination ‘the 
problem of thing-construction’ is misleading.  
3.4.3 Compresence 
The term ‘compresence’ has been used several times above. A few 
hints have also been made as to what the relation referred to might 
be. It will now be discussed more thoroughly.  
Concerning the choice of the term ‘compresence’ Maurin 
informs us that it is arbitrary. There are quite a few terms which have 
been used for relations that are at least similar to the one she has in 
view.2 Any one of these terms could have been used.3 
It needs to be settled whether compresence is an internal or 
external relation. To that purpose, the four distinguished determina-
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 127n.  
2 Some of these are enumerated in section 2.3.4. 
3 Cf. Maurin 2002, pp. 128-9. 
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tions of internality are applied. The first one examined is the fourth, 
the so-called ‘strong internality’. 
Understanding the distinction as strong not only means 
treating it as if the internality of a relation makes it 
necessarily obtain given the existence of that which it 
relates, but also as if it is such as to necessitate the exist-
ence of that which stands in the relation. Entities that are 
internally related to each other in this sense are, con-
sequently, existentially dependent on one another. For 
example: if tropes red1, round1 and soft1 are compresent,1 
and if their compresence is in this sense strongly internal, 
then the existence of each one of the compresent tropes 
necessitates,2 not only the existence of the relation of com-
presence which serves to connect them, but also the 
existence of each one of the other tropes standing in the 
relation in question.3 
According to Maurin, compresence cannot be strongly internal since 
there is no reason to believe that a particular redness-trope is existen-
tially dependent on the existence of a particular extension-trope. It 
would make better sense to say that the existential dependence is 
between some colour-trope and some extension-trope. However, 
Maurin points out that the relata of the compresence relation are not 
kinds of tropes. Nor is the compresence-trope which connects quality 
tropes.  
It holds between particular tropes such as this redness or4 
this extension and surely this redness might very well cease 
to exist (perhaps to be exchanged for a particular blueness-
                                                           
1 Here we have three quality tropes which are said to be compresent with 
each other. Does that mean that they are related by a triadic compresence 
trope? Or, are there three dyadic compresence tropes, each relating a pair of 
the three quality tropes?  
2 The term ‘necessitates’ here suggests that the existence of one of the relata 
forces the other to exist. This is a misleading way of saying that existential 
dependence is holding.  
3 Maurin 2002, p. 129. 
4 I suspect that this ‘or’ should be read ‘and’. 
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trope) without this in any way affecting the existence of 
this extension-trope. Surely we want our notion of com-
presence to be such that room is made for the possibility 
that any one of the tropes in a compresent bundle might 
cease to exist without this affecting the existence of the 
other tropes in the bundle (although it might of course 
affect the obtaining of the relation of compresence).1 
The main message here is a rather strong one: it should be possible 
for any of the tropes in a compresent bundle to cease to exist without 
that affecting the existence of any others. Note also that the remark 
put in brackets, in the last sentence, seems to leave it open whether 
the same compresence-trope would cease to exist or not when one of 
its relata do that. I take it that a new quality-trope is supposed to 
replace the one lost. All this suggests that Maurin is open to the 
recycling of tropes. Compresence-tropes cannot be recycled; this is 
evident from what is said below. Furthermore, it will be seen that the 
notion of strong internality reappears. 
We move on to what is considered to be Moore’s notion of 
internality. 
If compresence is essential to the identity of that which it 
relates, then in every case where it seems that pre-existing 
tropes (perhaps former constituents of other things) are 
put together to create a new thing, what in fact happens is 
that as these tropes enter into new compresence-relations, 
they are first destroyed and then replaced by new 
(although exactly similar) tropes now essentially related in 
this new thing. Since this seems simply wrong, even on 
Moore’s understanding of the distinction, compresence 
should be treated as an external relation.2 
Also here the implication is that tropes can enter into new com-
presence relations. That notion that they cannot is part of the 
Moorean internality; therefore compresence is not internal in that 
sense. I would say that the intuition that (quality) tropes can be 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, pp. 129-30. 
2 Maurin 2002, pp. 130-1.  
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recycled indicates that they lack adicity. In other words, they are not 
predicative rather, they are thought of as (small) substances.1 More-
over, as substances which lack predicativity, they can be used over 
and over again.  
Since Maurin lumps Armstrong’s notion of internality together 
with Moore’s, what comes next is Campbell’s notion of an external 
and founded relation. Maurin reminds us that it has already been 
pointed out that Campbell’s considered view is that there are no 
external and unfounded relations. Campbell calls his doctrine, 
according to which all relations are either internal or external and 
founded, ‘foundationism’. If foundationism is true, no relations need 
to be posited as entities in their own right. Although it might be 
tempting to embrace this doctrine, it should be resisted.  
Unfortunately, Campbell’s foundationist programme 
seems to break down just at the point where it is arguably 
needed the most. It breaks down, that is, for the truly 
fundamental relation of compresence. This is why: an 
external-founded relation cannot be a fundamental relation 
holding between individual tropes and so compresence 
cannot be external-founded.2  
I think this needs to be commented on. Remember that the notion of 
an external and founded relation is defined as holding between relata 
due to their natures. However it is one of these fragments of their 
natures3 that is relevant: the fragment which does not define their 
identities. A consequence of that is that the same entities can change 
and retain their identities but cease to be related by the externally and 
founded relation. Thus, an external and founded relation can only 
                                                           
1 In Armstrong 1989, p. 115, the apposite comment is made that bundle 
theorists, who are also trope theorists, “try to build up tropes into something 
a little bit more substantial.” They treat tropes as “junior substances”. This 
phrase originates from Ayer, who uses it for sense data. 
2 Maurin 2002, pp. 131-2. 
3 The term ‘nature’ is used in wide sense. The nature of an entity might be 
any qualitative content of it. In the example used by Campbell it is the dirt on 
shoes which constitutes the natures on which the relation being cleaner than is 
founded. 
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hold between entities which have the capacity to change and yet 
continue to exist. Tropes do not have that capacity. In Maurin’s own 
words: 
[I]ndividual tropes can never stand in a relation which is 
both founded in them and which is such that it need not 
relate the entities in question. Such a combination would 
require that tropes could change, but tropes simply cannot 
change and we cannot say about a trope that the way it is 
‘is not essential to its identity’. Tropes are simple entities. 
The way they are (their natures) is also all they are. It is 
what they are.1 
The conclusion is then that compresence is an external (and un-
founded) relation. On the subject of compresence and its relata, we 
can now state:  
(i) its terms are existentially independent of one another, 
(ii) it is not essential to the identity of its terms, and, (iii) it 
is not founded in the nature of its terms.2 
A consequence of this is supposed to be that two tropes can start out 
being compresent with each other and cease to be compresent after a 
while. Judging from what is said in an earlier quotation, each one can 
go on existing in other constellations after the separation. Compres-
ence is also an ontological addition to its relata, an increase of being.  
Thus, as regards the ontological characterisation of compres-
ence, it is concluded that it is yet another trope. It differs from the 
tropes to which it relates by being a relation. Does not that make it 
belong to another (fundamental) category? Maurin’s answer is a bit 
evasive. 
This is a serious objection since I have gone to great 
lengths in this book to avoid positing any category of 
entities other than the category of tropes. That there is a 
difference here that might be considered as a difference in 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 132. 
2 Maurin 2002, p. 133. 
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category is, I believe, impossible to contradict. How much 
the addition of a separate category of relations would 
tarnish the theoretical appeal of trope theory I do not 
know. All I can say is, once more, that the addition of a 
separate category of relations is a less serious addition than 
would be, for instance, the addition of a separate category 
of universals. Adding universals to a theory of tropes 
would, for one, probably mean a kind of double-counting. 
And, why not then rest comfortably with only universals in 
the first place? Why complicate the theory by adding 
tropes? Adding relations does not, in the same sense, strike 
at the core of trope theory and it does not tamper with its 
particularist (or, if you will, nominalist) ideal.1 
The statement here, that a theory including both tropes and uni-
versals would mean a kind of double-counting, evidently reveals an 
inability to see the relevance of moderate realism. Besides that, we see 
that the addition of relations which are particulars is not considered 
to tamper with the ideals of nominalism. That seems to settle the 
matter. Furthermore, relation tropes are also simple, abstract par-
ticulars.2 
The characterisation of compresence is continued in the next 
section. 
3.4.4 Compresence and Bradley’s Regress 
Being a true relation compresence might fall victim of Bradley’s 
regress. That would be a problem threatening the trope-theoretical 
edifice. This includes its key notion: trope.3 If the regress is a real 
problem for trope theory, it must be resolved.  
Maurin’s own rendering of part of what underlies Bradley’s 
argument against relations is as follows:  
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 166. 
2 Cf. Maurin 2002, p. 164, where this is said to hold for compresence.  
3 The notion of trope would be set rocking if the holistic conclusion Bradley 
draws from his argument is found to be valid.  
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Premise: If the world ‘truly’ includes a variety of 
distinct entities (whether they be things, 
universals or tropes) then these entities 
must be in some way ‘truly’ related. 
Premise: Every attempt at spelling out the relations 
required for the separate existence of these 
distinct entities will end up in contradiction. 
Conclusion: Therefore, the world cannot include a 
variety of distinct entities. Instead, the 
world is ‘truly’ a single entity, undivided and 
whole, and all distinction belongs to appear-
ances only.1 
Maurin agrees with the first premise. I suspect that this is the majority 
view among philosophers. It is therefore the second premise which is 
the really interesting one. The regress argument is put forward to 
support that premise.  
According to Bradley, a relation is either founded in its relata or 
it is not. What is the case for true relations? Unfortunately, whatever 
the answer is, true relations are impossible. As a consequence, no-
thing in the world can be separate from anything else. The world is 
really an undivided whole. What looks like distinctions between 
things are just that — appearances. How did this happen?  
Bradley asks: when we say that something is in a relation with 
something else, what does the ‘is’ mean? It cannot be the ‘is’ of 
identity. A better word to use would therefore be ‘has’. What is the 
meaning of ‘has’ then? Bradley thinks that there are only two possible 
meanings it can have. The first is that of ‘is predicated by’. Thus, 
when applied to two qualities or tropes, which are said to be related 
to each other by compresence, the relation is one of predication. 
‘Predication’ can denote either of two things, according to Bradley. 
First, what is predicated of something is a description of it, or at least 
a part of a description. If one predicates a quality of a thing, one is 
saying what it is to be that thing, or at least part of what it is to be 
that thing. Allegedly, this is another way of saying that the quality in 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 135. Cf. Bradley 1908, p. 25. 
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question is founded in the thing. Applied to a relation, it should also 
be founded in the things related. Maurin remarks that being founded 
in relata is no real possibility in the case of compresence.  
For, if it were, it would mean that part of what we are 
saying when we say that trope a is compresent with trope b 
is that part of what it is to be trope a is to ‘be in relation 
with b’ (or, at least, it is ‘to be compresent’).1 But this 
seems to blatantly contradict the presupposition that 
tropes are simple entities.2 
It is not obvious that the simplicity of a trope rules out the possibility 
that it has a relational property. Perhaps Maurin’s reason for denying 
the trope a relational property as part of its identity is that it would 
mean that the trope must consist of at least two components: the 
relational property and a qualitative content; that would be one 
content too many.3 
Since the former sense of ‘predication’ cannot be the right one, 
we turn to what is said to be its second sense. The relata now have 
compresence in the sense of being predicated by it, although without 
being compresent. About this proposal it can be said: 
The trouble with this alternative should be apparent. 
Turning the ‘is’ of ‘is compresent [with]’ into the ‘is’ of 
predication was originally thought to be a convenient way 
of providing the missing link between the relation and the 
entities it relates. Predication could provide such a link 
because it in part describes the actual contribution of the 
related entities. This is how predication works. Now, this 
very feature (that is, the feature which made predication a 
good candidate for connecting relata with relation) turned 
out to make the entities related complex in an illegitimate 
                                                           
1 This is so since compresence, as something predicated of the pair, is ‘part’ 
of them, according to Bradley’s containment model of predication. The ‘part’ 
which is in a is expressed by ‘being compresent with b’.  
2 Maurin 2002, p. 137.  
3 I would say though that this depend on the curious view that a relational 
property is contained in the entity which has it. 
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way. We cannot deal with this problem by saying that the 
‘is’ of ‘is compresent with’ is that of predication but that it 
does not function as predication does. This is simply non-
sense. Therefore, Bradley concludes, ‘true’ relations cannot 
be founded in the entities they relate.1 
Since true relations cannot be founded in their relata, another sense 
of ‘has’ in ‘has compresence’ must be searched for, a sense which is 
not that of ‘predication’. Bradley’s proposal is to make the relation 
“more or less independent.”2 If it is independent of its relata, it is not 
an attribute of them. Maurin remarks that this is an understanding of 
a true relation which seems to follow naturally from what she has said 
about compresence as an external relation. An external relation does 
not affect the existence or identity of its relata, so this promises to be 
the right interpretation. According to Bradley, all this has as its 
consequence though that a true relation leads to a vicious regress. In 
his own famous words: 
The relation C has been admitted different from A and B, 
and no longer is predicated of them. Something, however, 
seems to be said of this relation C, and said, again, of A 
and B. And this something is not to be the ascription of 
one to the other. If so, it would appear to be another 
relation, D, in which C, in the one side, and, on the other 
side, A and B stand. But such a makeshift leads at once to 
the infinite process. The new relation D can be predicated 
in no way of C, or of A and B; and hence we must have 
recourse to a fresh relation, E, which comes between D 
and whatever we had before. But this must lead to another 
F; and so on, indefinitely.3 
Evidently, the moral of this is that an independent relation is incap-
able of relating anything.  
Maurin’s response to the regress argument is that the external 
relation compresence certainly do relate; the task at this point is to 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 137. 
2 Bradley 1908, p. 21. 
3 Bradley 2008, p. 21. 
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explain how this might be. It should be kept in mind that what she 
has to say about how to solve it is a tentative effort to begin the 
formulation of a solution, not a complete solution.  
Let us start with what is the conclusion. 
For it to be true that a is compresent with b there must 
exist, apart from a and b, a compresence-trope. A compres-
ence-trope is, contrary to an ‘ordinary’ trope, a relation-
trope. The difference between an ordinary trope and a 
relation-trope is this: a relation-trope is such that, although 
its existence is contingent (that is, it might or might not 
exist) it must, given that it exists, relate exactly the entities it 
does in fact relate. In other words, any relation-trope is 
specifically dependent on the tropes it relates. This is true 
while, on the other hand, the related tropes are not likewise 
dependent on the existence of the relation-trope in ques-
tion. That is, the specific dependence which characterises 
the relation-trope is one-way. We might also put the posi-
tion as follows: the relation of compresence is external to 
the tropes it relates, but, simultaneously, the related tropes 
are internal to the relation of compresence.1 
We are informed here that the relata of a compresence-trope are not 
dependent on it for their existence. Remember the relata, which are 
specific quality-tropes, are not existentially dependent on each other 
either. Specific existential dependence does hold from a compres-
ence-trope to its relata though. Thus, there is something special with 
compresence-tropes. Presumably, the same also holds for all the 
other external relations. If it does not, one wonders why. 
Ponder now upon the message of the following statement. 
The relational view now incorporates this intuitive differ-
ence [i.e., that it is of the very essence of relations that they 
need not be related to the things they relate]2 and provides 
                                                           
1 Maurin 2002, p. 164. 
2 Cf. Grossmann 1992, p. 55, which Maurin refers to here. I take it that the 
message is not intended to imply that relations are related to their relata if 
they do in fact relate them. Instead, the intended implication is that relations 
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us with an ontological account of it. It tells us that, 
although there is no necessary connection from relata to 
relation, there is one from relation to relata. Putting a 
relation-trope alongside the entities it relates will not, on 
the present account, generate endless regress. In being a 
relation-trope it is of its essence that it does connect the 
entities it relates. This is a brute fact about relations and no 
further addition of relations is needed to provide for it.1 
The way things are described here, as well as in the previous quota-
tion, it seems as if a relation does hold between relation and relata 
after all since there is supposed to be a necessary connection from the 
former to the latter. Necessary or not, a connection is a relation, is it 
not?  
According to Maurin then, mutual existential dependence does 
not hold between any2 tropes, though there are unilateral existential 
dependences holding between specific compresence tropes and their 
relata. A compresence-trope is specifically existentially dependent on 
its relata. A particular compresence-trope must relate a specific pair.3 
Every other pair is ruled out. Since Maurin seems to contemplate the 
possibility of recycling quality tropes, there might be more than one 
compresence trope per pair of relata.  
Why is a compresence trope considered to be unilaterally 
dependent on the quality tropes it relates? Maurin’s reason for that 
seems to be that, being a relation, it must relate. If it does not, it fails 
to fulfil the function of a relation and would therefore not be a real 
relation (trope). Presumably, this holds for each and every external 
relation there is. The quality tropes do not need to be related by a 
specific compresence trope. Does that mean that each of them could 
                                                                                                             
are never related to their relata, not even when they in fact relate them. This 
might seem to be a subtle distinction; it is not. It is what makes the difference 
between there being a Bradleyan regress or not. 
1 Maurin 2002, p. 165. 
2 Maybe this is to overstate the thesis, though I do not think that Maurin says 
anything that contradicts it. 
3 I take for granted here that compresence is dyadic. 
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be free-floating, i.e. not compresent with anything?1 I do not think 
that Maurin gives any clear indication about what her answer to that 
question might be. It is clear though that she in fact considers quality 
tropes to lack predicativity. If she had recognised that it is of their 
very essence to qualify, then she would have been forced to recognise 
that they are predicative as well.  
To corroborate my claim that quality tropes are deprived of 
their predicative nature, I will remind readers of what was said in 
connection with a question asked by Erik Funkhouser in his review 
of Maurin 2002. 
Why can’t tropes have qualitative parts — e.g., color-tropes 
have hue-parts, saturation-parts, and brightness-parts? […] 
This seems plausible, though the possibility would raise 
problems like those for thing-construction that she 
discusses at great length. Namely, what accounts for the 
unity of such qualitatively complex tropes?2 
Maurin’s answer is: 
[I]f tropes are qualitatively complex in the sense imagined 
by Funkhouser they must […] be regarded as complexes 
of more fundamental tropes. Of course, complexes of this kind 
we may call tropes — but they are tropes only in a second-
ary sense. I therefore prefer to call them complexes of tropes 
(or compresent tropes) although I do not think much hinges 
on our choice of terms here.3 
Try to ignore the details of the specific example used. Instead, con-
centrate on what is relevant here regarding the issue of predication. It 
seems natural to interpret this as giving expression to a containment 
model of predication. That an entity has a certain property is analysed 
as its having it as content. This at least holds for entities which are 
                                                           
1 According to Williams they could do that, though by mere cosmic accident 
they do not.   
2 Funkhouser 2004, fourth paragraph.  
3 Maurin 2005, p. 136. 
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not simple.1 Note that even on the rather fundamental level of a 
colour trope2 the analysis is carried our in terms of compresence. As a 
result, the qualitative content of the analysed entity lacks predicative. 
In the light of all this, the description of quality tropes as being 
monadic appears misleading. Since they lack adicity, they are not ontic 
predicates.  
The tendency to consider quality tropes as (small) substances, 
rather than ontic predicates, is manifested by many moderate nomina-
lists. To explain why this is so is in itself an interesting task. 
                                                           
1 In Maurin’s terminology ‘simple’ actually means the same as ‘absolutely 
simple’. 
2 Unfortunately, language deserts us here. Since this entity, referred to by the 
term ‘trope’, is ex hypothesi not simple, it is no trope according to the doctrine.  
CHAPTER IV 
Moment Nominalism 
4.1 Introduction 
In the analytic ontology of Ivar Segelberg (1914–1987) relations and 
qualities belong to different categories. In it, universal relations are 
recognised straight out, but not universal qualities. When using the 
term ‘quality’, Segelberg usually has something like a trope in mind. In 
exceptional cases it can also be a class of (quality) instances, where 
the elements are exactly similar to each other. 
The term ‘trope’ is not used by Segelberg. His three books,1 
which make up almost the whole body of his writing, had been 
written when D. C. Williams published the article in which ‘trope’ 
first occurs. Though I doubt that Segelberg ever read anything by 
Williams, he was versed in the writing of G. F. Stout, which 
apparently inspired him. However, the writing of Edmund Husserl is 
that which inspired him most; he borrowed the term ‘moment’ From 
Husserl,2 which is his preferred designation for quality instances.  
Quality moments and universal relations constitute, in a certain 
sense, the elements of which the universe is ultimately constituted.3 
Thus, the ontology in question can be described as a mixture of 
nominalistic and realistic elements. Segelberg would object to being 
described as a nominalist, even in part, since he has a specific position 
                                                     
1 These are translated into English by Herbert Hochberg and Susanne Ring-
ström Hochberg, and collected in Segelberg 1999. References will be made by 
first indicating the page in Segelberg 1999 and then the corresponding page in 
the Swedish original; i.e., either Segelberg 1945, 1947 or 1953. 
2 It is presented in Segelberg 1999/1947, chapter IV, though not used as a 
technical term until Segelberg 1953. In its German form it is used in the third 
investigation of Husserl 1970. A distinction is made there between Momente 
and Stücke, which are dependent parts and independent parts of things 
respectively. Segelberg does not agree with that principle of division though. 
3 Cf. Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 228/137. 
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in mind for the denomination ‘nominalism’. It takes qualities to be 
constituted by resemblances between concrete objects.1  
When classifying Segelberg’s ontology as (partly) nominalistic, it 
is done with its qualitative side in view. I think that this in combina-
tion with the fact that universal resemblances, at least officially, are 
not assigned any constitutive role with regard to the qualitative con-
tents of moments, provide sufficiently good reasons for classifying it 
as a moderate nominalism.  
4.2 Individual and Universal 
4.2.1 Overview 
The two notions, individual and universal, are determined respectively 
in terms of a modal notion. This notion is dealt with in section 4.2.2. 
In section 4.2.3 an alleged intermediary form of entity is discussed in 
connection with a presentation of an intellectual experiment. In 
section 4.2.4 the final determination of the notion of individual 
appears. The determination of universal will be presented as we go 
along. 
 
                                                     
1 A position which is called ‘resemblance nominalism2’ by Gonzalo 
Rodriguez-Pereyra claims that there is for each quality a specific, universal 
resemblance relation. It obtains between all the (concrete) particulars which 
have the quality in question. According to Rodriguez-Pereyra’s standards, this 
is a nominalism since it takes the resemblance relations to be primitive; it has 
to meet the traditional difficulties which (ordinary) resemblance nominalism 
is beset with as well. Cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, p. 123. Segelberg dis-
tinguishes between two versions of what he calls ‘nominalism’. One of these 
satisfies the description of being a resemblance nominalism2. It is advocated 
by C. D. Broad in Broad 1933, pp. 111ff. The other version is a bit elusive as 
regards the status of resemblance. It takes typical examples, or paradigms, 
and the resemblances of things to these to be constitutive of possession of 
qualities. The specific version of if, discussed by Segelberg, is that of Hans 
Cornelius. Cf. Cornelius 1900, pp. 103ff. Segelberg rejects both these forms 
of nominalism. Cf. Segelberg 1999/1947, Chapter III.   
MOMENT NOMINALISM                                163 
4.2.2 A Modal Notion: Can 
According to Segelberg, there are no relation moments. Relations are 
(real) universals. All moments belongs to the qualitative side of 
ontology. An idea can be formed of what he means by the terms 
‘universal’ and ‘individual’1 from the following statement: 
No one would deny the following three statements. 1) 
There may not be two exactly similar objects2 in the uni-
verse, but it is not impossible that there be two objects, 
two sense-data for example, that are exactly alike. 2) If a is 
a universal, there cannot be another object exactly like a. 3) 
If there is an object other than a that is exactly like a, then 
a is an individual. But, a can be an individual even though 
there is no object, other than a, that is exactly like a. For a 
to be an individual, it is only necessary that there can be 
other objects that are exactly like a.3 
We learn here that universals cannot resemble each other exactly. 
Thus, Leibniz’s principle — the identity of indiscernibles — seems to 
be invoked with regard to universals. Moments,4 on the other hand, 
can be exactly similar to each other, like other individuals. If the 
principle were applicable to them, it would seem that they could be 
almost exactly similar to each other at best.5 
                                                     
1 In the previous chapters the term ‘particular’ has been used consistently. In 
the present chapter I adapt myself to Segelberg’s terminology. His Swedish 
terms are ‘individuell’ (adjective) and ‘individ’ (noun). The translators have 
chosen ‘individual’ (adjective as well as noun) instead of ‘particular’. 
2 In Segelberg’s terminology ‘object’ (in Swedish: ‘föremål’) is the most gene-
ral term. It corresponds to the German ‘Gegenstand’, as the latter is used by 
Alexius Meinong within the frame of his Gegenstandstheorie. Cf. Segelberg 
1999/1953, p. 239/5. If it had not been for the fact that Segelberg prefers 
‘föremål’ to ‘entitet’, the English word ‘entity’ may have been used just as 
well.  
3 Segelberg 1999/1947, pp. 145/18-9. 
4 Since all moments are supposed to be quality moments, the prefix ‘quality’ 
will often be left out.  
5 Kenneth Clatterbaugh convincingly argues that G. W. Leibniz is an ad-
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Modal notions are obviously used in these determinations of the 
notions of individual and universal. That gives cause for a comment: 
What do we mean when we say that an object a is an 
individual? One may reply: we mean that there can be 
several objects, including a, that are exactly similar to a. 
That an object b is a universal would then mean that there 
cannot be another object that is exactly similar to b. It is 
possible that this is what one sometimes means by ‘indivi-
dual’ and ‘universal’. But the concept “can”, which occurs 
in both analyses, is so indefinite, that the terms ‘individual’ 
and ‘universal’, so understood, become fairly worthless in 
a technical context.1 
                                                                                                   
herent of instance attributes — or moments if we like. Cf. Clatterbaugh 1973. 
Since the principle bearing his name stipulates that exactly similar entities are 
identical with each other, this might come as a surprise. If I have correctly 
understood him, Donald Mertz suggests that Leibniz restricts the applicability 
of the principle, as regards individuals, to concrete individuals. Cf. Mertz 
1996, pp. 148-9. He adduces the following as evidence for Leibniz’s recognis-
ing property instances. 
Therefore, since substance and accident depend upon each other, 
other marks are necessary for distinguishing a substance from an 
accident. Among them may be this one: That a substance needs 
some accident but often does not need a determinate one but is 
content, when this accident is removed, with the substitution of 
another. An accident, however, needs not only some substance in 
general but that very one in which it inheres, so that it cannot 
change it. (Leibniz 1969, pp. 390-1) 
This lets itself to the interpretation that the substance in which the attribute is 
inhering is essential to its identity. The following is even more explicit. 
[T]wo different subjects […] cannot have precisely the same 
individual affection, it being impossible that the same individual 
accident should be in two subjects or pass from one subject to 
another. [My italics] (Leibniz 1969, p. 704)  
It should be noted that Leibniz considers his principle to be metaphysically, 
but not logically, true. Logically it could be that, say, two pieces of matter 
were perfectly alike. This would not be consistent with the order of things 
though. Cf. Leibniz 1969, p. 699. 
1 Segelberg 1999/1947, pp. 156/35-6. 
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What more information is added then to the impressionistic deter-
minations made here? I would say that it is little more than variations 
on the same theme.  
One thing is added, though: the notion that an object cannot 
have a certain property implies that it has another property which, 
according to a law, prevents it from having the former.1 
Actually, it seems that each modal statement refers to a 
certain law or a certain group of laws — differing in differ-
ent cases. If one wishes to give an analysis of a modal 
statement, one must cite the law or group of laws referred 
to by the modal statement in question. 
 Applying this point to the above modal sentences 
about individuals and universals, we arrive at the follow-
ing. We take ‘x has p’ so: 
 x has p implies there are at least two objects, including 
x, which are exactly similar to x. 
If x is a universal, x cannot have p, which is to say that x 
must have some property g which is such that every object 
which has g2 lacks p. If x is an individual, x can have p; that 
is to say, x does not have the property g. But, which 
property g is referred to here?3 
It will turn out that the property, which is called ‘g’ here, is that of 
being (spatio-temporally) non-localised.4 A prerequisite for there 
being exactly similar entities is that they are spread out in space 
and/or time. This is argued for by means of four examples.5  
(1) One can imagine two exactly similar visual sense-data located 
in different parts of the visual field. One cannot imagine them located 
in exactly the same place, at the same time, though. 
                                                     
1 It is also explicitly stated in Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 157/36. 
2 In the Swedish original there is a misprint: it has ‘y’ instead of ‘g’.  
3 Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 158/37. 
4 Cf. Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 164/45. 
5 The way these examples are presented is apparently fraught with modality. 
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(2) Two exactly similar sensations of pain can be imagined as 
being located in separate parts of one’s body. However, one cannot 
imagine them being located in exactly the same place at the same 
time. 
(3) The notion that there are two exactly similar impulses of 
volition or two exactly similar experiences of emotion in the same 
consciousness at the same time seems absurd. One can imagine them 
occurring at different times, or in different persons, though. 
(4) One cannot imagine two exactly similar facts. The reason for 
that is that facts are not localised in time or space. One can imagine 
two exactly similar events; but these cannot exist at the same place 
and time.1 
With these four examples as premises — or, perhaps they are 
more like indicia — the conclusion is drawn: 
In order for a multitude of exactly similar objects to occur, 
it thus seems to be necessary that the objects are 
“dispersed” in space and time, or in short, in an extended 
complex, which is to say that the objects are in a certain 
sense localized. That an object is localized then means that 
the object either is part of an extended complex or that the 
object is a component of a complex which is part of an 
extended complex. If we adopt the theory that an object is 
a complex of its qualities, then we must hold that every 
qualitative gradation of a localized object is itself localized 
and that it occurs in one or several instances.2 
The answer to the question about what characterises individual 
objects is then that individual objects are spatio-temporally localised. 
According to the same line of reasoning, universals are not as 
localised.  
There is a further condition which individual objects must 
satisfy. We will come back to it in section 4.2.4 below after some 
preparatory information in the next section. 
                                                     
1 These examples are found in Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 159/38. 
2 Segelberg 1999/1946, pp. 159/38-9. 
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4.2.3 Semi-Individuality 
It is tempting to maintain that each individual entity is relationally 
different from every other individual entity.1 The following intel-
lectual experiment2 is presented in order to problemise that claim3.  
[O]ne can imagine a spatial whole so structured that it 
contains a number of objects which are not relationally 
different. The objects will then be ‘localized’, in the sense 
in which we just used the word, but they do not occupy 
different positions in the usual sense […].4 
The theme of the intellectual experiment can be varied interminably. 
Segelberg’s first variation of it runs as follows. 
1) We imagine an infinite space (spatial whole) S, to which 
we cannot apply the concepts up-down and left-right. In S 
there are two equally large spheres, a and b; a is red and b 
is blue. Between a and b there obtains a relation R, which 
we shall call the distance between a and b. R is obviously 
symmetrical […]. It is also obvious that a has a relational 
property which b lacks, namely, “having R to b”, and b has 
a relational property which a lacks, namely, “having R to 
a”. From this […] we can conclude the following: if a 
space (spatial whole) contains two objects that are not 
                                                     
1 Segelberg ascribes to Konrad Marc-Wogau the view that an individual 
object is relationally different from every other individual. Cf. Segelberg 
1999/1947, p. 160/39. Cf. Marc-Wogau 1945, pp. 164ff. 
2 More or less the same experiment is found in an article by Max Black, 
published a few years later. Cf. Black 1952.  
3 As I hope will be evident, Segelberg’s reasoning in connection with the 
intellectual experiment is a bit elusive. This makes it difficult to say for certain 
what his exact purpose with it is. 
4 Segelberg 1999/1947, pp. 160/39-40. Two senses seem to be figuring here. 
One of these concerns the relations of an object to space and time. The other 
concerns its relations to other objects.  
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congruent1 with each other, one necessarily has a relational 
property which the other lacks.2 
Due to their difference in colour the two spheres are incongruent 
with each other. As a consequence of that, they are also relationally 
different from each other. The two relational properties which Segel-
berg mentions are expressed by ‘having R to b’ and ‘having R to a’ 
respectively. With an eye to what will appear soon, I would like to say 
that there is probably no doubt that the number of spheres in this 
universe is two. 
There is a second variation of the same theme.  
2) We now imagine instead that a and b are two exactly 
similar spheres. Even in this case, a distance R obtains 
between the spheres. Consequently, the sphere a has the 
relational property “having R to b”, and b has the relational 
property “having R to a”. But this case is different from 
the previous case in a fundamental way. Since a and b are 
congruent in this latter case, there is no difference between 
“having R to a” and “having R to b” — rather, we deal 
with one and the same relational property. We will call this 
relational property ‘r’.3 
It is maintained that since a and b are congruent with each other, 
“having R to a” is the same relational property as “having R to b”. As 
a consequence this relational property cannot differentiate between a 
and b, since they both have it. The notion that there is only one 
relational property here can be called in question. After all, a and b are 
                                                     
1 The sense of this term of geometry is extended to apply to all kinds of 
entities, not just geometrical figures. Cf. Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 38/29. It 
can be assumed here that it has the sense of ‘exactly similar’. In the next quo-
tation we find them being used alternately. In section 4.3.2 a few uncertainties 
regarding the relations between the senses of these two terms, as well as a 
few others, are discussed.  
2 Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 160/40. 
3 Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 160/40.  
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not the same individual sphere. Their being (qualitatively) exactly 
similar to each other does not change that.1  
Someone might come up with the bright idea that a relational 
difference between the two spheres could be produced by means of 
calling one of them ‘a’ and the other ‘b’. Each sphere would then have 
a semantical property which the other lacks. This proposal is rejected 
though.  
If we at t1 call one of the spheres ‘a’, there is no possibility 
of deciding whether it is the “same” sphere or the other 
sphere which we will call ‘a’ at the next moment. And, if 
we speak about the sphere a in two sentences, there is no 
possibility of deciding whether the term ‘a’ in both senten-
ces refers to the same sphere. The impossibility of deci-
ding is not due to any limitation of the inquiring subject’s 
capability, but is due to the task being meaningless. With 
regard to this space, it makes no sense to speak of “the 
                                                     
1 This is a consequence of Segelberg’s moderate nominalism, according to 
which moments are individuals through and through. Herbert Hochberg 
comments on this.  
It is […] obvious that Segelberg’s view, appealing to individual 
properties, while proving apparent grounds for individuation, in 
that the quality instances will be numerically different in the two 
spheres, cannot distinguish them […], in the sense he requires. 
For he can only refer to such different quality instances by 
referring to the spheres — “the spherical shape of sphere x.” 
Thus he can not do what his argument against Marc-Wogau 
requires the latter to do. Neither philosopher can form a descrip-
tion of either the qualities or the spheres. This is the case 
whether one resolves the problem of individuation […] by means 
of numerically diverse quality instances, or by substrata, […] or 
by an appeal to relational differences. (Hochberg 1999, p. 28) 
Hochberg seems to assert that Segelberg cannot individuate a moment other 
than by referring to the sphere it belongs to. I suspect that he takes that to be 
circular though, since the sphere is defined in terms of its moments. Segel-
berg does not appeal to numerically different quality instances in connection 
with the intellectual experiment. Hochberg points that out immediately after 
what has just been quoted. I would say that Segelberg does in fact treat the 
relational properties here as (real) universals. Furthermore, I strongly suspect 
that ontological and epistemological problems are being amalgamated.  
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one” sphere, “the other” sphere, “the same” sphere, 
“which of” the spheres, or to use proper names for the 
spheres. In order to be able to apply such expressions […] 
it is necessary that the different objects have different non-
semantical properties. […] In other words, there must be a 
non-semantical exclusive description which fits a1 but not 
any of the other objects, an exclusive description of a2, and 
so on.1 
We see here that Segelberg insists on there being an exclusive, non-
semantical description for each object. Without that, it is not possible 
to distinguish between the entities inhabiting this universe. The task is 
even declared to be meaningless. Its meaninglessness is explicitly said 
not to be due to any limitation of the inquirer’s capability. In other 
words, what we are being presented is supposed not to be an 
epistemological problem. The suggestion is then that the problem is 
purely ontological. I have my doubts though. 
Incidentally, if the spheres have different names, one would 
assume that someone must have named them. An inquirer is men-
tioned. The existence of that person automatically destroys the 
symmetry of the imagined universe. That complication is disregarded 
though.  
Perhaps the most interesting variation is the third — particularly 
its second half. 
3) Even if S contains more than two mutually congruent 
spheres, it can be the case that the spheres do not differ 
relationally: that will be the case, for example, in the 
following situations. (i) the centers of the spheres form the 
corners in an equilateral polygon; (ii) the spheres are 
infinitely many and the distance between any two adjacent 
spheres is everywhere the same.2 
Again, it is explicitly asserted that all the spheres inhabiting the 
universe have all their relational properties in common. This is due to 
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 161/41 
2 Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 162/42. 
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their being congruent as well as symmetrically arranged. What was 
claimed with regard to the second variation then applies to the third 
as well. A conspicuous difference is of course that in the third — 
version (ii) — it is supposed to be meaningless to distinguish between 
the spheres in spite of the fact that they are infinite in number.  
The essential difference between the first and fourth variations 
is that the spheres of the latter are mutually congruent, while those of 
the former are incongruent. In addition, in the latter variation the 
spheres are asymmetrically arranged. 
4) If S contains a number of mutually congruent spheres, 
and we do not have a case either of type (i) or (ii) in (3), 
then relational differences obtain between the spheres. By 
saying that, one is not necessarily saying that every sphere in 
the group is relationally distinguished from every other 
sphere in the group.1 
When the spheres make up a configuration in which their relational 
properties differ, it is possible to apply individuating expressions to 
them: ‘the one sphere’, the other sphere’, etc. If we want, we can give 
them proper names of their own as well.  
I am a bit puzzled by the message in the last sentence of the last 
quotation, which seems to be that some of the spheres, which inhabit 
the asymmetrical universe, might be relationally indifferent. That 
claim may seem more plausible if applied to moments, instead of 
spheres. If there are no reasons of principle against there being more 
than one congruent moment in one and the same place simul-
taneously, these moments might be relationally indifferent as well.2 
But, we are talking spheres now. No two or more of them can occupy 
the same place simultaneously.   
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 162/42. 
2 Francisco Suárez explicitly contemplates this as a possibility. Cf. the fifth 
disputation of his Disputationes Metaphysicae, translated in Gracia 1982. Cf. also 
Mertz 1996, pp.128-9. 
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The heading of this section is ‘Semi-Individuality’. The notion 
referred to by that denomination is accounted for by using what has 
appeared in the presentation of the intellectual experiment.  
In (1)–(4) we have studied four sets of objects, M1, M2, 
M3, M4, where each M has one of the following 
“extreme” properties: 
 a) every element in M is congruent with every other 
element in M; 
 b) every element in M is incongruent with every other 
element in M; 
 c) every element in M is relationally indifferent with 
respect to every other element in M; that is, every 
relational property which belongs to one element in M 
belongs to every element in M; 
 d) every element in M is relationally different from every 
other element in M; that is, there is a set N of 
relational properties such that every element in N is a 
property of one and only one element in M and every 
element in M has one and only one element in N as a 
property.1 
Now that we have these four sets at hand, we can form a matrix.2 Of 
the four combinations one is declared contradictory: (bc). The three 
remaining combinations are then: (ac), (ad) and (bd).3 
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1947, pp. 162-3/43. There are two unfortunate misprints in 
the original. What comes after the semicolon in (c) has been mixed up with 
that which comes after the semicolon in (d). In the translation this mishap is 
corrected.  
2 The two distinctions from which the matrix is formed are of course those 
of congruence and incongruence, on the one hand, and of relational 
indifference and relational difference, on the other. 
3 See Segelberg’s puzzling assertion in connection with the fourth variation. 
Note that if it is not necessarily the case that every sphere of that universe is 
relationally distinguished from every other, the universe in question would 
neither be an (ac)-set, an (ad)-set or a (bd)-set. It would be an (a)-set, since the 
spheres are congruent with each other. It could not be a (c)-set or a (d)-set 
though, since some of the elements are relationally indifferent with respect to 
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In the light of what has appeared, Segelberg now asserts: 
If we do not undertake any thought experiments, but only 
consider the circumstances in our universe, where every 
set of objects has the property (d), and, consequently, each 
element in an arbitrary group of objects is relationally 
different from every other element of the group, we easily 
overlook the fact that it is not logically necessary for a set 
to have the property (d). This circumstance results in an 
ambiguity in the concept of “numerical difference”. If an 
object x is qualitatively different from an object y, x must 
be “numerically different” from y.1 But even if x and y are 
qualitatively identical, i.e. congruent,2 x can still be 
“numerically different” from y. Suppose that x is con-
gruent with x'; does the statement ‘x is numerically differ-
ent from x'’ then only mean that what we call ‘x’ and what 
we call ‘x'’ “are” more than one x? Or, do we also mean 
that the set with only x and x' as members is a (d)-set? 
This question cannot be resolved, since the possibility of 
an (ac)-set was not considered when we introduced the 
concept of “numerical difference”.3 
According to Segelberg, we live in a universe where no two indi-
viduals share all their relational properties. Our universe is a (d)-set. 
This has an implication which will be mentioned in section 4.2.4. 
                                                                                                   
each other while others are relationally different from each other.  
1 This gives expression to Leibniz’s Law — the indiscernibility of identicals 
— in its contra-positive form: the non-identity of discernibles.  
2 Note that congruence and qualitative identity are explicitly said to be the 
same relation. Cf. section 4.3.2, where it is discussed how the relations named 
by ‘congruence’, ‘exact similarity’, ‘absolute similarity’, ‘qualitative identity’ 
and ‘having all internal properties in common’ are related to each other. 
3 Segelberg 1999/1947, pp. 163/44-5. The phrase ‘when we introduced the 
concept of “numerical difference”’ does not refer to any introduction made 
by Segelberg himself. What he means is that the notion of “numerical differ-
ence” is undecided with regard to (ac)-sets. 
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What about (ac)-sets? Remember that the elements of such sets 
are supposed to be exactly similar as well as relationally indifferent. 
Regarding the elements of such sets Segelberg’s final word is: 
Perhaps, it is best to say that the elements of an (ac)-set are 
neither individuals nor universals, but what we might call 
‘semi-individuals’.1 
The claim that there is a principal difference between symmetrical 
and asymmetrical universes, as they have been determined in the 
intellectual experiment, can be called in question in various ways. The 
following is one objection.  
Imagine a universe inhabited by almost indiscernible entities, 
spheres for instance. Assume that the number of almost indiscernible 
spheres is two and that they are the only entities in the universe. This 
approximates both the first and the second variation accounted for 
above. As a matter of principle it coincides exclusively with the first 
variation though. Segelberg would say that there are two spheres in 
this universe. He is bound to agree that they are two even when the 
qualitative difference between them is infinitesimal.2 If they instead 
were congruent with each other, would he maintain that they are only 
one in number? If that is indeed what he would do, his use of 
‘meaningless’ would make some sense.  If he would claim instead that 
the number of spheres is still two but that they are now semi-
individuals, it is difficult to grasp what ‘meaningless’ is supposed to 
mean. In a variation having an infinite number of almost congruent 
spheres, arranged so that the universe is appropriately geometrically 
symmetrical, the step from an infinite number to just one sphere 
stands out as completely absurd. This is so either if we assume that 
complete symmetry would result from the smallest change of the 
spheres with regard to their intrinsic qualitative contents,3 or if we 
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 164/45. 
2 Remember that the intellectual experiment is not supposed to concern 
epistemology.    
3 This kind of argument, from the possibility of almost indiscernibles to in-
discernibles, originates from Robert Adams. Cf. Adams 1979, pp. 17-9. 
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assume that they are all congruent from the start and arranged in 
geometrical symmetry except for one sphere and that complete 
symmetry comes into existence when its relative position is changed 
slightly. 
The next comment concerns space. Roughly, there are two 
views on space: absolutism and relationism. According to the former, 
space is something in itself. Let us say that it is a set of points. If a 
sphere is in a certain place, it is so by occupying a particular point or 
points. According to moderate nominalism the points making up 
space might, or should, be thought of as moments, instances of 
pointhood. Thus, in a universe that is in accordance with the second 
variation, the points occupied by sphere a and sphere b are not the 
same. The same holds mutatis mutandis for universes in accordance 
with the third variation.1 No matter how similar they are to the rest, 
no spheres share the same spatial relational properties; the spatial 
relational properties being the ones which are holding between each 
sphere and space itself.2 
Assume instead relationism about space. Space is then con-
stituted by (spatial) relations that hold between entities, in our case 
spheres. Since space is not an entity in itself, no relations can hold 
between a sphere and space. The spheres are then prerequisites of the 
relations. Not the other way round. Thus, also with relationism the 
number of spheres is what it appears to be, irrespective of whether 
the universe is symmetrical or not. 
My impression is that Segelberg does not distinguish between 
universals and individuals when formulating the intellectual experi-
                                                     
1 Needless to say, the points occupied by incongruent spheres are not the 
same either.  
2 According to Hochberg, Segelberg explicitly considers absolute spatial loca-
tions in his discussion. Cf. Hochberg 1999, p. 27. The following statement 
might be what is supposed to justify Hochberg’s claim. 
If the objects a, b, c are dispersed in space — that is, if a, b, c are 
localized in space (in the sense just specified above) — the 
different objects have different positional properties. a has one 
which b and c do not have; b has one which a and c do not have, 
and so on. (Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 160/39)  
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ment. According to the doctrines of the moment nominalism he 
champions, the spheres are not bundles of universals; though they 
can be described as bundles of moments. The bundles are then 
individual through and through. Thus, given that a ≠ b, the relational 
property Rb is not the same one as Ra. Even when a and b are con-
gruent with each other, that does not change. Seemingly, Segelberg 
may wriggle free from this charge by referring to classes of exactly 
similar moments as surrogates for (real) universals. My objection 
would, still seemingly, be blocked by saying something in line with 
the following. As it is used above ‘having R to a’ is a short for ‘having 
R to some element of the congruence class in which a is an element’; 
the same holds mutatis mutandis with regard to ‘having R to b’. In that 
sense “having R to a” and “having R to b” are the same relational 
property. There is no indication of that in connection with the intel-
lectual experiment though. The two, “having R to a” and “having R 
to b”, are what might be called ‘impure relational properties’.1  
4.2.4 Individuality 
We saw it being maintained above that an entity can be congruent 
with another entity only if they both are spatio-temporally localised. 
That is part also of the message of the following two sentences. 
When one says that there are several objects congruent 
with x, one means that x does not have any property f 
which is incompatible with there being several objects 
congruent with x. The result of our reasoning is that the 
                                                     
1 Impure relational properties involve determinate individuals. In the par-
ticular case at hand the determinate individuals are the two spheres a and b. 
The relation R is a universal; it is the same in “having R to a” and “having R 
to b”. Pure relational properties are universal through and through. Accord-
ing to my understanding of the prevalent terminology in the literature, the 
distinction is supposed to hold between pure and impure properties. The 
examples given are always relational properties though. E.g. “being married 
to Henry VIII” and “being a student of Socrates”. Cf. Loux 1978, pp. 132-3.  
MOMENT NOMINALISM                                177 
property f being considered here is the property of being 
non-localized.1 
A prerequisite for being an individual entity then is being spatio-
temporally localised. Segelberg does not think that sufficient though, 
as the intellectual experiment accounted for in section 4.2.3 is 
supposed to show. The possibility of there being (c)-sets complicates 
the matter. 
[A] difficulty arises when we ask whether the elements of 
an (ac)-set are individuals or not. This difficulty clearly 
stems from the fact that the possibility of (c)-sets was not 
considered in the earlier discussion of the concepts of 
individual and universal. Perhaps, it is best to say that the 
elements of an (ac)-set are neither individuals nor univer-
sals, but what we might call ‘semi-individuals’.2 
A second condition for being an individual is then that it must not be 
an element of any (ac)-set. Although Segelberg does not explicitly say 
anything about it, this means that relational properties which have 
internal relations as their relation component also must be included. 
Otherwise, there will be a lot of moments which are relationally 
indifferent from each other since they are thought of as being 
instantaneous and, with certain restrictions, also as sharing their 
spatio-temporal position with each other. Those actually sharing their 
position with each other are not congruent though. Therefore, no 
two moments have all their relational properties in common. In 
particular, those sharing their positions with each other will differ 
with regard to relational properties involving internal relations.3 This 
is a consequence of their being incongruent with each other. I remind 
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 164/45. 
2 Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 164/45. 
3 Note that if the (dyadic) internal relations between moments are pseudo-
additional to their relata, a moment can share an internal relational property 
with at most one other moment. This since q1Rq2 is supposed to equal q1+q2, 
which obviously is not the same as qm+qn, where either m ≠ 1 or n ≠ 1. Cf. 
the discussion in chapter III. 
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readers of Segelberg’s claim that the individuals which inhabit our 
universe together form a (d)-set.  
4.3 Relations and Complexes 
4.3.1 Overview 
Section 4.3 deals with the relational side of Segelberg’s ontology. The 
principal distinction is the one between external and internal rela-
tions. It is made in terms of similarity, which is an internal relation 
itself. Before the notions of external and internal relations are dealt 
with in section 4.3.3, a few obscurities regarding similarity are 
discussed in section 4.3.2. In the same section two kinds of com-
plexes are presented: collection and complex unity. Segelberg attaches 
great importance to the distinction between these two.  
What might be described as the fundamental ontological glue of 
reality, the elementary connection, is dealt with in section 4.3.4. In the 
following section, 4.3.5, the analogue on the ideal side is also dis-
cussed. In the final section, Segelberg’s doctrine about entities of 
different orders is presented. 
4.3.2 Similarity 
In Segelberg 1945, we find his first proposed determinations of inter-
nal and external relations. A similarity relation called ‘congruence’ is 
essential for these determinations. As it is described in Segelberg 
1945, it is evident that congruence is closely related to — if not 
identical with — exact similarity. An indication of that is that ‘exactly 
similar’ and ‘congruent’ are used interchangeably. There are indicia 
though suggesting that there might be a difference between con-
gruence and exact similarity. Among the first which is said about 
congruence is the following.  
The concept congruence and its contradictory incongruence are 
elementary concepts, which cannot be defined by analysis. 
Their meaning can only be made clear by examples. That x 
and y are congruent implies that they are exactly similar; there-
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by implying that they have all internal properties in com-
mon. On the other hand, congruence does not imply that 
all external properties are shared.1 
Four relation terms can be extracted from this quotation:2 ‘con-
gruence’, ‘exact similarity’ and ‘having all internal properties in 
common’. Does each one of these name its own relation or are they 
perhaps three different names of the same relation? Yet a third 
possibility is that two of them name the same relation, while the third 
names its own. Further relevant information on this matter is found 
in what is stated concerning the difference between congruence and 
the mirror relation.  
We must distinguish congruence from the relation which 
obtains between an asymmetrical object and its mirror 
image. We call this relation the mirror relation. A right hand 
stands, at least approximately, in the mirror relation to a 
left hand. As one can distinguish them, without taking 
external properties (location) into consideration, they are 
incongruent. Two objects which stand in the mirror rela-
tion to each other, we call mirror correlates. It is important 
that a pair of mirror correlates can agree in all their inter-
nal properties. Such is the case in figure 3. The statement 
‘x is congruent to y’ is thus not equivalent to the statement 
‘x and y have all their internal properties in common’.3 
The illustration, referred to as figure 3, is:4 
 
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 38/29. The terminology of Segelberg 1945 is partly 
different from that of the two later books. In the former, ‘internal property’ 
and ‘external property’ are used; not so in Segelberg 1947 and 1953. In the 
two latter works, that pair is replaced by ‘quality’ and ‘relational property’. 
2 I disregard ‘incongruence’ for the moment. 
3 Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 39/30. 
4 The squares x, y and z can be taken to be red, blue and green respectively. 
Furthermore, not a single one of the squares is recycled. The total number of 
squares appearing in B, b and B' is nine, not three. Cf. Segelberg 1999/1945, 
p. 127/113. 
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                 B                          b                           B' 
    y  x  x  y  z  y 
  z z x 
 
Of these three figures B and b are said to be mirror correlates; the 
same holds for b and B'. B and B' are congruence correlates.  
What has just been reported is complicated by what Segelberg 
says in a footnote. It is mentioned there that in geometry objects are 
congruent if they match each other in size as well as in shape; he adds 
that geometry also distinguishes between direct congruence and sym-
metry.  
Direct congruence obtains between two figures if they can 
be made to cover one another by movement in the plane. 
The symmetry relation obtains between a pair of con-
gruent figures if a movement in three-dimensional space is 
necessary for one figure to cover the other. The term 
‘symmetry’ has the same meaning here as our expression 
‘mirror relation’.1 
All of this is relevant when interpreting the distinction between con-
gruence, in Segelberg’s extended sense of it, and the mirror relation. 
Note that, according to the last quotation, the mirror relation obtains 
between a pair of objects if moving them in three-dimensional space 
is necessary for one to cover the other. In the quotation before the 
last one, a right and a left hand are said to be mirror correlates. In 
fact, they are not since they cannot be moved in three-dimensional 
space in a way which makes one cover the other. Using a meta-
phorical description, a right hand is entered in three-dimensional 
space differently from a left hand. Hands are so-called enantiomorphs 
even in three-dimensional space. If there were a fourth spatial dimen-
sion, that might make it possible for them to cover each other. On 
the other hand, the two two-dimensional figures B and b' are mirror 
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 123n/110n. 
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correlates. Although they are enantiomorphs in two-dimensional 
space, they are homomorphs in three-dimensional space.1  
What are we to make of the determination of the mirror 
relation? The most natural thing to do would be to leave out what is 
said regarding the two hands. After all, they do not satisfy the explicit 
definition of what it means to be mirror correlates. If we decide to 
keep the two hands as examples of mirror correlates, the definition 
provided in the footnote must be changed. A revised version might 
be that two objects are mirror correlates if they can be made to cover 
each other in n+1-dimensional space, where n-dimensional space is 
the space the pair of objects is presently in and in which they cannot 
be moved so that they cover each other. This would imply a relational 
view of space though. This since, according to absolutism, real space 
does not have more than three dimensions. I propose that we choose 
the former solution.  
Thus, according to the geometrical definition, two figures are 
mirror correlates if they cover each other in three-dimensional space 
but not in two-dimensional space. I would say that the mirror relation 
is, at least, primarily a geometrical relation in Segelberg’s terminology 
as well. Congruence, on the other hand, is a general notion which is 
supposed to be applicable to all kinds of entities.  
Let us return to the quotation in which congruence and the mir-
ror relation are introduced. Since the example with the left and right 
hands is inadequate, it must be changed. I suggest that we instead use 
the figures B and b. Segelberg asserts then that they can be dis-
tinguished without taking their locations into consideration. From 
that, it is concluded that they are incongruent. However, when the 
mirror relation obtains between two objects, the relata agree in all 
their internal properties. This is a bit puzzling. One would expect that 
there is something in virtue of which congruence holds between 
congruence correlates but not between mirror correlates. What might 
                                                     
1 Cf. Nerlich 1994, Chapter 2. In that chapter — which has the heading 
‘Hands, knees and absolute space’ — the notions of enantiomorphism, 
homomorphism, etc. are discussed. As the heading suggests, there being 
hands and knees is, or can be turned into, an argument for the existence of 
absolute space.  
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that be? In preface to an answer to that question, I add a figure which 
is not found in Segelberg 1945.1 
                                            C 
 x  
    y  
 z 
 
Segelberg would say that C is neither congruent with any of the 
former three figures, nor is it a mirror correlate of any of them. Do 
the four figures at least have all their internal properties in common? 
B and b do, according to what is stated. Since B and B' are congruence 
correlates, B' also has all its internal properties in common with it and 
b. Is the same true of C? I will come back to that question after yet 
another notion has been described: isomerism, which, in turn requires 
the introduction of the notions of collection and complex unity.  
Collection and complex unity are essential notions in Segel-
berg’s ontology. They are said to be urphenomena; neither of them 
can be derived from the other.2 That does not imply that they are 
completely indefinable though. Both of them are defined in terms of 
the relation of being disparate. 
Two objects x and y are said to be disparate if and only if 
the following statements hold: (1) x and y are not identical; 
(2) x does not contain y; (3) y does not contain x; (4) there 
is no content of x which is also a content of y.3 
This can be rendered in the following way, which is more in line with 
the rendering of the definitions which follow. 
                                                     
1 None of the three squares of C are the same as any of the nine above. Its 
squares x, y and z are red, blue and green respectively though. 
2 Cf. Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 55/46. 
3 Segelberg 1999/1945, pp. 42/33. The definition presupposes that we know 
the meanings of the terms ‘contain’ and ‘content’.   
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I. A pair of objects x and y are disparate if and only if the 
following conditions obtain: 
(1) x and y are not identical. 
(2) x does not contain y. 
(3) y does not contain x. 
(4) There is no content of x which is also a content of y. 
Furnished with this definition, the notions of complex, collection, unity, 
complex unity and total collection are defined.1 
II. An object x is a complex if and only if there is a pair of objects 
y and z such that: 
(1) x contains y. 
(2) x contains z. 
(3) y and z are disparate. 
III. An object x is a collection, if and only if the following 
conditions obtain: 
(1) x is a complex. 
(2) There are at least two objects y and z, disparate from each 
other, and such that, if there is an object H, which contains 
x, then “H contains x” = “H contains y & H contains z”. 
IV. An object x is a unity, if and only if there are not two objects, 
y and z, such that, if there is an object H which contains x, then 
“H contains x” = “H contains y & H contains z”. 
V. An object x is a complex unity if and only if the following hold: 
(1) x is a complex. 
(2) x is a unity. 
VI. A collection y+z is a total collection of x, if and only if the 
following conditions obtain: 
(1) x contains y. 
(2) x contains z. 
(3) y is disparate from z. 
                                                     
1 The five definitions which follow are presented in this way in Segelberg 
1999/1947, pp. 209-10/110-1. 
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(4) There is no object u such that x contains u and u is dispar-
ate from both y and z. 
Segelberg often uses the term ‘t-collection’ instead of ‘total collec-
tion’. 
The definition of the notion of isomerism now reads: 
If a complex k has a t-collection [total-collection] x+y+z, 
and another complex k' has a t-collection x'+y'+z', where 
x is congruent to x', y is congruent to y' and z is congruent 
to z', k and k' are said to be isomeric (adjective) or isomers 
(substantive).1 
Two laws of isomerism for collections are discerned:  
(1) If two collections k and k' are congruent, they are isomeric 
as well.  
(2) If two collections k and k' are isomeric, they are also con-
gruent.2  
Neither of these laws holds for complex unities. An illustrative 
example is the pair of the two-dimensional figures B and b above. 
There is no content in the first figure that does not have a 
congruent correspondent in the second. But, in spite of 
this, the figures are incongruent with each other; no matter 
how the figures are rotated, one can not get them to 
match.3 
From this it is concluded that incongruent entities can be isomers. 
Now, is C isomeric with the other figures? If a total collection of C is 
x+y+z, it would seem that it is isomeric with each one of them. But is 
x+y+z a total collection of C? Is the corresponding collection of any 
of the other figures a t-collection of their contents? All of these 
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 50/41. In Segelberg 1945 the collection of two en-
tities x and y is designated ‘x, y’. In the two later books this is revised to ‘x+y’. 
In their rendering of the first book the translators use the revised version.  
2 Cf. Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 50/41. 
3 Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 51/42.  
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questions should get the same answer: no. To see why this is so, 
examine them more closely. Each of the figures obviously has a 
property which is lost if x+y+z is supposed to be its total collection. 
What is lost is the shape of each figure, i.e., the shape of a square. 
The collection x+y+z+s, where ‘s’ stands for the shape in question 
might better suit our requirements. The same holds mutatis mutandis 
with regard to C. Its shape is obviously not congruent with s though.1  
One might think that B’s “turn to the right” should separate it 
from b, which makes a “turn to the left”. These differences are rela-
tional, existing as a result of how B and b are related to the two-
dimensional space. The two would be congruent in the three-dimen-
sional space. This shows that the topology of the universe is relevant.2 
If it were Segelberg’s view that the relation to space did not make any 
difference with regard to whether two objects like B and b are 
congruent, he would have to say that B and b are congruent in the 
two-dimensional space as well.3 
That congruence is not the same relation as that of having all 
internal properties in common has explicitly been stated above. Being 
congruent implies having all internal properties in common though. 
                                                     
1 Cf. Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 49/40, where it is mentioned that three squares 
x, y and z may form a figure which does not have the shape of a rectangle. 
This also applies to the present example. 
2 Entered into a universe with the topology of the Möbius strip or the Klein 
bottle, they would be congruent there too. Cf. Nerlich 1994, pp. 51-4.  
3 That view is expressed in Wittgenstein 1961, sentence 6.36111:  
Kant’s problem about the right hand and the left hand, which 
cannot be made to coincide, exists even in two dimensions. In-
deed, it exists in one-dimensional space […]. The right hand and 
the left hand are in fact completely congruent. It is quite ir-
relevant that they cannot be made to coincide. 
 A right-hand glove could be put on the left hand, if it could be 
turned round in four-dimensional space. 
A comment on this, made by Ingvar Johansson, is that Wittgenstein pre-
supposes a relational conception of space. Since he takes spaces to be merely 
constructions, it becomes arbitrary how many dimensions a space has. There 
would not be any left-hand or right-hand properties if the number of dimen-
sions were arbitrary. Johansson is an advocate of absolute space, or, container 
space, as he calls it. Cf. Johansson, 1989, p. 157.  
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That may be concluded from another quotation. There are passages, 
which, at least to some extent, point in another direction. The first is 
in Segelberg 1945. Note that things are complicated by the fact that 
an account is given there of a view which is not his own. Anyhow, the 
relevant statement is that congruence is the same as qualitative iden-
tity.1 And how is ‘qualitative’ to be interpreted if not as being synony-
mous with ‘with regard to internal properties’? Thus, congruence and 
having all internal properties in common might be the same relation 
after all. Recall Segelberg’s assertion in his second book: 
If an object x is qualitatively different from an object y, x 
must be “numerically different” from y. But even if x and y 
are qualitatively identical, i.e. congruent, x can still be 
“numerically different” from y.2 
Here we find qualitative identity being explicitly identified with con-
gruence. And what is more, this is not a report on the view of some-
one else. 
In addition to the terms already mentioned, there is a fourth 
one: ‘absolute similarity’. It is used in one single place.  
One can distinguish two senses of the word ‘similarity’: 
absolute similarity3 and relative similarity. “Absolute simi-
larity” is the same as congruence; “relative similarity” 
obtains between objects which are “like” in one respect 
and “different” in another. That relative similarity obtains 
between a pair of objects, x and y, implies: x is incon-
gruent to y and x has a content z and y has a content z' and 
z is congruent to z'. We will assume in the future that 
every “similarity” between incongruent objects has this 
character.4 
                                                     
1 Cf. Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 41/32. 
2 Segelberg 1999/1947, pp. 163/44. 
3 The translators have inserted ‘(exact)’between ‘absolute’ and ‘similarity’. 
Since there is no such insertion in the original, I have removed it. 
4 Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 43/34. 
MOMENT NOMINALISM                                187 
‘Exact similarity’ is not mentioned here as a name of a variant of 
similarity. No direct information is therefore supplied concerning it. 
Another piece of information is given though: similarity between 
objects always involves congruence.1 An “extreme” form of relative 
similarity holds between mirror correlates. This since they are what 
Segelberg calls ‘absolute isomers’; meaning that for each total collec-
tion of either correlate the other has a congruent total collection.  
Where do we stand now regarding congruence and exact simi-
larity? It could be that there is no difference. The way ‘exact simi-
larity’ is used in the two later books is a strong indication of that. 
There is also the possibility though that, at least in the first book, 
congruence is not the same as exact similarity. Perhaps it falls some-
where between congruence and having all internal properties in com-
mon. The translation reinforces the indication of there being a tris-
tinction in this case. I repeat the relevant sentence to show what I 
mean by that.  
That x and y are congruent implies that they are exactly simi-
lar; thereby implying that they have all internal properties 
in common.2 
This way of rendering the relationship between the (possibly) three 
relations suggests that exact similarity is a middle man, due to the two 
words chosen by the translators: ‘implies’ and ‘implying’. The former 
might be misleading. A better translation of the Swedish word used 
would be ‘means’, instead of ‘implies’.3 If congruence between entities 
means that they are exactly similar and is thereby implying that they 
have all their internal properties in common, the indication of a tris-
tinction being made, instead of a distinction, is barely, if at all, visible. 
Congruence is then naturally thought of as being the same as exact 
similarity. 
                                                     
1 Evidently, this gives expression to what was named ‘the similarity principle’ 
in chapter II. 
2 Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 38/29. 
3 The Swedish word is ‘innebär’. 
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It should also be noted that the congruence which holds 
between mirror correlates depends on the relations each mirror corre-
late has to space. Since these relations are not internal properties of 
either mirror correlate, neither are they contents of them. Perhaps 
that implies that relational differences are irrelevant.  
4.3.3 Internal and External Relations 
Let us return to the notions of internality and externality using a 
reference to David Hume as an introduction: 
In The Treatise,1 Hume divides relations into two classes: 
those which are completely dependent on the “ideas” we 
compare, and those that can be changed without the 
compared “ideas” changing. We call the first type of 
relation simply a relation or an ideal relation; the second type 
a connection or a real relation.2 
Though inspired by Hume’s distinction, the one Segelberg has in 
mind is not of such a limited scope as the former one at least appears 
to be. Ideal relations do not have ideas as their exclusive relata. 
                                                     
1 Hume says in the place referred to: 
These relations may be divided into two classes; into such as 
depend entirely on the ideas, which we compare together, and 
such as may be chang’d without any change in the ideas. (Hume 
Treatise, Book 1, Part 3, Sect. 1) 
As pointed out in Hochberg 1999, pp. 336-7n, Segelberg may (mistakenly) 
believe that Hume partitions all relations as belonging to one of these two 
classes. This is not so though. Hume’s distinction applies to the class of what 
he calls ‘philosophical relations’.  
2 Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 41/32. Where Swedish has (at least) three words, 
English seems to have only two. The former are ‘relation’, ‘förhållande’ and 
‘förbindelse’; the first of these being the most general. The English word 
‘connection’ equals that of ‘förbindelse’ quite well. When it comes to 
‘förhållande’, in the sense used by Segelberg, the term ‘ideal relation’ seems to 
be the best alternative, despite its clumsiness. To use ‘relation’ both as a spe-
cific and a general term seems risky. I have therefore inserted ‘ideal’ in a few 
places.  
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Segelberg’s definition of internal relation, under the name ‘ideal 
relation’, reads: 
If R is an [ideal] relation, the following conditions obtain. 
If xRy and x~x',1 where x, y and x' can be any objects, 
then there is an object z, such that x'Rz and z~y.2 
A relation which satisfies this condition is (at least) b-type ideal. To 
earn the status of being a-type ideal it must also satisfy the following, 
somewhat stronger, condition: 
If an [ideal] relation R is an a-relation (a-ideal), a general 
implication obtains from xRy & x~x' to x'Ry.3 
Examples of a-type ideal relations are congruence and the mirror 
relation. The whole–part relation is an example of a b-type ideal 
relation.4  
According to Segelberg a relation and its converse are in fact the 
same relation. Given that this is so, it is a bit puzzling how a relation 
                                                     
1 The sign ‘~’ stands for congruence. 
2 Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 41/32. 
3 Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 41/32. 
4 Unfortunately, there are two misprints in the original text. One of them still 
remains in the translation. The paragraph, in Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 41/32, 
in which they both occur reads: 
Examples of [ideal] relations: (1) Congruence. If x is congruent to y 
and x~x', then there is an object z (for instance y), such that x' is 
congruent to z and z~x [my remark: it should be ‘z~y’, instead of 
‘z~x’; this is the first misprint]. (2) The mirror-relation. If x has the 
mirror-relation to y and x~x', there is an object (for example y 
itself), such that x' is a mirror-image of z and z~y. (3) The 
relation of whole–part. If x has y as a part and x~x', there is an 
object z such that x' has z [the text has x, trans.][my remark: this 
is the second misprint] as a part and z~y.  
Assume for a moment that the rendering of the condition in (1) is not a 
misprint. Congruence still satisfies it: (x~y & x~x') → ∃z(x'~z & z~x) is a 
true proposition. This condition is not the same as that of (2) and (3) though. 
It might turn out that congruence is the single relation which satisfies it. If it 
is not a misprint, a tristinction is being made within the class of ideal rela-
tions.  
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can be internal while its converse is not. Segelberg comments on this. 
I let him speak for himself. 
According to our way of looking at it, […] a relation and 
its converse relation are basically the same thing seen from 
two points of view. That a is larger than b is exactly the 
same thing as that b is smaller than a. The fact, which both 
statements signify, has the constituents a, b, and the rela-
tion of comparison, and no other constituents.1 On the 
other hand, one can say that there is a difference in mean-
ing between them, in the sense that the understanding of 
the experience, which the one statement expresses, differs 
in a typical way from the understanding of the experience 
which the other statement expresses. In the first case one 
begins by thinking about a, while in the second case one 
begins by thinking about b. What is it, then, that makes 
one use the expression ‘larger than’ in the one case, and 
‘smaller than’ in the other case, given that the meaning is 
totally opposite when one chooses the relational expres-
sions in reverse? One can put the matter in the following 
way: The relation of comparison has two sides, a “plus 
side” and a “minus side”; in the state of affairs “a is larger 
than b”, the plus side is turned to a and the minus side to 
b; in the opposite state of affairs the minus side, instead, is 
turned to a and the plus side to b. We now use the 
expression ‘larger than’ in order to express the relation in 
question, if the term of the relation which is thought of 
first is united with the plus side of the relation. However, 
when the term conceived first is united with the relation’s 
minus side, we use the expression ‘larger than’. What has 
been said here about the relation “larger than” (“smaller 
than”) holds, mutatis mutandis, of all asymmetrical rela-
tions.2 
                                                     
1 Below it will be seen that Bradley’s regress is supposed to arise in connec-
tion with states of affairs. There is no sign of that here though. 
2 Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 190/81. I suspect that the non-symmetrical rela-
tions are included in the class of asymmetrical relations. 
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Thus, there is only one state of affairs, although it might look like 
there are two. The appearance of two states of affairs is due to sub-
jectivity; it is dependent on the order in which the relata are con-
sidered. In the light of this, Segelberg now says: 
As it is desirable to define the concept “internal relation” 
without bringing in subjective factors, we should not 
define the concept so that an asymmetrical relation can be 
internal without its converse being internal. Rather, we 
should, instead, distinguish between two different con-
ceptions of internal. We speak therefore about unilaterally 
internal relations and bilaterally internal relations.1 
The use of ‘conceptions’ in ‘different conceptions of internal’ suggests 
that a distinction is made between concepts and conceptions. In the 
Swedish original, however, just one single word is used. Its meaning is 
that of ‘concept’. Thus, Segelberg’s intention is not to distinguish 
between the concept of internal relation, on the one hand, and various 
conceptions of it, on the other. Instead, what are distinguished are 
two concepts of internal relation.  
That a relation R is internal means, we will say, that at least 
one of the following statements holds: 
 1) If x has the relation R to y, then every object con-
gruent to x has the relation R to at least one object con-
gruent to y. 
 2) If x has the relation R to y, then every object con-
gruent to y has the converse of R to at least one object 
congruent to x.2 
If only one of the conditions (1) or (2) is satisfied, a relation R is 
unilaterally internal. If both conditions are satisfied, R is bilaterally 
internal. To be an internal relation is to be either unilaterally internal 
or bilaterally internal. I take it that congruence and the mirror relation 
are both bilaterally internal; the whole–part relation is unilaterally 
internal.  
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 190/82. 
2 Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 191/82. 
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External relations do not fulfil any of the two above-mentioned 
conditions. To begin with, three examples of external relations are 
presented:  
(1) Spatial contact. If x lies spatially next to y and x~x', there 
need not be an object z, congruent to y, which lies next to 
x'. (2) Temporal succession. If the event x takes place before 
the event y and the event x is exactly similar to the event 
x', there need not be an event z, congruent to y, such that 
x' occurred before z. (3) The relation between simultaneous 
experiences in a total consciousness. If x and y are simultaneous 
experiences in a total consciousness and x~x', there need 
not be any experience z, congruent to y, such that x' and z 
are simultaneous moments in a total consciousness.1 
Connections and ideal relations form unities together with their 
relata. In the states of affairs “x is spatially next to y” and “x is larger 
than y” the unifiers are a connection and an ideal relation respectively. 
The terms ‘connection’ and ‘ideal relation’ are also used as denomina-
tions for their respective unities.  
Whether an asymmetrical relation exists singly or in pair with a 
converse relation is an intricate problem. As it appears, asymmetrical 
relations come in pairs though. An obvious question is then: which 
one of the two is it that really exists? I suppose that Segelberg would 
find that question easy to reply to. His answer would be that there is 
only one since the two are the same.  
If the asymmetrical relations do come in pairs, logical equi-
valence holds between atomic facts. Given that a relation holds, its 
converse also holds between the same relata, in the opposite order. 
Hochberg suggests that there is a good reason to think that asym-
metrical relations come in pairs.  
To recognize converse pairs is to recognize that, given a 
relation R, one does not introduce a further relational 
predicate ‘R*’ by definition. Rather one holds that there is a 
unique relation that is the converse of R. There may be 
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1945, pp. 41-2/32-3. 
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other relations with the same extension as the converse, 
R*. For neither properties nor relations are identified with 
their extensions. This means that one cannot take the con-
verse to be the relation represented by a defined predicate, 
as in the familiar set theoretical approach: yR*x =df xRy. 
[…] For this assumes that only one relation has the 
appropriate extension […]. The assumption is not viable, 
if the predicates represent relations, not classes.1 
4.3.4 Elementary Connection 
The fundamental ontological glue of Segelberg’s ontology is the ele-
mentary connection. It is a close relative of that which Williams calls 
‘concurrence’. The essential difference between these relations is of 
course that Segelberg’s connection is a universal.  
The first appearance of elementary connection is in Segelberg 
1945. It is also there we find the most transparent and complete 
determination of it. 
A […] kind of connection is found in a homogenously 
colored surface. The color and the extension are here 
connected in a totally different way than, for example, 
parts of space in contact. If we wish to characterize the 
relation between color and extension, it is natural to speak 
of a “fusion” of color and extension or to say that color 
and extension “permeate” each other or that the color 
“covers” the extension. 
 We call this connection an elementary-connection or e-
connection, since it should be evident that other kinds of 
connections are compound relations, in which the e-con-
nection is a component, and since the e-connection itself 
does not have any other connection as a component.2 
As it will turn out, the proposed definition of the elementary con-
nection is made in terms of immediate union and being immediately 
                                                     
1 Hochberg 1999, p. 160. 
2 Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 54/45. 
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united. Instead of trying to account for these two notions, I let Segel-
berg present them himself.  
Assume that x and y are immediately united, that x lacks 
content1 and that y has a solitary content z. It is easily seen 
that the immediate union between x and y can be of differ-
ent kinds. If x is immediately united with z, x is, thereby, 
immediately united with y, but in a different way than if x 
is immediately united with y without the intermediation of 
z. We consequently have to distinguish between a direct and 
an indirect immediate union. In the above example, the 
following cases of an immediate union between x and y 
can be imagined: (1) x is directly united with y but not with 
z; (2) x is directly united with z but not with y; (3) x is 
directly united with both y and z. If one considers several 
contents of x and y, the number of alternatives of union 
quickly gets larger.2 
The notion of solitary content seems to play an essential role here. 
The definition of it can be rendered: something is a solitary content 
of another entity if the latter does not have any content which is 
disparate from the former.3 This, at first, gives the impression that a 
solitary content is simple, in some sense. This impression is rein-
forced by an example given in direct connection with the definition. 
It is found in the next quotation, which also contains the definition 
itself. 
By a simple unity we mean a unity which does not have 
several disparate contents. That a unity is simple does not 
                                                     
1 Presumably, x lacking content does not mean that it is empty. I take it that 
it is a simple entity and this in a strong sense. Perhaps we can assume that it is 
an atom, in the original sense of that word. Furthermore, although it is 
perhaps not explicitly said anywhere that only moments can be e-connected, 
this seems to be implied. The description of an e-connection as being a fu-
sion of entities and that colour and extension are used as examples of e-con-
nected entities are parts of the circumstantial evidence.  
2 Segelberg 1999/1945, pp. 56/46-7. 
3 Cf. Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 52/43. 
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exclude that it has many contents, so long as these are not 
disparate. A simple unity x can thus contain y, z and u, for 
example, y contains z and z contains u. Here, it is assumed 
that x does not contain a content that is disparate from y, z 
or u. If an object x contains an object y without having a 
content disparate from y, y is said to be a solitary content of 
x.1 
There is another example of a solitary content: the general colour 
character, as it occurs in all colours. It is a solitary content of them, 
since it is impossible to find any content in a specific colour which is 
disparate from this general character.2 There is a footnote made in 
connection with this example, in which Segelberg comments on what 
is called a ‘simple quality’.  
The general concept of a “simple quality” does not cor-
respond exactly to the concept of “simple unity”, as a 
simple quality cannot contain another object. If, for 
example, red is a simple quality, red cannot contain the 
quality color. On the other hand, this does not pose any 
obstacle if red is a “simple unity”. The concept of a simple 
quality seems to involve a collectionistic outlook as a psy-
chological presupposition, that is to say, an outlook which 
does not allow for the possibility of solitary contents.3 
This of course adds to the impression that an entity which has a 
solitary content is simple, in some sense, although it is not that of 
being absolutely simple.  
In another paragraph there is more information, which is also 
new. It brings on a revision of the first impression of what having a 
solitary content amounts to.  
An especially important case of a solitary content is the t-
collection [total collection] of a complex unity. If k is a t-
collection of a complex unity a, k is a solitary content of a. 
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 52/43. 
2 Segelberg 1999/1945, pp. 52-3/43. 
3 Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 124n/111n. 
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If a collection k is a solitary content of a, k is a t-collection 
of a.1 
The implication to simplicity is completely absent here. Instead, the 
assertion is made that the t-collection of any complex unity is a 
solitary content of it. Since there are complex unities of infinite com-
plexity with regard to disparate contents, it turns out that the first 
example is misleading. The entity used as an example there just 
happened to be a simple unity.  
Do not fail to notice another implication of the statement made 
in the last quotation: a t-collection of a complex unity is itself a 
content of that complex unity. This piece of information is in-
dependent of how the notion of solitary content is defined. I am not 
sure of whether the entity x, which plays a principal part in the 
determination of the elementary connection, has a solitary content or 
not. In the second quotation of the present section we were informed 
that it lacks content. Perhaps it has a solitary content in a trivial sense; 
i.e., it is its own solitary content. 
A prerequisite to understanding Segelberg’s definition of ele-
mentary connection is an understanding of what it means for some-
thing to be immediately united with something else. An objection 
might be raised that an alleged distinction between direct and indirect 
immediate union is mistaken, since entities are either immediately 
united or they are not. Immediacy does not admit of any further gra-
dation on its own. However, Segelberg wants to distinguish between 
what he calls ‘direct immediate unity’, on the one hand, and ‘indirect 
immediate unity’, on the other. Furthermore, he defines the notion of 
elementary connection in terms of direct immediate unity. The actual 
definition is found in the fourth paragraph of what follows.  
In case2 1 there is a complex, which we call a, in case 2 the 
complex b, in case 3 the complex c. All these unities can be 
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 53/43. 
2 The three cases are those listed four quotations back — i.e., Case 1: x is 
directly united with y but not with z; Case 2: x is directly united with z but not 
with y; Case 3: x is directly united with both y and z; and in all these cases z is 
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represented, in our schematic symbolism, by ‘xy’, since all 
have the collection x+y as a t-collection. But, obviously, 
they are not congruent. 
 In the complex a, x is directly immediately united with 
y. In b, x is indirectly immediately united with y, which 
implies that x is directly immediately united with a content 
of y, but not directly immediately united with y itself. 
 In the complex c, x is directly immediately united with 
both y and z. Hence, c contains both a and b. 
Consequently, one can distinguish, in c, a unity of x and y 
which does not contain a unity of x and z, while y contains 
z, and x is in fact immediately united with z. If one 
observes this, one can give a definition of the concept ele-
mentary unity: By an elementary unity of x and y is meant an 
immediate unity of x and y, which does not contain an 
immediate unity of x and some content of y or of a 
content of x and a content of y. 
 The complex a is thus an elementary unity of x and y; 
the complex c is not an elementary unity of x and y, but it 
contains such a unity; the complex b1 neither is nor contains 
an elementary unity of x and y. If x and y form an ele-
mentary unity, x and y are elementarily-connected. In the com-
plexes a and c, x and y are thus elementarily-connected.2 
Thus, the definition of an elementary unity is: 
Elementary unity of x and y =Df. An immediate unity of x and y,  
 (i) which does not contain an 
immediate unity of x and 
some content of y,  
 (ii)  which does not contain an 
immediate unity of y and 
some content of x, or  
                                                                                                   
a solitary content of y. Cf. Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 56/47. 
1 The original has ‘c’. This misprint is corrected in the translation. 
2 Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 56/47. 
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 (iii)  which does not contain a 
unity of a content of x and 
a content of y. 
Since it is explicitly asserted that x and y are e-connected in c, the defi-
nition should not be interpreted in such a way that an elementary 
unity of x and y must not contain an immediate unity of either of 
them with a content of the other or an immediate unity between 
contents of each of them. It may in fact do either of those things, but 
it must also contain a direct immediate unity of x and y themselves. 
Without the latter, x and y are not e-connected with each other. 
Briefly summing up, being e-connected is being directly immediately 
united. 
Note that the terminology used initially is slightly changed in the 
actual formulation of the definition of e-connectedness. Initially, the 
content z is referred to as being a solitary content of y. This is not the 
case in the definition at hand, where z is referred to as being a content 
of y.  
Whether z is a solitary content, or just a content, of y seems to 
make a difference. Take the case where the solitary content of y is 
z1+z2+z3; i.e., z1+z2+z3 is a t-collection of y. Now, to start with, what 
does it mean to say that x is directly, immediately united with this 
solitary content of y? Does it mean that x is directly, immediately 
united with each one of its three elements? Or, will it do if it is 
directly, immediately united with just one of them? If the latter is 
sufficient, then it seems as if the direct immediate unity is with a 
content of y, and not a solitary content of it. If instead the former is 
necessary, it is somewhat difficult to grasp how that differs from 
being directly immediately united with y itself. If there is a difference, 
how is it possible for x to be directly immediately united with y 
without being directly immediately united with at least one of its 
contents? Evidently, the last question touches on the essential one 
regarding the relations between part and whole and vice versa.  
I take it that irrespective of how the questions of the previous 
paragraph are answered, it is important to note that xy can exist 
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without x and y being e-connected with each other. In the complex 
unity b1 they are not so connected. Instead, x is e-connected with a 
content of y; that is sufficient for x and y to form xy. If e-connected-
ness between x and y were a prerequisite for the symbolisation ‘xy’, 
the latter could not be used in the case of b.  
4.3.5 Elementary Ideal Relation 
The elementary connection is an external (or real) relation. In this 
section I discuss the notion of elementary ideal relation. When 
introduced in Segelberg 1945, both congruence and incongruence are 
described as elementary concepts.2 Later in the same work, when 
relations in general are discussed, it is stated: 
The phenomenological unity, which exists when a pair of 
objects stand in a relation to one another, we call a 
relational unity. A relational unity is either elementary or 
compound. To say that xRy is a compound relational unity 
means that it can be analyzed into xR'z & zR"y or xR'z ∨ 
zR"y. It is to be noted that the concepts elementary and 
compound do not correspond to the concepts simple and 
complex, introduced earlier. Every relational unity, even an 
elementary one, is a complex unity. The relational unity “x 
is a paternal aunt of y” can serve as an example of a com-
pound relational unity. It implies that there is an object z, 
such that x is a sister of z and z is the father of y. The 
unities “x is a sister of z” and “z is the father of y” are, in 
turn, compound unities. There is reason to believe, even if 
it cannot be logically proven, that every compound rela-
tional unity can be analyzed into a number of elementary 
relational unities. So, if xRy is a compound unity, R is said 
to be a compound relation; if xRy is elementary, R is said to be 
an elementary relation.3 
                                                     
1 I am referring to the entity b appearing in the last quotation.  
2 Cf. Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 38/29. 
3 Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 53/44. 
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Immediately after this quotation the relational unity “x is incongruent 
to y” is described as being an elementary relational unity. We are also 
informed that incongruence is in itself an elementary relation. After 
the proclamation of its being elementary, argumentation follows 
which is intended show that congruence cannot be elementary. 
According to the argument, incongruence must hold between at least 
two entities. It does not form a unity together with just one entity of a 
pair. Without any of the entities of the pair, there will be no in-
congruence unity. Thus, nothing can have an elementary relation to 
itself. If it could, the elementary relation would need to be reflexive. 
Since incongruence is elementary and irreflexive, there cannot be any 
(other) elementary relation which is reflexive. Each reflexive relation 
is therefore compound. Congruence is reflexive. Therefore, it is com-
pound.  
It might come as a surprise that the compound relation of this 
pair is congruence and not incongruence. The reason it is not the 
other way round is because congruence is the negative one. No 
doubt, this also comes as a surprise. Segelberg gives a sort of argu-
ment for all this in connection with the introduction of the two.  
The concept “incongruence” is the negation of congruence. 
It is then noteworthy that congruence, ontologically con-
sidered, is the absence of incongruence. Incongruence is 
the positive, congruence the negative.1 You can convince 
yourself of this by the following consideration: The nega-
tive is not observable in the same sense in which the 
                                                     
1 Evidently, a distinction between the concept of incongruence, on the one 
hand, and the concept of congruence, on the other, is presupposed here. Judg-
ing from what is stated in the first, second and third sentences the concept of 
incongruence is the negation of that of congruence. However, ontologically it 
is the other way round: congruence is the negation of incongruence. This 
means then that in the second and third sentences ‘congruence’ and ‘incon-
gruence’ do not refer to concepts. I take it that they refer to the two 
(universal) relations. Furthermore, in the translation ‘concept’ is inserted after 
‘negative’; it is not there in the Swedish original. Since it annuls the pre-
supposed distinction between concept and universal relation, I have removed 
it.  
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positive is: If we wish to determine, for example, whether 
an object is white or not-white, we look for the property 
“white”; we consider the object to be “not-white” if we do 
not find the property white. We do not look for the 
property “non-whiteness” and explain the object’s being 
“white” in terms of our not coming across the negative 
property. Consequently, when we want to decide if an 
object has a certain negative property, we seek the cor-
responding positive property, and ascribe the negative 
property to the object if we do not come across the posi-
tive property. How do we then proceed when we want to 
decide whether x and y are congruent or incongruent? 
Obviously we look for incongruence (difference) and 
regard x and y as congruent, if we do not find any 
incongruence (difference). Incongruence is apparently the 
positive, and congruence the negative. That the negative1 
congruence has acquired a positive linguistic expression is 
explained by the fact that congruence is a more unusual 
and more significant phenomenon than incongruence.2 
One might go batty when learning that incongruence is positive and 
congruence negative. Note though that incongruence still means dif-
ference; difference still appears to be negative. Its being ontologically 
positive does not change that. The argument for its being positive is 
that we look for it when it is to be decided whether two entities are 
congruent or incongruent. The argument for this, in turn, is that we 
look for a positive property, not a negative one, when it is to be 
decided whether an entity has a property or not. This has the appear-
ance of being an epistemological argument rather than an ontological 
one. If that is indeed the case, has it any bearing on ontology? I think 
not.  
However that may be, the statement quoted in section 4.3.2,3 
that both congruence and incongruence are elementary relations is 
                                                     
1 The translators have inserted ‘concept’ after ‘negative’. I have removed it, 
for the same reason as a moment ago. 
2 Segelberg 1999/1945, pp. 39-40/30-1. 
3 I am referring to the following statement. 
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revised then. According to the latest news, only incongruence is ele-
mentary. 
4.3.6 Objects of Different Orders 
Segelberg distinguishes between different orders of objects. While 
individuals are of the lowest (first) order, universals occupy a higher 
order. Each object of the lowest order is located in space and time. 
The higher order ones have no such location. Anything containing a 
universal — i.e., a relation — is a higher order object. Thus, together 
with relations,1 states of affairs and relational properties are higher 
order objects. This is illustrated by what he asserts regarding the 
distinction between a rectangle and a state of affairs. 
Compare a rectangle H, consisting of the squares a and b, 
to the following state of affairs (S): the square a lies beside 
b. Both H and S are complexes containing a and b. What 
basically distinguishes H from S is that S contains, in 
addition to a and b, a relation. It appears likely that every 
complex unity (i.e. every complex that is not simply a 
collection) which contains a relation is either a state of affairs 
or a relational property. Objects of the lowest order never 
contain relations. In an object of the lowest order which is 
a complex, a relation obtains among its components, but 
the relation is not a component of the object. If x is the complex 
yz and if the relation R obtains between y and z, then R is 
                                                                                                   
The concept congruence and its contradictory incongruence are ele-
mentary concepts, which cannot be defined by analysis. Their 
meaning can only be made clear by examples. (Segelberg 
1999/1945, p. 38/29) 
If I am right earlier in this section, that a distinction is made between the 
concepts of congruence and incongruence, on the one hand, and the universal 
relations of congruence and incongruence, on the other, then the assumption 
should be that the sense in which ‘concept’ and ‘concepts’ is used here is the 
general one, which includes also universal relations. Due to the elusiveness of 
Segelberg’s use of ‘concept’, occurrences of the term are easily misinter-
preted. I am sorry to say that the same applies to my own use of ‘notion’.  
1 Cf. Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 166/48.  
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not a component of x; but R is a component of the state 
of affairs yRz, which is an object of the second order.1 
Part of the message here obviously is that the rectangle H would not 
exist if certain relations did not hold between the two squares a and b. 
Both these squares are contents of H. Although the relation R, which 
is one of the relations holding between a and b, is essential for their 
forming H, it is supposed not to be a content of H. This is somewhat 
obscured by the first half of the penultimate sentence: “In an object 
of the lowest order which is a complex, a relation obtains among its 
components […].” The use of ‘in’ here suggests that the relation in 
fact is a content of the object. The relation holding among the com-
ponents of H is a state of affairs; as such, the latter is a higher order 
entity. Therefore, neither R nor aRb is a component of the first order 
object H.  
Incidentally, since the two squares a and b are first order objects 
themselves, neither of them contains any relation. However, as in the 
case with the rectangle H, there are relations that hold between the 
constituents of each square. These relations are constitutive of their 
states of affairs. They are also necessary for there being a square a as 
well as a square b.  
The stated reason for not allowing relations among the contents 
of first order entities is that if they were, it would result in a vicious 
regress. The regress is an old acquaintance. 
If one supposes that H contains those relations that obtain 
between a and b, one falls victim to Bradley’s infinite 
regress. Bradley is right in that there is a relation R 
between a and b, and there is a relation R' between a and 
R, and so on. However, these relations are not compo-
nents of H, but of complexes of higher order.2 
If the regress would ensue given that a relation were a component of 
the rectangle and this is supposed to constitute a conclusive reason 
against its being a content of the latter, why is this not equally so for 
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1947, pp. 165-6/47-8. 
2 Segelberg 1999/1947, pp. 221/127-8. 
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higher order objects? It is not obvious what Segelberg’s answer is. 
Herbert Hochberg suggests that the regress is considered to be harm-
less when occurring in states of affairs. 
Segelberg’s solution, accepting an infinite chain of facts as 
non-problematic, since the elements of the chain are 
merely deductive consequences of the original fact, as in 
the case of the series of sentences (i) ‘p’, “p’ is true’, ‘“p is 
true’ is true’, etc. […].1 
If the regress is to be harmless, it must be of the implicative sort; 
though I do not know for certain whether Segelberg believes that. 
Regrettably, Hochberg does not give any hint of what text to consult 
for corroboration. Anyhow, he does not agree with what he takes to 
be Segelberg’s view on the alleged regress.  
When Segelberg takes an infinite series of states of affairs, 
beginning with aRb, to be unproblematic, he ignores two 
problems. First, a theory that allows such a generation of 
entities is prima facie implausible, though not paradoxical. 
Second, such a theory fails to provide, at any point in the 
series, the ontological analysis of the original fact. Hence, 
it fails to specify a sufficient truth ground for the initial 
atomic sentence. A viable theory will neither recognize 
such an infinite series of facts nor fail to specify the truth 
grounds for atomic sentences. In short, a viable theory 
cannot permit such infinite Bradley-type series.2 
From what is said with regard to the second problem, it is evident 
that Hochberg considers the regress to be an analytical one.3 
If one considers an analytic regress to be running amok when-
ever a state of affairs is supposed to exist, one must accept that the 
                                                     
1 Hochberg 1999, p. 166. The step from ‘p’ to “p’ is true’ has as a prerequisite 
that p obtains. The original fact is p. If it does not obtain, the regress does not 
come off.  
2 Hochberg 1999, pp. 165-6. 
3 I am a bit puzzled by what he says with regard to the first problem. If the 
regress is of the analytic sort, why is Segelberg’s assumption not paradoxical? 
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analysis of what the original state of affairs consists in never comes to 
an end. For some reason, Segelberg thinks that the regress is un-
problematic with regard to higher order entities. The strategy he uses 
for avoiding it in connection with the first order objects (where he 
thinks it is problematic) is to deny that they are contents of such 
objects. As long as they can be among the contents of higher order 
objects, he thinks he has got everything he needs. The higher order 
objects take care of the laundering of (some of)1 the first order 
objects, so to speak. 
Besides the word ‘order’ Segelberg also uses ‘degree’, though 
not for the same purpose. 
One can order states of affairs in a hierarchy in the follow-
ing way. Lowest are those facts which are not facts about 
facts, for example, violets bloom in April. We will call such 
facts, facts of the first degree. One step higher are facts 
about first-degree facts, for example, [(a>b) & (b>c)] has as 
a consequence (a>c). If we go one step higher, we find 
facts about second-degree facts, and so on.2 
The term ‘degree’ is only used in connection with states of affairs. It 
should be fairly easy then not to confuse the notions of first-order 
and first-degree entities.  
Regrettably, ‘order’ is also used in a way which is somewhat 
problematic. We find it being used in this way in the following 
statement. 
Relations and other objects of higher order are not univer-
sals in the same sense as, for example, the concept3 “man” 
is universal. While universal objects of the first order are 
logical constructions, this is not true of (universal) objects 
of higher order. To universal objects of the first order, 
                                                     
1 This insertion is made bearing in mind that there might be simple entities 
completely lacking any internal structure. These entities would be true atoms.  
2 Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 165/47. 
3 The implication here seems to be that a concept is not a higher order entity. 
My guess is that it is a logical construction — most likely, a similarity class. 
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there correspond one or several instances. There are no 
instances corresponding to objects of higher order. The 
relation which obtains from a relational property to the 
object which has the relational property is a relation that is 
totally different from that which obtains from a universal 
object of the first order to an instance corresponding to 
that universal. The use in English of the same expression 
— ‘instance of’ — for the two relations — that from an 
object to its relational properties and that from an instance 
to a universal object of the first order1 — causes a great 
deal of confusion.2 
The phrase ‘universal object of the first order’ is a bewildering com-
pound. It even looks like a contradiction in terms. Though it is hardly 
a successful formulation, it need not be contradictory. As it occurs 
above it is a harbinger of Segelberg’s doctrine on qualities. A more 
transparent phrase to use when referring to what is called ‘universal’ 
here would be ‘surrogate for universal’ where “universal” is a class of 
moments. Such a class is considered to be a first-order object.  
A number of ordinary objects can be thought of as combining 
to make up a complex entity; an example of this would be four books 
which constitute a pile of books and can be viewed as constituting a 
collection. In a collection, the ordering of the elements has no 
relevance. However, if the books are thought of as constituting a 
complex unity instead, the ordering of them, their relative positions, 
are essential. 
When one says that these perspectives are different ways 
of looking at the same objects, one has, however, expressed 
oneself inadequately. The pile of books abstracted from 
the ordering is a different object than the pile of books in-
cluding the ordering. The collection of books is an abstract 
                                                     
1 The word used in the translation is ‘level’. I have changed it to ‘order’ 
though. My justification is that the word used by Segelberg here is the same 
as that which has been translated into ‘order’ earlier. The translators also use 
‘level’, instead of ‘order, in the summary of Segelberg 1947. This is equally 
unmotivated. Cf. Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 228/137.  
2 Segelberg 1999/1947, pp. 166/48-9. 
MOMENT NOMINALISM                                207 
component in the complex unity, which constitutes the 
concrete1 pile of books. One can say that the collection of 
books provides the “building blocks” for the concrete pile 
of books. One can easily see that the same pile2 of books 
can form several different concrete piles of books. If the 
books are a, b, c, and d one can form pile abcd, in which, a 
is on the top and d is on the bottom, the pile bacd, and so 
on. Therefore, we must distinguish between, on the one 
hand, the collection a+b+c+d and, on the other hand, 
different wholes, for which this collection furnishes the 
building blocks, e.g. abcd, dcba, and so on.3 
In order for the books to form a complex unity together, none of 
them needs to be e-connected with another. I am quite certain that a 
book cannot be e-connected to another book; only moments have 
the capacity to be connected with each other in that way. 
What is the pile of books including the ordering? Is it a first 
order object? According to the official doctrine, it cannot be since 
ordering is a relational matter. It seems natural though to think of a 
complex unity, of whatever order, as an entity with a qualitative 
content as well as a relational content. Its relations connect the dis-
parate non-relational contents in an internal structure. As one might 
expect, Segelberg rejects this. 
One tends to picture a connecting relation as a content in 
the complex unity disparate from the connected objects. If 
x and y are connected into the complex unity xy, one then 
thinks one can, in xy, distinguish a relation R, disparate 
from x and y, which connects x and y into the unity. It is 
obvious that a union of two objects, x and y, often con-
tains moments which are disparate from x and y. But, it is 
a mistake to think that every union of x and y must contain 
objects disparate from x and y. Such an idea is dependent 
on a collectionist outlook: As the collection x+y and a 
                                                     
1 I think we can assume that neither ‘abstract’ nor ‘concrete’ is used here in a 
technical sense.  
2 It would be better to use ‘collection’ here.  
3 Segelberg 1999/1947, pp. 185-6/75. 
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unity xy both contain x and y, but are not congruent, from 
a collectionist point of view one of x+y and xy must 
contain a moment which the other lacks. Since the collec-
tion x+y, by definition, does not have a content disparate 
from x and y, the “differentiating” content must belong to 
xy, and since some such content cannot be observed in xy, 
an unobservable relation-moment1 between x and y is 
simulated. Collectionism seeks to understand every union 
of x and y as a collection of x, y and certain “ties”, rela-
tions, which unite x and y into a unity. The notion, how-
ever, is absurd. A collection of x, y and one or more 
relations z can never be the same as a unity xy. For, the 
collection x+y+z exists whether x, y and z are “dispersed” 
or form a unity; but, the unity xy does not exist if x, y and 
z are “dispersed”.2 
It is evident that a complex unity is not a collection, or vice versa. From 
that alone it does not follow though that a complex unity completely 
lacks relational content. Relations are obviously essential for there 
being any complex unities at all. This is once again confirmed by 
Segelberg himself when he says that a complex unity xy does not exist 
if its components, x and y, are “dispersed”. I quote yet another pass-
age to underline my point, which will be presented more explicitly 
after its content has been digested. 
Even though the rectangle xyz3 is not […] congruent to 
the collection x+y+z, one must not jump to the 
                                                     
1 Hochberg takes occurrences of ‘moment’ such as this one, and a few others, 
to indicate that Segelberg is contemplating individual instances of relations. 
Cf. e.g. Hochberg 1999, p. 45. With the possible exception of one occurrence 
of it, ‘moment’ is not used in that book in the sense given to it later. 
‘Moment’ is not a technical term in Segelberg 1945. Its sense in the three 
occurrences of it in the quotation above is more like that of ‘element’ or 
‘constituent’. The exception is one place where exemplars of a relation R seem 
to be contemplated. Cf. Segelberg 1999/1945, p. 53/44. 
2 Segelberg 1999/1945, pp. 55/45-6. 
3 The rectangle in question consists of the three squares x, y and z, suitably 
arranged. 
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conclusion that the rectangle xyz is not a collection. If an 
object k contains the mutually disparate objects x, y and z, 
without being congruent to the collection x+y+z, there 
are, then, two possibilities: (a) There is an object u, such 
that k is congruent with the collection x+y+z+u. — (b) 
There is not an object u, such that k is congruent with the 
collection x+y+z+u. Only in the latter case is k a unity. 
 Does k contain an object u, disparate from x, y and z, 
and such that k is congruent to the collection x+y+z+u? 
One can think of two possibilities here. (a) One often 
assumes that in a spatial whole we can distinguish, along 
with the parts, separate “contact relations”. One can then 
imagine that u consists of such contact relations. This 
suggestion can immediately be rejected on the following 
grounds: o can contain x, y, z and contact relations without 
having x in contact with y and y in contact with z. (b) The 
rectangle k contains, besides x, y and z, a total extension, t, 
in the shape of a rectangle. Is xyz congruent to the 
collection x+y+z+t? — No, because an object o can 
contain the objects x, y and z, as well as t, without o 
containing elements combined into the rectangle xyz. The 
rectangle xyz is therefore a different object from the 
collection x+y+z+t. 
 The reasoning can be generalized. If the rectangle xyz 
contains x, y, z and an arbitrary object u, disparate from 
these, one can always imagine a collection x+y+z+u, 
incongruent to xyz, in which x, y, z, and u do not form a 
rectangle. As the collection x+y+z+u exists, whether x, y, z 
and u are “spread out” or form a rectangle xyz, the 
rectangle cannot be congruent with any collection. The 
rectangle xyz is thus a unity.1 
Evidently, as the two notions are defined, there is no way a collection 
and a complex unity can be congruous with each other. My im-
pression is that Segelberg takes the fact that no collection equals a 
complex unity as a pretext for there not being any relational content 
in a complex unity. But, of what relevance is the fact that collections 
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1945, pp. 49-50/40-1. 
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fail to be congruent with complex unities as regards the issue of there 
being relations among the contents of the latter? The obvious answer 
is: very little, if any at all. The strange thing that seems to happen here 
is the following: one constituent of the complex unity is rejected 
because the complex unity is considered not to be a collection, i.e., a 
mere sum, of its constituents. To reject the non-relational con-
stituents of the complex unity for the same reason would of course 
be even more striking.  
It seems obvious that the relevant difference between a complex 
unity and a collection of its qualitative contents is the result of one or 
more relations, which give the complex unity whatever structures it 
has. In fact, Segelberg does not really deny that. His stratagem is to 
submit the connecting, which is performed by relations, to states of 
affairs that accompany the first-order complex unities. Instead of 
letting relations, being among the contents of a first-order complex, 
connect its other constituents, he supplies the complex unity with 
servants, i.e., states of affairs, which take care of that for it. 
My conclusion is that the threat of Bradley’s regress gives 
Segelberg reason for postulating that first order objects do not have 
any relational contents. If relations are allowed to act in accordance 
with their nature, which is to relate, then it is of little relevance that a 
first order complex unity is not congruent with any collection, not 
even a t-collection of its contents. Note that if the analysis of a 
complex entity, having one or several relations as constituents, is 
carried out in terms of collections of its constituents, the lack of con-
gruence between the entity and a collection of its constituents is 
bound to be taken as a pretext for the conclusion that relations are 
not constituents of the complex in question. The analyses of complex 
unities presented by Bradley himself are ample cases in point of this. 
In spite of his assumption that “relations are nothing if not con-
junctive,”1 he ends up with that a relational complex can be analysed 
without remainder as the class of its constituents, including its struc-
turing relations, although the relations are no longer conjunctive.2 
                                                     
1 Cf. Bradley 1970, p. 642. 
2 ‘Conjunctive’ is another word for ‘relating’.  
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And since they are not conjunctive in the analysans, they cannot be so 
in the analysandum either. Thus, yet another relation is supposed to be 
needed to perform the relating. As can be expected, it must share the 
fate of the first relation. At this point, the regress is rolling along 
nicely.  
4.4 Qualities and Quality-Moments 
4.4.1 Overview 
In the two final sections of this chapter, sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3, the 
qualitative side of Segelberg’s ontology is presented and discussed. It 
is here that his nominalistic persuasions are primarily manifested.  
4.4.2 Three Postulates for a Theory of Qualities 
In Segelberg 1953 three assumptions are made with regard to 
moments and what are called ‘qualities’.  
1. Every quality Q corresponds to one or more quality-
moments q′, q′′, q′′′, etc. 
2. A quality Q is identical to the class of quality-moments 
which Q corresponds to. 
3. An individual object (of the first order)1 is either a 
quality-moment or a complex of quality-moments.2 
Nothing is said explicitly in either of these postulates regarding 
similarity. Just before the presentation of the postulates a supple-
menting assumptions are made though. 
A quality is naturally something other than a correspond-
ing quality-moment. We must, therefore, distinguish the 
                                                     
1 All individual objects are of the first order. Cf. Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 
165/47. In the translation the word ‘level’ is used, instead of ‘order’. Since the 
Swedish word, which is in line with the terminology introduced earlier, is that 
of ‘order’, I have changed ‘level’ into ‘order’.   
2 Segelberg 1999/1953, p. 241/7.  
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following two relations, both of which hold, when two 
objects x and y have the same quality Q. 
 1) x has a relation R to a quality-moment q′ and y has a 
relation R to a quality-moment q′′, and q′ and q′′ are 
exactly alike. (The relation R is here a content relation.)  
 2) The object x stands in a relation T to the quality Q; y 
also stands in the relation T to Q. This relation is 
expressed by the word ‘has’ (‘have’) in the sentences ‘x has 
the quality Q’, ‘y has the quality Q’, ‘x and y have the same 
quality’. 
 The relation T is a relative product of two relations: the 
first is the above mentioned R. The second we call ‘S’. It is 
a relation which holds from the quality-moments q′ and q′′ 
to the quality Q, and which we can express by the sentence 
‘q′ and q′′ are cases of Q’.1 
Thus, an analysis of two objects x and y both having the quality Q, 
i.e., Q(x) and Q(y), is performed:2 
(1) xTQ and yTQ; where T = R/S, i.e., (xRq′ & q′SQ) and 
     (yRq''  & q′′SQ) 
(2) Q = Sim{q', q'',…} 
(3) xRq′ and yRq'' 
R is a specific content relation. S is the relation expressed by the 
phrase ‘is a case of’, holding from a moment to a quality, the latter 
being a similarity class. It is not completely clear whether that means 
that S is a specific content relation, having the element relation as a 
constitutive part, nor is it evident exactly how the correspondence 
relation holding between a quality and its cases is to be interpreted. 
Perhaps correspondence and being a case of are converses of each 
other.  
Qualities are identified with classes of moments. In the second 
quotation we see that the elements of such a class are thought of as 
being exactly similar to each other. Later, Segelberg says that they 
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1953, p. 240/7. 
2 The order in which I summarise (some of) the content of the postulates and 
the addendum is random.  
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might instead be just rather similar to each other,1 though he does not 
expand on that particular subject. But, judging from what he says 
concerning, e.g., swans, it is evident that the similarity between them 
is not exact similarity; they are thought of as forming similarity classes 
in a way which is not different in principle from the way in which 
moments do.   
Evidently, an important issue is the role of (exact) similarity. 
What relevance does it have as far as the qualitative contents of its 
relata are concerned? In the following quotation nothing is said with 
regard to that specific issue. Though, he does say something regard-
ing the need for universals:2 
What is it which “unifies” the different instances a1, a2,… 
of A into the group a? Naturally, it is the similarity 
between a1, a2,…, but what does it mean to claim that they 
are similar, if not that they have a property in common? 
And the common property in question must be precisely 
A. Husserl makes the claim that for this reason it is 
necessary to postulate the universal A. As far as we can 
see, this is not correct. One must here distinguish between 
two kinds of similarity: I) exact similarity, or as we would 
rather say, congruence; II) relative similarity, which obtains 
between different objects that have some quality in common. 
When we say that a universal object A occurs in several 
instances; a1, a2,…, which form the set a, we consequently 
must distinguish two cases: 1) a1, a2,… are exactly similar; 
they form a congruence-group; 2) a1, a2,… are only relatively 
similar. Only in the latter case does similarity imply that a1, 
a2,… have a common property. Suppose that they have a 
property P in common; P then occurs, according to Stout’s 
position, in several instances p1, p2,…, and these are all 
congruent with each other. That which “unifies” the 
individual instances x1, x2,…, if these are distinct instances 
                                                     
1 Cf. Segelberg 1999/1953, p. 244/13. 
2 The context of this quotation is a discussion of Stout’s arguments for the 
existence of quality-instances. I think it is clear though that Segelberg is 
expressing his own view. 
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of the same object, is, consequently, either a congruence 
relation between x1, x2, etc. or a congruence relation 
between a quality of x1 and a quality of each of the remain-
ing objects in the group x. There is no need to postulate a 
universal here.1 
The message of what is stated here regarding the need for universals 
is a bit puzzling. The first impression is that they are needed in cases 
of relative similarity but not in cases of congruence. It would be a 
mistake to think that relative similarity requires relata to have uni-
versal content while congruence does not. An argument similar to 
that used in connection with the intellectual experiment with spheres 
as the only inhabitants of the universe can be used here as well. It 
might run as follows. Assume that there are two entities which are 
(qualitatively) dissimilar to each other. Assume also that one of them 
is changing to become exactly similar to the other. Now, why is there 
a need for a shared universal content when the two are dissimilar to 
each other, all the way from almost no similarity to almost exact simi-
larity, but none when they are exactly similar? Of course, Segelberg is 
not maintaining anything like that; he formulates himself in a mis-
leading way. The final point made in the quotation may be interpreted 
as rejecting the notion that there is a need for universals even in cases 
of relative similarity. However, this stresses the need for getting a 
clear idea of whether the exact similarity has a founding role as 
regards the qualitative content of its relata. 
It is very clear that Segelberg’s relation of exact similarity is not 
pseudo-additional; he shows no tendency to deny its existence. But 
what role does it perform? According to Hochberg, it performs two 
roles: 
The realist’s exemplification connection only serves to 
connect particulars to universals to form states of affairs 
that are the truth makers for atomic sentences: it connects 
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1947, pp. 152/28-9. Note the oscillation here between 
using the term ‘group’ and that of ‘set’. Although group and set are dis-
tinguished between in other places, not so here. Furthermore, I suspect that 
‘set’ and ‘class’ are synonyms when used as technical terms. 
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elements into complexes. The instance nominalist’s pur-
ported connection is not just such a connection. For it not 
only [1] connects exactly similar quality instances into 
necessary similarity facts, but, by so doing, it is involved in 
[2] connecting a qualitative content to an object. The 
realist’s connection may or may not obtain, given the exist-
ence of the elements — the particular and the quality — 
that are constituents of it. The nominalist’s similarity fact 
necessarily obtains, given the elements that enter into it. 
Thus, the similarity connection may be said to be an 
“internal,” as opposed to an external connection of exem-
plification, and, hence, while it is a “universal” it is quite 
unlike the exemplification connection.1 
The argument put forward here is formulated so subtly that it is easily 
misunderstood, or missed. However, two roles are allegedly per-
formed by exact similarity: 
(1) Connecting exactly similar quality instances into necessary 
similarity facts; e.g., □(m1~m2). 
(2) Connecting qualitative content to quality instances. 
In my formulation of the second role I do not use Hochberg’s phrase 
‘connecting a qualitative content to an object’. Since the first role is 
explicitly said to concern quality instances, the same presumably 
holds for the second role as well. It is therefore potentially misleading 
to use ‘object’ instead of ‘quality instance’ — or, ‘moment’. 
The second role is what primarily interests us here. Does Segel-
berg consider his universal relation of congruence to perform that 
role? The answer is: no. He might be wrong though. In fact, it could 
be that he is forced to recognise something in line with what Hoch-
berg suggests. I would say that he attempts to avoid the question by 
not ever asking it. He presupposes that there are individual moments 
and that they resemble each other in various ways due to their indi-
vidual natures. Similarity is considered to be a uniform phenomenon. 
                                                     
1 Hochberg 1999, p. 46. As far as I can see, Hochberg is repeating an argu-
ment which is also stated in Hochberg 1988.  
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Although there are various degrees of similarity, strictly speaking 
there is just one similarity relation. That relation is exact similarity. All 
the others are accounted for in terms of that.1 
4.4.3 Quality Relations 
Segelberg takes into account several quality relations that belong to 
the content relations. The latter are relations having what he calls ‘the 
simple content relation’ as part. Schematically a content relation 
between two relata x and y can be written ‘yIx & F’. The first con-
junct expresses the simple content relation; the second represents a 
state of affairs about the relata.  
Before anything else is said about quality relations, Segelberg 
thinks that something should be said about the concept of quality 
(i.e., moment).2 The message of the following quotation is interesting 
in more ways than one. 
In order to be characterized as a quality, an object must be 
simple. […] [Although] there is nothing to prevent a 
quality containing a multitude of mutually incongruent 
moments, if only these are not disparate. A certain shade 
of purple-red, for example, contains certainly the general 
determinable red and indefinitely many other deter-
minables in the series — color : red : purple-red. But, a 
less general determinable in this series contains each and 
every of the more general determinables, hence the purple-
red shade is not a complex in which the different deter-
minables are components. In regard to a quality, one can-
not just distinguish over and under-determined contents, 
as it can also have contents that are, so to speak, laterally 
ordered. In the case of the purple-red shade, one not only 
distinguishes a strain of red, but also, with that, a strain of 
                                                     
1 It has been seen earlier that the same should hold for Williams. It turns out 
that he is flirting with different sorts of similarity relations though, of which 
neither is reducible to any other.  
2 The terminology using ‘moment’ as the preferred term instead of ‘quality’ or 
‘quality instance’ had not been settled when this was published. That happens 
in Segelberg 1953. The quotation above is from Segelberg 1947. 
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the laterally ordered determinable violet. But neither the 
red nor the violet strains are disparate components or the 
purple-red quality, as both have the general color deter-
minable in common.1 
We learn here that qualities (i.e., moments) are simples; though that 
does not mean that they necessarily have just one component. A 
relatively low determinate of the determinable colour has every higher 
determinable as content. Although Segelberg perhaps does not expli-
citly say so anywhere, I presume that wherever a colour determinable 
is present all of its lower determinates are also present. Thus, we can-
not expect to find a thing which is coloured but not coloured in any 
determinate way. What is referred to above using the term ‘purple-
red’ might be such a determinate. But, if it is not a lowest deter-
minate, it cannot occur without being the content of something 
which is a lowest determinate. That is the message of approximately 
the first half of the quotation. The message of the second half is that 
a colour (moment) can have contents which are laterally ordered. 
Purple-red is said to be an example of that. It does not only have the 
content of the red-series; there is also a strain in it from a laterally 
ordered colour-series: violet. All these various contents do not make 
the quality (moment) a complex entity. It is simple since none of its 
contents are disparate from every other.  
Segelberg distinguishes between three different quality relations. 
As a prelude to the presentation of these, he asserts: 
That an object o contains a quality q is not the same as o 
having the quality q. If, for example, o has a yellow part, o 
contains the quality yellow, but o does not have this quality; 
o is not yellow. In order for o to have the quality, some-
thing more is required than that o contains the quality. 
What is this ‘more’?2 
 
 
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1947, pp.218/123-4. 
2 Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 219/124. 
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The first quality relation 
So what is the first quality relation? It is that which holds between 
one quality (moment) and another when the first contains the latter. 
The example given is a purple-red shade q which is red. Differently 
put, the former has the quality red.  
Earlier it was said that ‘x has the quality Q’ expresses a relative 
product, which in this particular case would be: qRm & mSQ. Here m 
is a moment of redness. The relation S probably is the element-
relation, which in this context holds from moments to a class, which 
in turn form the congruence class Q. Finally, R is a content relation. I 
suspect that Segelberg’s characterisation of it is simply that it is, or 
involves, the simple content relation holding between two moments. 
The second quality relation 
Example: ‘The surface y is red’. The surface y is a certain 
complex, in which one can distinguish extension (u) of a 
certain degree, a certain form (f) and a certain color (r). 
The collection u+f+r constitutes a total collection of the 
surface. This contains, furthermore, a partial unity with the 
total collection u+r as a total collection, but no partial 
unity with f+r as a total collection. One can say that the 
extension quality forms a certain “center” of this complex. 
That a unity x is a center in a complex E then means that 
the following conditions obtain: 
 (1) E has a total collection x+y+z+… (2) Each and 
every one of the elements in E’s total collection (except) x) 
constitutes, together with x, a total collection of a partial 
unity of E. Expressed differently, x forms a dyadic ele-
mentary-complex together with each and every one of the 
remaining members of the total collection.1 
Judging from what is stipulated in the second paragraph, there should 
be a partial unity with the t-collection u+f. I suspect that it has been 
left out by mistake. Without that partial unity, u will not form a dyadic 
elementary-complex with each and every one of the remaining 
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1947, pp. 219/124-5. 
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members of the t-collection of the entire surface. Note that Segelberg 
is in effect saying that f and r are not e-connected with each other. 
That is implied by there being no partial unity having f+r as t-
collection.  
Why is the extension moment the centre of the complex, i.e., 
the surface? Why is the form moment, or the colour moment, not the 
centre? Why is there a centre at all? I presume that it is not an ad hoc 
stipulation that the extension moment is the centre. A special 
significance is ascribed to extension, but it is not explained why. 
There is room for speculation here.  
Anyhow, a moment q having the second quality relation to a 
complex H means: 
1. H contains q. 
2. H has a centre c. 
3. q is either the center of H or q forms together with H’s 
center a total collection of a partial unity in H.1 
Since each moment of the complex forms a partial unity with its 
centre, each and every one of the moments also stands in the second 
quality relation to the complex itself.  
The third quality relation 
Example: ‘The tonal series H has the melody quality g’. 
One has to distinguish between (1) the tonal series in-
cluding the gestalt-quality; we call this complex H. (2) the 
tonal series minus the gestalt-quality; we call this complex 
H′.2 
If a moment g has the third quality relation to a complex H, it means: 
1. H has a total collection g+H′. 
2. g is directly connected with H′.3 
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 219/125. 
2 Segelberg 1999/1947, pp. 219-20/125.  
3 Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 220/126. It would be better to use ‘united’ here, 
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What this means en clair is that g and H′ are e-connected. This should 
not be confused with the fact that the second quality relation holds. 
In that case, g would be the centre of the complex; as it is now, there 
is no partial unity in the complex which has g+H′ as t-collection.  
The third quality relation brings up the issue of how a moment 
can be e-connected to a complex without being so connected with 
any of its constituting entities singly. In the particular case at hand it 
is perhaps intuitively attractive that the moment g should be e-
connected with the rest of the complex, without being connected 
with any of its parts, since g is a melody quality. Then, it is convenient 
to assume that the complete tonal series must be e-connected with 
this particular g. Imagine though that the tonal series is interrupted 
halfway. Can g be e-connected with what is just a segment of the 
complete tonal series?1 This question will be dealt with after an 
excursus regarding the internality of quality relations. 
The quality relations are internal relations if they hold between 
individual entities. This follows from the definition of internal rela-
tion presented earlier. If quality moments are recognised, the quality 
relations are unilaterally internal, according to Segelberg. Using a bit 
of formalism which he uses in part himself, this means that a quality 
relation satisfies the following condition: 
(I) (xRy → x′Ry′′) ∨ (xRy → y′R*x′′).2 
The first disjunct is deciphered: If x has R to y, then R obtains from 
every object congruent to x to at least one object congruent with y. 
The second disjunct is deciphered: If x has R to y, then the converse 
of R obtains from every object congruent to y to at least one object 
congruent with x. 
Now, assume that the third quality relation is unilaterally inter-
nal. Can a melody quality g be e-connected to a segment of the tonal 
                                                                                                   
instead of ‘connected’. 
1 I am simplifying the description of the situation. Evidently, neither the 
moment g, nor the tonal series H′, can be recycled and appear in other 
complexes similar to H.  
2 Note that ‘′’ and ‘′′’ are heavily loaded with information.  
MOMENT NOMINALISM                                221 
series H′ given the other premises of the definition? What Segelberg 
says in this context does not settle this. However, in another place he 
asserts: 
[A]ctually, we often experience melodies — for example, 
when we remember a piece of music — without evidently 
experiencing any sound qualities. This kind of appre-
hension can be characterized as an experience of a “free-
standing” gestalt-quality. In the same way, one can remem-
ber a facial expression without visually experiencing the 
spatial and color qualities which constitute the sense data 
corresponding to the face. On the whole, free-standing 
gestalt qualities seem to play a surprisingly large role in so-
called imageless (non-visual, non-auditory, etc.) thought.1 
In the light of what is said here, g need not be e-connected to any 
tonal series. Presumably, every tonal series congruent with H′ is 
connected in this way to a gestalt quality congruent with g. 
Note that e-connectedness, which figures in the determinations 
of the quality relations, is not a quality relation in itself. The trivial 
reason for that is that it is a connection; if it were to be internal, it would 
have to be so in a radically different sense of ‘internal’.  
 
                                                     
1 Segelberg 1999/1947, p. 207/107. 
CHAPTER V 
Moderate Realism 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter II contained an analysis of the moderate realism of the young 
Donald Williams. After that followed discussions of versions of 
moderate nominalism. In the present chapter, the circle is closed and 
moderate realism is once again the subject.  
The tradition of moderate realism goes back a long time in the 
history of philosophy. Traces of it can be found in Plato1 as well as in 
Aristotle.2 Some of the leading scholastic philosophers, including 
Thomas Aquinas3 and John Duns Scotus,4 are moderate realists. 
Before the scholastic era, moderate realism was expressed by philo-
sophers such as Boethius5 and Avicenna.6 The latter has formulated 
two arguments for particularism, presented below. Being one of the 
leading scientists of his time,7 Avicenna knew his Aristotle well. Both 
of his two arguments set out from premises found in Aristotle.  
The majority of this chapter deals with the moderate realism of 
Donald Mertz. My discussion of it is based on Mertz 1993, 1996, 
2001, 2003 and 2006.8 Being a versed scholar in philosophy and its 
history, his articles are veritable goldmines of information and ideas.  
                                                     
1 Cf. Phaedo, 102b-e, and Theaetetus, 209a-d. 
2 Cf. Categories, 1a24-b9, and Metaphysics, 1017b25, 1039b24-6, 1042a29, 
1049a28ff, 1057bff, 1071a27-9. 
3 Cf. Aquinas 1955, p. 127. 
4 Cf. Harris 1959, pp. 94-5. 
5 Cf. Gracia 1984, p. 78. 
6 Cf. Morewedge 1973, pp. 33-4. 
7 It is no exaggeration to say that he is one of the most eminent scientists of 
all time. 
8 Mertz 2006 is an anthology containing seven articles, six of which are 
published separately. 
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This chapter also includes an argument for the existence of 
instances from the possibility of symmetrical universes.  
5.2 One Partial and Two Mistaken Arguments for Particularism 
5.2.1 Overview 
Presentations of Avicenna’s two arguments for particularism are 
given in sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3. Both the arguments are mistaken to 
the extent that they assume false premises. However, the second 
argument in particular is very interesting. My main reason for present-
ing it is that a refined version of it is discussed in section 5.3.3.  
Yet another argument for particularism is presented in section 
5.2.4. It is not more than a partial argument though. It assumes the 
existence of universals and combines that with the possibility of there 
being Segelbergian-Blackian universes.  
5.2.2 Avicenna’s First Argument 
Avicenna1 (980–1037) presents two arguments for particularism.2 
One of these, which will be referred to here as the first, is stated in 
his The Book of Scientific Knowledge.3 In this argument, as well as in the 
second, transcendent realism, or Platonism, is rejected in favour of 
immanent realism.4 The first also takes a view on predication for 
granted: every property predicated of an individual substance is 
likewise predicated of its corresponding species and genus. If the 
assumption is made that predicates are the same throughout and 
combine it with this particular view on predication, the result is a 
                                                     
1 In his own cultural sphere this true polyhistor is known by the name ‘ibn 
Sina’, short for ‘Abu Ali al-Husayn ibn Abd Allah ibn Sina’.  
2 I rely heavily on Mertz 1993 and 1996 in this section as well as in section 
5.2.3. 
3 There is a translation of it in Morewedge 1973.  
4 Cf. Morewedge 1973, p. 33. 
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contradiction. The presupposed view on predication is ascribed to 
Aristotle.1 
As everyone knows, Plato was a learned man. Meno, on the 
other hand, was not. Although they do not share the property of 
being learned, they are both men. Since they are men (species), they 
are animals (genus) as well. Unfortunately, the result of all this is that 
the species and the genus are not just learned but ignorant too. With 
the help of a simple formalisation this can be formulated: 
Learned (Plato) → [Learned (Man) & Learned (Animal)]   
Ignorant (Meno) → [Ignorant (Man) & Ignorant (Animal)] 
The conjunction of these two implications entails that being a man 
has contradictory properties; the same holds for being an animal. 
Regarding this Avicenna says: 
The identical form of man-qua-man cannot be a knower 
like Plato and also an ignoramus like someone other than 
Plato. It is not possible for knowledge to be and not to be 
in one and the same thing. Neither is it possible for one 
and the same thing to contain both blackness and white-
ness simultaneously. It is similarly impossible for the uni-
versal animal to be a particular real animal, for it would 
then have to be both walker and flyer, as well as not 
walker and flyer, and be both biped and quadruped.2 
Since nothing can have such a set of properties, something must have 
gone wrong here. Avicenna’s solution to the problem is to consider 
predicates as particulars. Using the same formalisation slightly 
changed, this becomes: 
                                                     
1 Cf. Categories, 2b38-3a5. What Aristotle explicitly says is: 
When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is pre-
dicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject. 
Thus, ‘man’ is predicated of the individual man; but ‘animal’ is 
predicated of ‘man’; it will, therefore, be predicable of the indi-
vidual man also: for the individual man is both ‘man’ and animal’. 
I leave open whether Avicenna has interpreted Aristotle correctly. 
2 Morewedge 1973, p. 33. 
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Learned1 (Plato) → [Learned1 (Man1) & Learned1 (Animal1)]  
Ignorant1 (Meno) → [Ignorant1 (Man2) & Ignorant1 (Animal2)]1 
Here, all occurrences of properties are unit properties, i.e., particulars. 
Therefore, no contrary properties are ascribed to the same subjects. 
5.2.3 Avicenna’s Second Argument 
The premise of Avicenna’s first argument, that what is predicated of a 
primary substance is also predicated of its species and genus, is shaky. 
In Aristotle’s Metaphysics the doctrine is no longer the same; in it 
property predicated of a primary substance is predicated of a compo-
site of matter and form. Thus, according to this hylomorphism, it is 
of such a composite that ignorance is predicated whenever it is 
predicated of a particular man, for example, Meno.  
The second argument contains a questionable premise, that 
relations are reducible to the monadic attributes of their relata. From 
antiquity to the end of the nineteenth century, this was the majority 
view among occidental philosophers.2 It seemed to be sanctioned by 
Aristotle himself, whose description of relations as the “least of all 
things a kind of entity or substance”3 was frequently referred to. 
Perhaps that description was nothing more than an unguarded 
remark casually made. Regardless, Avicenna is among those who rely 
on the authority of the Philosopher. Additionally, the view has its 
proponents nowadays, especially among the trope theorists. Thanks 
to the arguments put forward by the young Bertrand Russell among 
others, the premise has been on the defensive during the twentieth 
century.4  
                                                     
1 The subscripts indicate that the entities are particulars. Although ‘Plato’ and 
‘Meno’ lack subscripts, they of course also refer to particulars 
2 There have been a few exceptions to this. Peter Aureoli (1280-1322) might 
be one. A complication is that he considers relations not to be extra-mental. 
This is due to his conceptualism. Cf. Henninger 1989, pp. 153-4, 182-3. It 
makes his view similar to that of John Locke, who thinks of relations as the 
result of comparisons. Cf., e.g., Essay, bk. II, ch. 25, par. 8.  
3 Cf. Metaphysics, 1088a22.  
4 Cf. Russell 1903, pp. 221ff. 
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Avicenna presents his second argument in the book The 
Healing.1 I repeat that an essential premise of the argument is that 
relations are reducible to properties of their relata. In the following 
passage, the father-son relationship is used by way of illustration. 
Each of two things has in itself an idea with respect to the 
other, which is not the idea the other has in itself with 
respect to the first. This is evident in things whose related 
terms differ, as in the case of the father. Its relation to 
fatherhood, which is a description of its existence, is in the 
father alone. […] The same applies to the state of the son 
with respect to the father. There is nothing here at all 
which is in both of them.2 
The attributes (ideas) referred to in the first sentence are the esse ads 
of the relevant esse ins of the two relata, the father and his son. The 
term ‘esse ad’ is the scholastic counterpart of the Greek ‘το piροξ τι’.3 
Both can be translated ‘being towards’. The scholastic term ‘esse in’, 
having the meaning of ‘being in’, refers to the relevant monadic 
attributes of the relata. An esse ad is thought of as a second-order 
attribute of an esse in. In this particular case, the relevant esse ins are 
the attributes being father and being son respectively. An English 
alternative of ‘esse in’ is ‘relation-property’.4 
The first formalisation5 below is a preliminary version of the 
property-reduction of a relation in the general case. The esse ins of the 
relata are R′ and R″ respectively. Towards-x and Towards-y are the 
                                                     
1 There is a translation of it in Marmura 1975. 
2 Marmura 1975, pp. 87-8. 
3 Aristotle’s name of the category of relation is ‘piροξ τι’.  
4 The meaning of ‘relation-property’ is of course closely related to, if not the 
same as, that of ‘relational property’. Having a relation as constituent, a 
relational property is itself subjected to the property-reduction. Likewise, a 
relation-property is bound to involve an unreduced relational element. How-
ever, this seems to have been repressed by the adherents of the doctrine. 
5 It is proposed by Donald Mertz. Since he is using it when formulating his 
own refined version of the argument, it is practical to use it here as well. 
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esse ads. The capital ‘R’ names the relation to be reduced. The colon in 
front of a formula indicates that whatever comes after it is a fact.1 
For any binary relation predicate ‘R’ and relata x and y, 
there exist relation-properties R′ and R″ such that ‘R(x,y) is 
true ≡ [:R′(x) • :Towards-y (R′) • :R″(y) • :Towards-x (R″)]2 
Applied to the particular case of the father and his son: 
‘a is the father of b’ is true ≡ :Fatherhood (a) •      
:Towards-b (Fatherhood) • :Sonship (b) • :Towards-a 
(Sonship)3 
The argument for particularism begins to show itself when the ana-
lysis is applied to equivalence relations. Avicenna’s example is being-
similar-as-white-to. One would expect that the relevant esse in is the 
universal whiteness. However, appearances are deceptive.  
If such a state of affairs [an equivalence relation between 
two subjects] consists in the fact that each of the two 
[subjects] has a state [relation-property] with respect to the 
other, this is similar to the case of the swan and snow, 
each of which is white. Nor is this state [the white of one 
subject] rendered identical by the fact that it stands with 
respect to the other; for whatever belongs to each indi-
vidual with respect to the other belongs to that individual 
and not the other; but it possesses it with respect to the 
other.  
 If you have understood this from what we have given 
you by way of example, then know that the identical state 
of affairs obtains in the rest of the relatives that do not 
disagree in their two terms.4 
                                                     
1 Colons are not used in Mertz 1993. They are part of Mertz’ considered 
formalism and used in his later works. I have therefore taken the liberty of 
inserting them when it is warranted.  
2 Mertz 1993, p. 197. 
3 Mertz 1993, p. 197. 
4 Quoted from Marmura 1975, p 88. The inserts are made by Mertz. 
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The way Avicenna expresses himself here is somewhat compressed. It 
is quite clear though what his message is. If universal whiteness is the 
esse in, the reduction of the equivalence relation can (preliminarily) be 
written, using the same formalism as above: 
‘a is similar as white to b’ is true ≡ :White (a) •     
:Towards-b (White) • :White (b) • :Towards-a (White)1 
It is evident that this can be nothing more than a preliminary render-
ing of the situation. This since the whiteness which is the esse in of a 
cannot be identical with that of b. The relevant esse ads — Towards-b 
and Towards-a respectively — are contraries in this context. There-
fore, the formalisation should be reformulated: 
‘a is similar as white to b’ is true ≡ :White1 (a) •      
:Towards-b1 (White1) • :White2 (b) • :Towards-a2 (White2)2  
The universal whiteness itself is not ascribed contrary esse ads here. 
Instead, the contrary esse ads are ascribed to separate instances of 
whiteness: White1 and White2, respectively.  
Finally, in generalised form the traditional property-reduction of 
binary relations looks like this: 
For any formal binary relation predicate ‘R’ and relata x 
and y, there exist relation-properties R′i and R″j such that 
‘R(x,y)’ is true ≡ [:R′i(x) • :Towards-yk (R′i) • :R″j (y) • 
:Towards-xl (R″j)]3 
                                                     
1 Mertz 1993, p. 198.  
2 Mertz 1993, p. 198. The subscripts in ‘Towards-b1’ and ‘Towards-a2’ belong 
to the predicates as wholes. More perspicuous formulations would perhaps 
be ‘(Towards-b)1’ and ‘(Towards-a)2’.  
3 Cf. Mertz 1993, p. 197, and 1996, p. 123. In a reduction carried through 
completely, the esse ads should of course also be reduced. If not, unreduced 
relational elements will be left over, not accounted for. An apposite 
speculation as regards the esse ad element is: 
Perhaps, historically, the ‘towards’ aspect was not taken to be 
another relation because it was conceived to be analogous to the 
act of pointing which achieves reference to another without any 
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Avicenna intends his second argument to be completely general. This 
is obvious from his admonition that “[y]ou must never think that an 
accident, one in number, exists in two substrata.”1 In other words, the 
attributes of things are without exception particulars. This is more 
easily seen if one accepts the notion that things resemble each other 
in respect of whatever attribute they seemingly have in common. 
That means that there is an equivalence relation holding between 
them. It has the form: being-similar-as-P-to. And as the second argu-
ment shows, what seems to be the same esse in will, due to contrary 
esse ads, be different esse ins.2  
Mertz’s refined version of Avicenna’s second argument is dis-
cussed in section 5.3.3. The main difference between it and its model 
is due to Mertz’s rejection of the monadic reduction of polyadic ontic 
predicates. 
5.2.4 A Partial Argument from Segelbergian-Blackian Universes  
The intellectual experiment put forward in Segelberg 1947 is essen-
tially the same as that of Black 1952. In the present section, this expe-
riment provides the setting for a partial argument for the existence of 
instances of universals. The immediate point of departure is neither 
                                                                                                   
physical/causal connection. Of course, reference itself is an un-
reduced semantic relation, albeit of a more implicit and abstract 
kind. It is erroneous to think that polyadic relations are elimi-
nated completely in terms of monadic properties. (Mertz 1993, p. 
197) 
1 Marmura 1975, p. 88. 
2 In connection with Avicenna’s admonition Mertz makes an interesting 
reflection: 
[T]his admonition has come to be associated with Leibniz, in 
whose work it is standardly interpreted to be but the insistence of 
the property reduction of relations […]. But Avicenna’s intent 
goes deeper, and he uses the property reduction of relations as a 
means of demonstrating the nonrepeatability of property reducta 
themselves. (Mertz 1996, p. 125) 
Leibniz’s view is subjected to various interpretations. However, none of these 
interprets the reductive doctrine as supplying the premises for an argument 
like that of Avicenna.  
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Segelberg 1947 nor Black 1952; instead, it is the discussion in 
Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004.  
In the latter work, the author acts as spokesman for a realistic 
version of the bundle theory.1 Its fundamental principle reads: 
(BT) Necessarily, for every particular x and every entity y, y 
constitutes x if and only if y is a universal and x 
instantiates y.2 
The modal operator indicates that (BT) concerns itself with every 
concrete particular there is and might be. The term ‘particular’ is 
short for ‘concrete particular’. 
Constitution and instantiation are treated as reciprocal. An 
entity constitutes or is among the constituents of a concrete particular 
if and only if the latter instantiates it. Furthermore, concrete parti-
culars must have constituents.3 Only universals can be constituents.4 I 
                                                     
1 As reported earlier, Rodriguez-Pereyra is not a realist of any kind. He 
describes himself as a resemblance nominalist. Cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002. I 
take it that what he is doing in Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004 is defending a version 
of realism, which he considers to be second best after his own version of 
resemblance nominalism. I would say that the version of realism defended is 
a moderate realism.  
2 Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004, p. 72. We are informed that there is also another 
version of the bundle theory, according to which tropes constitute concrete 
particulars. Evidently, if (BT) is supposed to be constitutive for the bundle 
theory, tropes must be interpreted according to some version of moderate 
realism. However, that is not what Rodriguez-Pereyra has in mind. He takes 
tropes to be nominalistic in nature. The following principle, which is not 
mentioned by Rodriguez-Pereyra, might be a trope theoretical counterpart of 
(BT). 
(Bt) Necessarily, for every particular x and every entity y, y constitutes 
x if and only if y is a trope and x instantiates y. 
What I have in view is an interpretation of (BT) which is in line with moder-
ate realism. In that context (Bt) does not fit in. 
3 Cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004, p. 72. 
4 Although Rodriguez-Pereyra does not explicitly mention it, instantiation 
cannot itself be a constituent of any particular. If it were, it would have to be 
instantiated, according to (BT). That would immediately result in an analytical 
(vicious) regress.    
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would say that the description of concrete particulars as bundles of 
universals, which is used in connection with the presentation of (BT), 
is a hazardous one. It suggests that concrete particulars lack internal 
structure. (BT) is not intended to have that implication.  
There is an alleged knock-down argument against the bundle 
theory. It assumes that it is committed to a false version of the prin-
ciple of the identity of indiscernibles.1 The latter is rendered by 
Rodriguez-Pereyra: 
(PII) Necessarily, for all particulars x and y and every 
universal z, if z is instantiated by x if and only if z is 
instantiated by y, then x is numerically identical with y.2 
Max Black puts forth his intellectual experiment as a counterexample 
of (PII).3 It is presented in the middle of a dialogue between two 
persons. One of them is an adherent of (PII) and the other is not. It 
is the latter who is speaking. 
Isn’t it logically possible that the universe should have 
contained nothing but two exactly similar spheres? We 
might suppose that each was made of chemically pure 
iron, had a diameter of one mile, that they had the same 
temperature, colour, and so on, and that nothing else 
existed. Then every quality and relational characteristic of 
the one would also be a property of the other. Now if 
what I am describing is logically possible, it is not im-
                                                     
1 Cf. e.g. Armstrong 1978a, p. 91.  
2 Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004, p. 72. A trope version of the principle, not 
mentioned by Rodriguez-Pereyra, might be: 
(PIIt) Necessarily, for all (concrete) particulars x and y and every 
trope z, if z is instantiated by x if and only if z is instantiated by 
y, then x is numerically identical with y. 
If we modify this principle by replacing ‘every trope z’ with ‘every 
Sim{z1,…,zn}’, the revised principle — call it ‘(PIIt*)’ — will most certainly 
be false.  
3 The refutation of this principle is not what Segelberg is aiming at. On the 
contrary, it seems to be a (tacit) premise for his application of the intellectual 
experiment. 
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possible for two things to have all their properties in com-
mon. This seems to me to refute the Principle.1 
Earlier in the dialogue, the adherent of (PII) claims that it is logically 
impossible for two things to have all their properties in common.2 
Armed with the ammunition he believes the intellectual experiment 
supplies him with, the other thinks he can refute that. According to 
Rodriguez-Pereyra the bundle theory does not imply (PII); (BT) can 
even be used to refute (PII), since the latter may be false while (BT) is 
true.3 
There is another defence of the bundle theory. John O’Leary-
Hawthorne argues that a universe4 like Black’s does not pose a threat 
to the theory. According to him, the description that the universe 
contains two indiscernible particulars is not adequate; strictly speaking 
it contains only one entity, a bundle of universals. Furthermore, this is 
compatible with (PII).5 What the intellectual experiment does is that it 
reminds us of a consequence of the bundle theory. This consequence 
is that a bundle of universals can be at a distance from itself in the 
same way as a single universal can be at a distance from itself.6 The 
two spheres are but one single bundle of universals, which is fully 
present at two places.7 O’Leary-Hawthorne follows this up by saying 
that a defender of (PII) should not appeal to relational differences 
when confronted with a case of, for example, two indiscernible drops 
of water because what is two drops of water, loosely speaking,  is only 
one drop fully present at two places, strictly speaking,.8 Rodriguez-
Pereyra’s verdict upon this is: 
                                                     
1 Black 1952, p. 156. 
2 Cf. Black 1952, p. 154. The adherent of (PII) claims that if not anything else 
separates the two, there are at least two properties that do: being identical 
with a and being identical with b respectively — a and b are the two spheres.  
3 Cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004, p. 73. 
4 The word he actually uses is ‘world’. So does Rodriguez-Pereyra. 
5 O’Leary-Hawthorne 1995, p. 194. 
6 O’Leary-Hawthorne 1995, p. 196. 
7 O’Leary-Hawthorne 1995, p. 195. 
8 O’Leary-Hawthorne 1995, p. 194. 
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[…] Hawthorne’s defence is not effective. The possibility 
that allegedly refutes the Bundle Theory is the possibility 
that there is a world with two indiscernible particulars. 
Hawthorne shows neither that this is not a genuine possi-
bility nor that the Bundle Theory can accommodate this 
possibility. What Hawthorne shows is that a world that 
apparently contains indiscernibles may instead be a world 
containing a multiply located bundle of universals and no 
numerically distinct but indiscernible particulars. But for 
Hawthorne’s defence to succeed what needs to be shown 
is that Black’s world is a world that contains a multiply 
located bundle of universals and no numerically distinct 
but indiscernible particulars. For if Black’s world contains 
two indiscernibles then it cannot be correctly described as a 
world that contains no numerically distinct but indi-
scernible particulars. But Black’s world contains two indi-
scernible iron spheres, and so it cannot be correctly 
described as not containing two indiscernible particulars.1 
An overall claim here is that Black’s universe is possible. It contains a 
bundle of universals which is multiply located. However, it also 
contains two indiscernible iron spheres and these are particulars; each 
of which is singly located. The argument showing the correctness of 
the overall claim is that there might be universes containing two 
almost indiscernible spheres.  
No one should deny the possibility of such worlds, and 
certainly there is nothing in them that a bundle theorist 
cannot accept. That world contains two particular spheres, 
a and b. But if a has a temperature T and a different parti-
cular b of the same kind as a has a temperature T* in-
finitesimally different from T, then it is possible for a to 
have T*. Thus if the world with the almost indiscernible 
spheres is possible, so is another world in which the 
spheres are completely indiscernible. So Black’s world, 
which contains two indiscernible particulars, is possible. 
And, if so, Hawthorne’s defence fails, for Black’s world 
                                                     
1 Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004, pp. 73-4. 
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cannot be correctly described as a world not containing 
two indiscernible particulars.1 
I suspect that this argument would not worry O’Leary-Hawthorne. 
His response to it would probably be that the universe, which is de-
scribed here as containing two almost indiscernible spheres, contains 
two bundles with one location each. There are other things that might 
worry him, though; I will say something about those below. 
If (PII) is entailed by (BT), the bundle theory is incompatible 
with the possibility of there being a universe such as the one de-
scribed by Black, and Segelberg. Fortunately, (BT) does not entail 
Leibniz’s principle.  
For all BT asserts is that particulars are entirely constituted 
by the universals they instantiate. This entails that particu-
lars instantiating the same universals have the same con-
stituents. But this is compatible with the falsity of PII — 
unless particulars with the same constituents must be nu-
merically identical.2 
It is easy to take it for granted that completely sharing the (universal) 
constituents with something else equals being numerically identical 
with it. However, to reach that conclusion from (BT), an extra pre-
mise is needed, for example, the following:  
(PCI)3 Necessarily, for all complex objects x and y and every 
entity z, if z is a constituent of x if and only if z is a 
constituent of y, then x is numerically identical with y.4 
Although the need for an extra principle to reach (PII) from (BT) 
shows that the latter does not imply the former, we will remain com-
mitted to (PII), given that (PCI) is true. So, is it true?5 Well, it is true 
                                                     
1 Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004, p. 74. 
2 Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004, pp. 75-6.  
3 The decoded name of this principle is ‘the Principle of Constituent Iden-
tity’. It is borrowed from Loux 1998, p. 107. 
4 Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004, p. 76.  
5 Michael Loux thinks so. According to him, one “can provide a complete 
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for mereological sums and sets. Rodriguez-Pereyra reminds us that 
ontologists who recognise universals tend to deny that mereological 
composition is the only mode of composition. States of affairs should 
be recognised as well, but these do not obey mereological composi-
tion. As a result, an adherent of the bundle theory has reason to reject 
(PCI).1  
A restricted version of (PCI) is (PCI*). It concerns particulars, 
instead of complex objects, which makes it slightly weaker than the 
former. 
(PCI*) Necessarily, for all particulars x and y and every entity z, 
if z is a constituent of x if and only if z is a constituent 
of y, then x is numerically identical with y.2 
Since PCI should not be recognised, independent reasons for 
recognising PCI* are needed. There does not seem to be any though. 
[T]o accept (PCI*) one would need a previous account of 
the kind of complex objects particulars are that commits 
us to (PCI*). But although it may not be clear what kind of 
complex objects particulars are, they are not those kinds of 
complex objects, like sets or mereological sums, that 
would render (PCI*) true. So there seem to be no reasons 
to accept (PCI*). 
 Thus the way seems to be open for the bundle theorist 
to reject (PCI*). By rejecting (PCI*) the Bundle Theory is 
liberated from its commitment to (PII). So by rejecting 
                                                                                                   
“recipe” for complex things by identifying the items that count as their con-
stituents.” (Loux 1998, p. 156) In Segelberg’s terminology, by identifying the 
t-collection of a complex, one provides a complete recipe for it. Segelberg 
would not agree with this. 
1 I would say that this once more illustrates that the term ‘bundle’ is not a 
particularly successful one. It suggests that the complexes referred to are 
extensionally determined, like sets and mereological sums.  
2 Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004, p. 77.  
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(PCI*) the Bundle Theory can accommodate Black’s 
world.1 
As indicated above, particulars’ being entirely constituted by univer-
sals does not entail their being identical with bundles of universals. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra proposes that we distinguish between a bundle of 
universals, on the one hand, and instances of it, on the other. 
Although an instance of a bundle of universals is entirely constituted 
by the bundle, the two are distinct entities.2 What holds for the 
former need not do so for the latter, and vice versa. An instance is 
uniquely located, while a bundle might be simultaneously multiply 
located. A bundle is located at the same places as its instances are 
located, but an instance need not be located wherever the bundle is 
located. So, wherever an instance of a bundle is found, the bundle is 
there also, but not the other way round.  
So when a bundle of universals has more than one in-
stance, there are some numerically distinct particulars with 
exactly the same constituents. So it is not incoherent for 
the bundle theorist to reject (PCI*). 
 Not only that. By claiming that particulars are instances 
of bundles, the bundle theorist must reject (PCI*). For 
bundles can be in more than one place at once. So a 
bundle can have more than one instance. So there can be 
numerically distinct particulars with exactly the same con-
stituents. So (PCI*) is false.3 
Referring to the terminology of chapter II, a bundle of universals is a 
concrete universal since it exhausts the universal content of a con-
crete particular, or several concrete particulars. Now, if no distinction 
is made between a bundle and the instances of it, there will be a few 
odd results with regard to their locations. 
Assume relationism about space. The location of an entity is then 
caused by its spatial relations to other entities. Space is constituted by 
                                                     
1 Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004, p. 77. 
2 Cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004, p. 78. 
3 Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004, p. 78. 
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the spatial interrelatedness of entities. A peculiar consequence of the 
premises of a bundle theorist such as O’Leary-Hawthorne’s is that 
there need not be a difference between a case where a bundle is 
located in two places and one in which it is located in three places. 
Further, its circumstances must of course be rather special. Imagine a 
universe with two exactly similar spheres separated by a certain 
distance. Compare this with another universe with three exactly 
similar spheres which are separated by the same distance as in the 
former universe. Together, these form an equilateral triangle. Since 
there is no distinction made between bundles and instances, there is 
no relational difference between these two cases. However, if 
instances of the bundle were allowed for, that would result in a differ-
ence. There would be two spheres in the first universe and three in 
the latter. O’Leary-Hawthorne should, and perhaps even would, be 
impressed by this. An indicium of that is the suggestion, made by him 
and Jan Cover, that the difference between the two situations is that a 
triadic distance relation is applicable in one case but not in another. 
Consider some sphere s. There is one possible world W 
containing s where the sole occupants are what we ordi-
narily describe as spheres in relational space five feet apart. 
There is another possible world W′ containing s where the 
sole occupants are what we ordinarily describe as three 
spheres in a relational space, each five feet from each other 
(thus making up an equilateral triangle). How can the 
bundle theorist distinguish these worlds? Clearly, if the 
bundle theorist restricts himself to dyadic facts, he will 
struggle. If the relata of dyadic facts are immanent univer-
sals, it is hard to find a dyadic fact instantiated by one of 
W or W′ but not the other. But, once again, unless there is 
some obligation to restrict oneself to dyadic facts or to 
insist that all triadic facts supervene on dyadic ones, the 
Triplication Problem is no objection to the Bundle Theory 
per se.1 
                                                     
1 O’Leary-Hawthorne & Cover 1998, p. 214. 
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Since O’Leary-Hawthorne obviously wants there to be a difference 
between the two situations, it should worry him that his ontology 
cannot account for it. In fact, in the case at hand it cannot. The tri-
adic relation does not deliver the difference he believes is there. 
If absolutism about space is assumed instead, the outcome is even 
more counter-intuitive. Since all places are the same place, according 
to the premises of the bundle theory in question, each spatially 
located entity is in the same place as every other entity. The assump-
tion is here that space is a set of points. Further, if universal point-
hood is recognised, but not instances of it, there will only be one 
single point to occupy.1 This, by the way, indicates that an absolute 
space must be particular, not just universal.2 Obviously, the notion 
that each bundle of universals having spatial location would have the 
same location as every other bundle that is identical to or different 
from it is nothing short of an absurdity.  
The problems referred to in the two previous paragraphs are 
remedied if instances of bundles are recognised. The problems in 
connection with relationism are met if the locations of instances are 
prior to those of the universals they are instances of. Then, the 
bundles will be located due to their instances being located while the 
latter are located due to the spatial relations holding between them. 
Furthermore, the problems connected with absolutism evaporate. It 
is instances of bundles of universals which have locations primarily; 
the places they occupy are instances themselves. Places are instances 
of a universal we might call ‘pointhood’. Since the instances of point-
hood are separate from each other, the instances of other universals 
occupy different points. In both of these alternatives, the number of 
spheres equals the number of instances. 
What has been pointed out here constitutes a more or less 
conclusive reason for there being instances. Given that there are 
universals, the absurdities which result from recognising them and 
bundles of them, but not their instances, show that instances should 
                                                     
1 Cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004, p. 75. 
2 Cf. Johansson 1989, p. 147, where the particularity and universality aspects 
of absolute space (container space, in Johansson’s terminology) are discussed.  
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be recognised as well. An account of instantiation remains; to that 
end, the analytic ontology proposed by Donald Mertz is discussed in 
section 5.3.  
5.3 The Moderate Realism of D. W. Mertz 
5.3.1 Overview 
According to Donald Mertz, Avicenna’s second argument is poten-
tially a conclusive argument for particularism. In Mertz’s own refined 
version of it, he claims that its potentiality has become actual. An 
analysis of the refined version is found in section 5.3.3. Before that, 
the principles defining Mertz’s own moderate realism are presented in 
section 5.3.2.  
Section 5.3.4 details the notion of unit attributes, describing 
how each unit attribute is considered to have two aspects. In section 
5.3.5, one of these aspects is examined more closely with regard to 
whether it is a simple or complex entity. Section 5.3.6 defines con-
tinuous composites and considers the issue of whether unit attributes 
are continuous composites. The predicative aspect of unit attributes is 
the subject of section 5.3.7. Finally, in section 5.3.8 a short presenta-
tion is given of how unit attributes form network structures. 
5.3.2 Principles of Moderate Realism 
A reason for not using the term ‘trope’ as a comprehensive term is its 
strong association with nominalistic particularism. There are other 
terms which can better fulfil that role. Among these are ‘property 
instance’, ‘attribute instance’, or just ‘instance’, as well as ‘unit pro-
perty’ and ‘unit attribute’. Mertz uses all of them. In addition, he uses 
the pair ‘relation instance’ and ‘unit relation’. As regards the two latter 
terms, it should be noted that it is not just that he considers relations 
to occur as particulars. More importantly, he does not think that the 
distinction between monadic ontic predicates, on the one hand, and 
polyadic ones, on the other, should be assigned any importance of 
principle. Ontic predicates, irrespective of their adicities, should be 
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recognised as forming one single category. What is essential is that an 
ontic predicate has adicity, not of what degree the adicity is.  
Ontological particularism at its minimum is said to satisfy two 
principles. These two principles are: 
For instances Rni and R
n
j , of the same n-place relation R
n, 
Principle of subject uniqueness (SU): 
If :Rni (a1,a2,…,an) and :R
n
i (b1,b2,…,bn), then a1 = b1,…, an = bn , 
and 
Principle of instance uniqueness (IU): 
If :Rni (a1,a2,…,an) and :R
n
j (a1,a2,…,an), then R
n
i = R
n
j .1 
Since these two principles supposedly constitute the minimum con-
tent of particularism, the phrase ‘of the same n-place relation Rn’ 
should be neutral between realistic and nominalistic interpretations of 
the general particularistic doctrine. Keep that in mind when reading 
the following.  
As subject-unique (SU), no relation instance can have 
more than one distinct n-tuple of relata. It is not the case, 
for example, that Red1 inheres as numerically the same in 
both apple a and distinct apple b, for otherwise Red1 
would have the nature of a universal and not an un-
repeatable instance. The principle of instance-uniqueness 
(IU) formalizes the non-redundancy thesis: for example, 
that apple a cannot have (at the same time and corre-
sponding to the same spatial region) numerically different 
instances of the property Red. The doctrine of instance 
uniqueness can be supported not only by an argument 
from ontic economy (‘Ockham’s razor’), but also an argu-
                                                     
1 Mertz 1996, p. 10. Again, I have taken the liberty of inserting the colons. 
While the superscript of ‘Rni’ indicates adicity, the subscript indicates 
individuality. Quite often a simplified notation is used, omitting super- and 
subscript. In this practice, ‘R’ sometimes stands for either a relation or an 
instance of it. This more ambiguous use can make it quite difficult to inter-
pret what the intended sense is.  
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ment from the identity of indiscernibles:1 namely, that 
there is simply nothing that could serve to intrinsically 
differentiate two relation instances if they have numerically 
the same relata n-tuple and are of the same relation con-
stant Rn. The central problem for particularism is to pro-
duce cogent arguments for the existence of instances that 
satisfy the requirement of subject uniqueness SU.2 
In chapter III we saw that Maurin is not entirely out of sympathy 
with the idea that tropes are recyclable.3 However, (SU) rules that out. 
One may ponder upon whether this means that (SU) should be 
revised in some way so that her view fits in or if she should recon-
sider her position. Anyhow, since (SU) and (IU) are declared to be the 
common content of all versions of particularism, what category the 
referent of ‘R’ belongs to should be left open. For example, it must 
not be presupposed that it designates a universal. The use of the term 
‘intension’ in the quotation probably offends that provision since 
‘intension’ and ‘universal’ are synonymous in Mertz’s own termino-
logy.  
Evidently, if universals are to have any role to play in this con-
text, this is to be stipulated by yet another principle, which has to be 
added to the minimum principles. The following is such an additional 
principle: 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Cf. Mertz 1996, pp. 148ff, mentions some of Leibniz’s own opinions on the 
principle. Among other things, he considers it to be a metaphysical, not a 
logical, principle. While it is logically possible that ∃x∃y[(x ≠ y) & ∀P[P(x) ↔ 
P(y)]], it is inconsistent with God’s wisdom and therefore inconsistent with 
the way things must be. Cf. Leibniz 1969, p. 699. I do not know to what 
extent Mertz relies on God’s wisdom here. 
2 Mertz 1996, p. 11. 
3 Her compresence tropes cannot be recycled. Presumably, the same holds 
for all the other external relations. A well-founded suspicion is that the 
predicativity of relations makes all the difference here. 
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Principle of immanent instance realism (IR): 
For distinct relation instances Rni , R
n
j ,… there exists and entity 
Rn which is a numerically identical aspect of each of the 
instances Rni , R
n
j ,…1 
There are quite a few adherents of (IR). An inexhaustive enumeration 
of is: Boethius,2 Avicenna,3 Thomas Aquinas,4 John Duns Scotus,5 
John Cook Wilson,6 Edmund Husserl,7 Nicholas Wolterstorff8 and 
Peter Strawson.9 It is quite possible that Plato10 and Aristotle11 also 
belong to this list.12 
                                                     
1 Mertz 1996, p. 11. (IR) is not intended to imply that only extra-conceptually 
instantiated universals exist. Universals which are merely conceptually in-
stantiated are also recognised. Cf. Mertz 2006, p. 39. 
2 Cf. Gracia 1984, p. 78. 
3 Cf. Morewedge 1973, pp. 33-4. 
4 Cf. Aquinas 1955, p. 127. 
5 Cf. Harris 1959, pp. 94-5. 
6 Cf. Cook Wilson 1926, Vol. I, pp. 171, 187, 199, 207-8, 233; Vol. II, pp. 
665, 670-1, 713. 
7 Cf. Husserl 1970, Vol. I, pp. 376-7. 
8 Cf. Wolterstorff 1970, pp. 90ff. 
9 Cf. Strawson 1971, pp. 168-9, footnote 1. 
10 Cf. Phaedo, 102b-e, and Theaetetus, 209a-d. 
11 Cf. Categories, 1a24-b9, and Metaphysics, 1017b25, 1039b24-6, 1042a29, 
1049a28ff, 1057bff, 1071a27-9. 
12 Francisco Suarez is not on the list. He seems to be a nominalist of some 
sort. Cf. Suarez 1964, pp. 30, 36, 47-8. However, he is classified as a parti-
cularist. To some extent, that fact undermines the status of (IU) as a necess-
ary condition of particularism. Regarding Suarez and (IU) Mertz says: 
[…] Suarez maintains that an entity is its own principle of in-
dividuation […]. […] But, if accidents are not individuated by 
their subjects, it is improper to explain the individuality of acci-
dents, which is something intrinsic and tied to their very natures, 
by something extrinsic […]. He thus goes on to assert that there 
is no apparent reason in principle why multiple instances of the 
same accident cannot be simultaneously in the same subject (a 
denial of the principle of instance uniqueness, IU), though, as a 
matter of fact, no such duplicated inherence occurs naturally 
[…]. (Mertz 1996, pp. 128-9) 
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Mertz is scanty with own arguments for realism. He mainly 
refers to arguments presented by others, in particular those of Arthur 
Pap, David Armstrong, Reinhardt Grossmann, Herbert Hochberg 
and Frank Jackson.1 Since none of these is a particularist, their argu-
ments support realism in general. He is of course right that the philo-
sophers listed probably have supplied the best arguments for realism 
which can be found.  
Moderate nominalisms do not satisfy (IR). Depending on which 
moderate nominalism we are dealing with, the stipulated substitute 
principle will vary. Take for example G. F. Stout’s moderate 
nominalism. His unit attributes are the same type because they all be-
long to a certain class. Belonging to this class is what gives them their 
qualitative content.2 This makes his ontology a version of class nomi-
nalism.  
Neither should (SU) and (IU) involve any particular view on 
predicativity. The quality tropes of many, if not all, moderate nomina-
lisms are not predicative entities. The quality tropes of Campbell 
constitute a case in point. An apposite description of them is: 
[T]ropes are not ontically predicative, they do not exist as 
‘inhering’ in a subject, but rather ‘free-float’, as it were. 
The grouping of tropes (e.g., bald2, snubnose5, white1, etc.) 
which constitutes ordinary individuals (e.g., Socrates) is a 
function of the unique compresence relation.3 
                                                                                                   
I suppose that Suarez’s claim that duplication in fact never occurs explains 
why he is on the list of particularists. By the way, it is stated here that the 
individuality of unit attributes is in some way dependent on their subjects. 
This is not part of either principle (SU) or (IU). It is a consequence of 
Mertz’s own view on predication.  
1 Mertz 1996 and 2001 mention: Pap 1959, Armstrong 1978 and 1989, Gross-
mann 1983, Hochberg 1988 and Jackson 1977. 
2 Cf. Stout 1930, Essay XVII. Caution is called for here. Stout’s notion of 
class may very well differ from that which is used nowadays. 
3 Mertz 1993, p. 190. 
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Earlier Campbell often said that instances of compresence should 
also be reduced to their relata.1 He seems to have changed his mind 
in recent years though.2 The goal he used to try to attain was the 
reduction of all polyadic attributes. The former were supposed to 
supervene on their relata. Compresence was no exception to this. 
Using a bit of picturesque language, the alleged cement of a complex 
was looked upon as nothing in addition to the bricks of the complex 
in question.3 In this vision of reality nothing is predicative. In contra-
distinction to that view, Maurin has recognised unreducible predica-
tive instances of compresence from the start, though her quality tro-
pes totally lack predicativity.4  
In addition to (SU), (IU) and (IR), Mertz recognises two other 
principles:  
Principle of instance predicates (IP): 
Only unrepeatable relation instances, Rni , are ontic predicates — 
that is, exist as predicative among specific subject n-tuples, the 
universal Rn is not ontically predicative.5 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Cf. Campbell 1990, pp. 40ff. 
2 Cf. Campbell 2003. 
3 Cf. Campbell 1990, pp. 130ff. 
4 For some reason both she and Campbell refer to quality tropes as being 
monadic. It would be more apposite to describe them as monads. Not 
necessarily interpreted idealistically, although the history of the term ‘monad’ 
suggests that.  
5 That universals are not predicable is contrary to Aristotle’s view, though the 
notion that particulars (instances of universals) are predicable need not be. 
This can be seen from his definitions of universal and particular, in De Inter-
pretatione, 17a38-40: 
Some things are universal, other individual. By the term ‘univer-
sal’ I mean that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of 
many subjects, by ‘individual’ that which is not thus predicated. 
This allows for two different interpretations: either that particulars are not pre-
dicable at all or that they are not predicable of many subjects.  
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Principle of relata-linking (RL): 
No n-adic relation instance Rni exists except as ontically predicative 
among, and hence necessarily presupposing, some n-tuple of 
entities which as such it relates.1 
The introduction of these two principles corroborates the impression 
that predicativity is not supposed to be a part of the content of any of 
the three former principles. It is thanks to (IP) that relation instances 
are predicative and that universals are not. Since the second half of it 
is negative, I suppose a nominalist could in principle concur with it in 
its entirety. However that may be, the predicative entities are unit 
attributes and are characterised as being ontoglial.2 Their ontoglial 
nature is manifested thus: monadic ontic predicates link to subjects; 
polyadic ontic predicates link among subjects.3 The subjects of ontic 
predicates may be other ontic predicates. On the lowest level of 
reality they must be since substrata are repudiated. Free-floating unit 
attributes are also repudiated, by (RL).  
Mertz’s preferred name for his own analytic ontology is ‘moder-
ate realism’.4 He does not intend it as an exclusive name for his own 
particular version of particularism though.  
                                                     
1 Mertz 1996, p. 26. Although unit relations only exist as actually relating enti-
ties, there are universals which are not instantiated. 
[I]ntensions exist for which there are no corresponding ontic pre-
dicates and so facts, e.g., Unicorn1, Phlogiston1 […]. (Mertz 2006, 
p. 107) 
Also mentioned are the intensions Spouse2 and Employer2, as exiting in a 
universe reduced to one extant human being who has retained these inten-
sions by abstraction. With regard to the issue of uninstantiated universals, the 
two latter are evidently irrelevant. The two former are more interesting. I sus-
pect that neither of them is a totally free creation of the mind. Presumably, 
they are synthesised from intensional material gained from experience.  
2 Cf. Mertz 1996, p. 25. The term ‘ontoglial’ is derived from the glue of being in 
Greek. Unfortunately, Mertz wavers a bit concerning which entity is the 
actual glue. In Mertz 1996, p.25, the implication is that it is the unit attributes. 
In Mertz 2006, p. 25, it is said to be the predicational aspects of unit attri-
butes. 
3 Cf. Mertz 1996, p. 24. 
4 An alternative denomination is ‘network instance realism’, it suggests that 
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The conjunction of Principles SU, IU, and IR, with R 
restricted to the limiting case of monadic properties, con-
stitutes the Moderate Realism of Avicenna and the Christian 
scholastics, and represents a median between the extremes 
of Platonic realism on the one hand and nominalism on 
the other.1 
The doctrine which restricts R to monadic attributes is the one men-
tioned in section 5.2.3. In its classical form it decrees polyadic predi-
cates to be reducible to monadic ones in combination with a peculiar 
characteristic of pointing. Perhaps it originates from Plato.2  
5.3.3 A Refined Version of Avicenna’s Second Argument 
Earlier, we saw certain second-order attributes being essential for 
Avicenna’s arguments. It holds correspondingly for Mertz’s refined 
version of the second argument. This is evident from the following 
concise account of it:  
Like Avicenna’s arguments, the following turns upon the 
fact that a relation R as it occurs in the complexes aRb and 
bRa has distinct and incompatible second-order properties. 
In particular, let it be the case that both facts aRb and bRa 
obtain, where R is a non-symmetric relation, for instance, 
x loves y.3 We have in this case two distinct complexes, or 
facts, composed of apparently exactly the same parts. Of 
course, this is impossible. The standard and intuitive 
observation is that there is an order in which R relates its 
relata and this order is distinct for the two complexes. In 
                                                                                                   
instances form networks together. Among the networks are the ordinary 
objects. The network aspect is worked out, e.g., in Mertz 2004. 
1 Mertz 1993, p. 193. 
2 Cf. Cavarnos 1975, pp. 17-25, for an account of Plato’s view. Although this 
doctrine is found in the writing of Plato, he need not be its originator. For all 
we know, it may originate from ancient Egypt.  
3 Since loving is an intentional relation, it might happen that an existing sub-
ject loves a non-existing relatum, and surprisingly often actually does so. The 
inverse is yet to happen. I take it that John and Mary both exist.  
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the fact that Mary loves John, the loving is from Mary to 
John, and not the other way around. The latter would be a 
separate arrangement which may or may not obtain. The 
distinction between the two complexes, aRb and bRa, is a 
function of the relation, and specifically of its ordering 
connectedness among its relata. In aRb, R relates a-to-b 
and not b-to-a, whereas in bRa, R relates b-to-a and not a-
to-b. But then, if R is numerically identical in both com-
plexes, then R possesses contrary next-level properties. We 
must conclude that R is numerically distinct in its occur-
rences across these complexes.1 
Throughout this quotation the term ‘R’ is used. What ‘R’, or ‘relation’, 
indicates is a relation instance of the form ‘Rni’. In fact, there is 
supposed to be two such instances; the argument can be summed up 
as follows. If one and the same relation instance is supposed to 
obtain in one fact as well as in another, where it is holding in the 
opposite direction, it has contrary properties. This is impossible. 
Therefore, the relating entities of the two facts cannot be numerically 
identical with each other. The two contrary properties, which are 
relevant in this particular example, are relating-a-to-b and relating-b-
to-a respectively.  
Evidently, Leibniz’s law is invoked here.2 The contrary proper-
ties indicate that there cannot be the same relating entity in both 
cases. Thus, the two facts should be rendered aR1b and bR2a res-
pectively. Or, more in line with the canonical notation: :R21(a,b) and 
:R22(b,a). Here the relating entities are particulars, not universals. 
It is important to note that there is a universal R2 involved here 
and that it makes a difference.  
There is a sense in which R is the same in both complexes 
(as intension R — e.g., Loves); yet, as relating distinct spe-
cific relata and thus establishing a specific order among 
them, R is particularized (as instances Ri and Rj). If one 
fails to make a distinction between the intension of a rela-
                                                     
1 Mertz 1993, p. 199.   
2 Cf. Mertz 1996, p. 184.  
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tion and the actual relating or linking that is unique to a 
specific ordered n-tuple of relata, then the above argument 
does away with relation universals, and we end up at best 
with trope nominalism. The combinatorial state con-
stituting one ordered n-tuple is not the combinatorial state 
of a differently ordered n-tuple. Yet the intensions under 
which all relating must take place are repeatable.1 
One problem which classical realism has failed to solve is satisfactory 
explanation of the role of universals. The regress, named after 
Bradley, can be seen as an illustration of that. Although Mertz, strictly 
speaking, agrees with the (tacit) premise of the regress argument, that 
(universal) relations do not relate, he does not agree with the 
conclusion of the argument. The conclusion being that there is no 
such thing as a relating. The entities which actually relate relata are 
unit relations, which are numerically distinct from each other. That is 
what is supposed to be shown by the arguments for particularism. 
While Avicenna and the tradition offer analyses in terms of esse ins 
and esse ads, what is proposed here is an analysis in which a unit attri-
bute is an esse inter; i.e., a fully real interconnective.2 For relations, to 
be is to bond.3 I hasten to add that is instances of relations that are 
supposed to bond, not relations themselves.  
What about the second-order attributes appearing in the pre-
sented argument for particularism? The direction of a unit relation is 
said to be a second-order attribute, or at least that it founds one. 
Furthermore, it is due to that second-order attribute that the unit rela-
tion is not the same as another. The form of the second-order attri-
bute mentioned is: being-from-a-to-b. Which formula can be used to 
adequately express that the unit relation of the fact has this second-
order attribute? Is it perhaps ‘:R32(R21,a,b)’? In this rendering it is a 
triadic unit relation holding between R21, a and b. A regress may lie in 
wait here. If that is in fact the case, which kind is it? If it is analytical, 
R43 will need to do the relating of R32 to the rest; the next step after 
                                                     
1 Mertz 1996, p. 185.  
2 Cf. Mertz 2001, p. 55, and 2006, p. 26. 
3 Cf. Mertz 1996, p. 187.  
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that is the need of R54 to do the relating of R43 and rest; etc. Mertz 
would most certainly not admit that an analytical regress is inherent 
here. If there is a regress here, perhaps it is an implicative one.  
One could also deny that there is any regress here at all. Part of 
that denial would be that the first step in the proposed rendering of 
the situation — i.e., ‘:R32(R21,a,b)’ — is a misrepresentation. The 
second-order property is expressed in the relative order the con-
stituents have in the formula ‘:R21(a,b)’, particularly that of ‘a’ and ‘b’. 
This since the predicational aspect of R21 is specific for the pair a and 
b and no other.1  
The argument from converse second-order properties has been 
questioned. One objection is made by Reinhardt Grossmann. The 
particular version of the argument from which he starts is found in 
Alexius Meinong.2 Meinong maintains that the triangularity of a par-
ticular triangle, A, is not the same as that of another triangle, B. The 
reason for that is that the two have different properties: being the 
triangularity of A and being the triangularity of B, respectively.3 In 
order to show that this is deceptive, Grossmann invokes an analogy.  
[T]his argument is of the same form as the following falla-
cious argument. The son of John cannot be the son of 
Mary; for the former has the property of being the son of 
John while the latter does not. […] But, of course, Tom — 
the only son of John and Mary — has both properties; he 
is both the son of John as well as of Mary. And so, too, 
the property of being a triangle has both the property of 
being the triangularity of A as well as that of being the 
triangularity of B.4 
I take it that the counter-argument here is as follows: If the argument 
from converse properties is sound, Tom cannot be the son of both 
                                                     
1 Using an ugly formula: :R21(a,b) → ∀x∀y[(:R21(x,y) ↔ ((x = a) & (y = b))]. 
2 According to Grossmann, the same kind of argument can be found in 
Wolterstorff 1970, p. 139, and Cook Wilson 1926, vol. I, pp. 346, 394. He 
might be right about that. However, in both cases it is rather implicit. 
3 Cf. Meinong 1968-78, vol. 1, p. 75.  
4 Grossmann 1983, p. 109. 
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John and Mary. If he were, he would have two properties which are 
converses of each other: being the son of John and being the son of 
Mary. However, since Tom in fact is their son, he can simultaneously 
have these properties. Hence, the argument is not sound.  
Classification of the two relational properties mentioned as 
being converses of each other is dubious. Never mind that though. 
Contemplate instead the remark that Grossmann’s counter-argument 
misses the point. The criticised argument does not rule out that a 
person can have two parents. What it is meant to show is that there is 
not just one but two instances of the parent relation involved. One of 
these holds between the father and the son. The other holds between 
the mother and the son. The claim is that if it were the same relating 
entity, it would have two properties which it cannot have simul-
taneously: holding-from-John-to-Tom and holding-from-Mary-to-
Tom. However, in Grossmann’s rendering of the argument what he 
takes to be relevant is that the son has converse properties: being-the-
son-of-John and being-the-son-of-Mary. Evidently, that is a mis-
representation of the argument.  
If there is a relation in the example with the two triangles, being 
the analogue of the parent relation, it would be instantiation. Now, is 
it the same relating obtaining in both triangles? If instantiation is 
supposed to be a relation just like any other, a particularist would give 
a negative answer. The reason for that is the same as in the case with 
the parents and their son. If we instead concentrate on the triangu-
larity of the two triangles, it is of course less evident that there are in 
fact two instances of it: one in A and another in B. Meinong’s claim, 
that they are two since they have different properties, is taken by 
Grossmann to be no more than an assertion.  
As will be seen below, Mertz does not think that there are any 
instances of an instantiation relation. Further, since there is no such 
relation, there can be no instances of it. However, he has a notion 
which can be said to correspond to instantiation. It is called ‘predi-
cational aspect’ among other things. It will be seen in what follows 
that since it per definitionem is particular, the triangularity of A is not 
identical with that of B. What is said in the previous sentence is of 
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course not a valid inference. A few more premises are needed. They 
are supplied below. 
5.3.4 Unit Attributes: Preliminaries 
Every unit attribute has two aspects according to Mertz. One of these 
he refers to using denominations such as ‘universal aspect’, ‘inten-
sional aspect’ or simply ‘universal’ or ‘intension’. The other aspect has 
several alternative names, some of which are: ‘predicational aspect’, 
‘predicational tie’ or just ‘predication’ or ‘tie’, ‘unification under an 
intension’ or just ‘unification’, ‘relating under an intension’, ‘relating 
aspect’ or just ‘relating’, ‘combinatorial aspect’, ‘agent unifier’, ‘uni-
fying agency’, ‘agent-combinator’, etc.1 Since the intensional aspect is 
a universal, it is shareable. The predicational aspect, on the other 
hand, is not shareable. Consequently, it is a particular, or, it is at least 
particular (adjective). For the rest of this chapter I will be using most 
of the denominations mentioned, and also a few in addition to these.  
Two arguments are frequently adduced by Mertz. Both are in-
tended to show that the predicational aspect under an intension must 
be a particular. A version of one of these reads: 
[T]he relating-under-R is unique and unrepeatable to each 
fact because the existence sustaining unification under R 
among one set of relata can obtain while the like uni-
fication under R among the other (or any other) set of re-
lata ceases to exist. [---] Restated as a reductio, if it were one 
and numerically the same unification under R sustaining 
the existence of each fact, just as for realists it is numeri-
cally the same intension R ‘in’ each fact with ontic predi-
                                                     
1 While the terms of the first group are used univocally, some of the second 
are used equivocally. E.g., by ‘agent-combinator’ is often meant an entire 
ontic predicate. But, equally often is meant just its predicational aspect. The 
same is true of a phrase like ‘relating under an intension’. One of its possible 
senses is that of ‘instance of an intension’. Another is that of ‘predicational 
aspect’. There is even a third sense, which is an intermediate of the former 
two. Thus, a tristinction is indicated: (i) instance of an intension, (ii) predi-
cation under an intension, and (iii) predication. The distinction between the 
intermediate and either of the other two is easily blurred. 
MODERATE REALISM                                  253 
cate R, […] all such facts would obtain or cease to exist 
simultaneously. A content or intension R might persist, 
but all of its relatings, being identical (numerically one), 
would come into and go out of existence together. All of 
this is counter-factual. An intension R can be shared, but a 
union under it among a specific relata set cannot.1 
Thus, if the assumption is made that the same specific predicational 
aspect is the unifier of distinct facts; all these facts must go out of 
existence whenever one of them ceases to exist since all these facts 
have identically the same predicational aspect. However, this is 
counter-factual. The assumption must be repudiated. When the inten-
sion Love is involved, we realise that John’s love for Mary can obtain 
even when her love for him ceases to exist, and vice versa. The same 
applies to the predicational aspects of monadic predicates. When one 
of the apples of a pair of red apples ceases to be red, the other does 
not automatically stop being red. Since one and the same predica-
tional aspect cannot behave differently from itself, it cannot be the 
same predicational aspect everywhere doing that. Instead, there are as 
many particular predicational aspects under a specific intension as 
there are instances of it. 
A generalisation of the argument would be that it cannot be the 
same predicational aspect that is doing the job in every obtaining fact, 
irrespective of intension. Given that assumption, when one fact goes 
out of existence, every other fact must also cease to exist since the 
relating aspect in all facts is identical. 
The other argument is the one from contrary second-order 
properties. In one of his formulations of it Mertz refers to a principle 
which he calls ‘the constituent analogue of the identity of 
indiscernibles’: 
(CII) Entities having exactly the same constituents are identi-
cal, i.e., 
                                                     
1 Mertz 2001, p. 55-6. 
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(x)(y)[(z)(z is a constituent of x ≡ z is a constituent of y) 
⊃ x = y].1 
While the original version of the principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles — with ‘universals’ instead of ‘constituents’ — is con-
troversial, Mertz considers (CII) to be fairly uncontroversial.2 It is 
said to be intuitive and consequential,3 similar to the principle, or 
axiom, of extensionality for set theory. 
The second argument can now be stated quite briefly. 
[I]f the relating-under-R between a and b were numerically 
one and the same in all of its facts, then, because R, a and 
b are also numerically the same in all these facts, under CII 
it would be the case that :R(a,b) = :R(b,a).4 
                                                     
1 Mertz 2001, p. 49. The principle is found in Moreland 1998, p. 252, where it 
is stated that “[i]t is hard to see how two entities could share literally all their 
constituents in common and still be two.” 
2 Cf. Mertz 2006, p. 15. (CII) is rejected by Armstrong. Cf. Armstrong 1986, 
pp. 85-8; 1989, p. 90; 1997, pp.118-21. According to him, the differences 
between entities having the same constituents are due to differences in how 
the constituents are organised. The implication is then that organisation is 
separated from the constituents. Thus, :R(a,b) and :R(b,a) are different due to 
difference with regard to organisation, not constituents. A slightly misleading 
way of specifying the sense ‘constituent’ has in Mertz’ terminology is to say 
that organisation is an aspect of the constituents. This illustrates the 
importance of keeping track of how ‘constituent’ is being used. Cf. the 
following footnote. 
3 The inversion of (CII) might be called ‘the constituent analogue of the 
indiscernibility of identicals’ (CII*):  
(CII*) Entities being identical have exactly the same constituents, i.e., 
(x)(y)(z)[(x = y) ⊃ (z is a constituent of x ≡ z is a constituent of 
y)]. 
This principle, just as (CII), is intuitive and consequential. This holds good 
also when ‘constituent’ is replaced by ‘universal’ in (PCI*). In contrast to 
Leibniz’s principle, Leibniz’s law is considered valid by most philosophers. 
Now, I would say that given the sense in which Mertz is using ‘constituent’, 
the significant difference between Leibniz’s principle and law is made trivial. 
4 Mertz 2001, p. 55. I remind of (PCI), presented in section 5.2.4: 
(PCI) Necessarily, for all complex objects x and y and every entity z, if 
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Since the relating aspect, according to the assumption, is numerically 
the same in :R(a,b) and :R(b,a), it has the same second-order unit pro-
perty in both facts. That would be one, but not both, of the following 
two: from-a-to-b or from-b-to-a. However, that is impossible.  
What now of the distinction between the two aspects of a unit 
attribute? A decision has to be made with regard to analysis. There 
seems to be only two alternatives. According to one of these, a pre-
abstraction real complexity exists within the unit attribute. According 
to the other, there is only a post-abstraction distinction between par-
tial and incomplete aspects of what is itself a simple entity.1  
Mertz considers the first analysis to be untenable. If it is 
accepted, one out of two absurdities must also be accepted. One of 
these absurdities is a vicious regress. The other is the non-relational 
tie theory.  
Let us see first how the regress supposedly arises.  
[A]ssume analysis 1), i.e., that a fact of the form :R(a,b) has 
as real and distinct constituents relata a and b, intension R, 
and the latter’s predicational tie. So construed, the predica-
tional tie under R will have R as an additional term or 
relatum. This is so since the tie, to be a tie and to be R’s tie, 
must do the connecting of R to a and b. Now, clearly the 
tie cannot itself be an additional and full relation2 (a tie 
                                                                                                   
z is a constituent of x if and only if z is a constituent of y, then 
x is numerically identical with y. 
This principle is similar to (CII). However, I take it that the intended sense of 
‘constituent’ in (PCI) is not the same as that of (CII). In Mertz’ interpretation 
of the principle (CII) the predicational aspects of constituents are included. 
(PCI) does not include corresponding instantiation among the constituents. 
An objection to this might be that constitution and instantiation are reci-
procal in the sense that what is a constituent is instantiated and what is 
instantiated is a constituent. However, the notion of instantiation, which 
seems to be presupposed by Rodriguez-Pereyra, does not rule out the possi-
bility that the constituents of a complex are arranged differently in another 
complex.  
1 Cf. Mertz 2001, p. 57. 
2 The term ‘full relation’ has not been used before. It means the same as ‘unit 
relation’.  
256                                           CHAPTER V 
with its own intension) R', for otherwise R' would be the 
first step in Bradley’s vicious regress of further and further 
relations. In effect, the original fact :R(a,b) would turn up 
on this analysis to be identical to the fact :R'(R,a,b). But, of 
course, the latter fact is exactly the same kind of entity as 
the original fact and so would itself dissipate upon the 
present analysis into the further fact :R"(R',R,a,b), and so 
on, evaporating into the oblivion of an endless regress.1 
The overall assumption of this reductio is that the predicational and 
intensional aspects of what appears to be the relating entity of :R(a,b) 
are distinct from each other. That means that the referent of ‘R’ is not 
doing the relating in the fact. Instead, R is one of the relata of the 
relating entity, which is the predicational aspect of R. Now, if this 
predicational aspect is itself a unit relation, its predicational aspect 
must also be a unit relation. As such, it has an intensional aspect as 
well as a predicational aspect. That predicational aspect is a unit 
relation in itself, with an intensional aspect and a predicational aspect. 
By now, we see how the regress is progressing. But, why should we 
admit that the predicational aspect of the first unit relation in this 
series is a unit relation itself? The answer is that this is one of two 
possibilities. The other possibility is that it is nothing more than the 
predicational tie itself; it is not a unit relation in itself. The next reductio 
involves the latter assumption. 
Let us move on then to that reductio. Now the assumption is that 
the predicational aspect of a unit relation is a bare tie. Part of the 
argument reads:  
Failing on this analysis [i.e., the previous one], we will 
assume the alternative — that the predicational tie in the 
fact :R(a,b) is bare, i.e., has no content or intension. So 
under the present assumption, for a fact with an n-adic 
intension R, the predicational linking is characterised as 
both a blank tie, a mere togetherness, and one that is n+1-
adic, e.g., for dyadic intension Love, its tie in fact 
:Love(a,b) must be triadic, or for triadic intension Between, 
                                                     
1 Mertz 2001, p. 57.  
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its tie in fact :Between(a,b,c) must be four-term. Now I 
note first that this latter characteristic should render the 
present assay implausible on the face of it. For, it declares 
to be a pervasive illusion what we understand when we are 
cognisant of a property or relation — that the n-subject 
specification that constitutes part of the very apprehension 
of any intension R is always false by one term. An inten-
sion carries its n-adicity as a part of its very meaning. To 
understand the intension is to grasp the number of sub-
jects the corresponding predicate can have. Yet the present 
assumption renders this understanding false in every case.1 
An objection to this might be that the analysis brings us new 
knowledge. We thought we had correctly understood the adicity of 
the relating entity of the fact. Unfortunately, we were wrong. What 
seemed to be the relating entity turned out not to be that entity. As a 
consequence we were mistaken regarding the adicity of the proper 
relating entity. Now we know better.  
The rest of the argument runs like this: 
Beyond this is the further and, I contend, compelling cri-
tique deriving from the untenability of the very notion of a 
bare linking. Here the fact :R(a,b) is supposed to resolve 
into three subjects, R, a, and b, held together by a tie that 
itself has no content (no intension R'), its content having 
been separated out as R. This is the ‘non-relational tie’ 
theory that some ontologists contend is the proper con-
clusion in the face of Bradley’s regress. But if this is the 
case, […] it implies that the unity among R, a, and b in the 
fact :R(a,b) is no different in kind than the unity among 
them as elements of the set {R,a,b}. On a blank asso-
ciation the unification between the terms is conditioned on 
nothing but their existence, the natures and characteristics 
of the terms are irrelevant. In particular, no ordering 
among the terms is specified.2 
                                                     
1 Mertz 2001, p. 57. 
2 Mertz 2001, p. 57. 
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In the former reductio it was part of the assumption that the predica-
tional aspect of a unit attribute is a unit attribute. The assumption of 
the present reductio is instead that it is a bare linking. The conclusion 
of the latter is that the unity among the constituents of :R(a,b) is not 
more intimate than it is among the same entities when they combine 
to form a set. In other words: {R,a,b} = :R(a,b). Evidently, that is an 
absurdity. Furthermore, since there is no controlling intensional input 
to a bare linking, every fact will have the same modal character. Pre-
sumably, they will all be contingent. This constitutes a reductio on its 
own.1  
There are only two conceivable analyses of the “relationship” 
between the two aspects of a unit attribute. One of these has been 
dealt with in the previous paragraphs. It turned out to be abortive. 
The conclusion is that what underlies the distinction between them 
cannot be a pre-abstraction real complexity. What is left then is the 
other alternative, according to which there is no ontic distance 
between the two aspects. This being so, what we have is a post-
abstraction distinction. According to this second analysis, the true 
picture of the situation is that although a unit attribute is a simple 
entity, there is a real foundation within it for making a distinction 
between two aspects.2 
The analysis hinted at in the second part of the previous para-
graph is difficult to spell out and to understand. In section 5.3.5, the 
two aspects of a unit attribute are discussed. Mertz’s proposed ana-
lysis of their union is examined after that. But first, preliminary deter-
minations of simplicity and complexity are introduced.  
The kinds of simplicity supposed to inhere in unit attributes are 
defined in terms of its opposites, which are two notions of com-
plexity. One of these kinds of complexity, in turn, is defined in terms 
of having predicative structure. An entity is complex in this sense if at 
least one of its constituents, or aspects, is predicated of another of its 
constituents or aspects. Since facts per definitionem involve ontic pre-
dicates’ linking to subjects, or linking between subjects, facts are 
                                                     
1 Cf. Mertz 2001, p. 58. 
2 Cf. Mertz 2001, p. 58. 
MODERATE REALISM                                  259 
complex entities in this sense. Evidently, ordinary objects are also 
complex entities. With this kind of complexity, comes what Mertz 
calls ‘ontic distance’: “Relations as ‘actually relating’ maintain ‘ontic 
distance’ among their relata — a real distinction in the containing 
entity (i.e., fact or state of affairs).”1 
If sets and sums are conditioned by nothing else than the exist-
ence of their elements or members, perhaps they are simple entities in 
the sense hinted at in the previous paragraph? The elements or mem-
bers may of course be complex entities in themselves. For example, 
the set of all human beings obviously involves complexity since each 
human being is a complex entity by itself. However, the complexity 
of the set depends primarily on whether there is any set forming 
(unit) relation; likewise with regard to mereological sums. I would say 
that it is reasonable to assume that there is a set-forming relation, as 
well as a sum-forming one since set theory has its element-of relation 
and mereology its part-of relation, governed by axioms which are 
non-arbitrary.2 Therefore, neither sets nor sums are simple entities in 
the sense hinted at here. 
The way unit attributes are talked about suggests that they have 
a nature. Perhaps that is unavoidable. It is difficult to say anything 
without at least formally predicating something. That is also true of 
unit attributes. What is predicated of a unit attribute is, among other 
things, that it is simple and unrepeatable. Does this imply that it has 
two unit attributes as some sort of constituents? The predicational 
aspects are talked about in a similar way. They are said to be un-
repeatable and unique. Presumably, if these predicates really are ontic 
predicates of their respective subjects, they are of their essence. At 
least in one place, the scholastic principle that what is of the essence 
of an entity must be a constituent of it is referred to approvingly by 
Mertz.3  
                                                     
1 Mertz 2001, p. 47. 
2 Cf. Mertz 2006, p. 25, where it is pointed out that the element-of and part-
of relations are in principle unreducible to extensional surrogates of any kind 
within their respective theories.  
3 Cf. Mertz 2006, p. 14. 
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It may seem petty to make a fuss about attributes such as sim-
plicity, unrepeatability, uniqueness and the like. They seem awkward 
anyhow. However, the impression is given that Mertz takes them 
seriously. In fact, he seems to be using them as ammunition when 
shooting at the notion of a bare particular.1 But, since it is hard to 
make heads or tails of all this, I leave it at that.2 
5.3.5 Intensional Aspect: Simple or Complex? 
Interpretational efforts are needed to figure out what the structure of 
a unit attribute is. Allegedly, use of ‘structure’ here is contradictory, 
strictly speaking since a unit attribute cannot per definitionem have an 
internal structure. If it had, it would be complex in a sense which 
Mertz cannot permit. Anyhow, as preparation for a discussion of the 
“structure” of a unit attribute, I will briefly discuss the constituents 
or, as he prefers to say, aspects of unit attributes.  
There is a kind of simplicity which we might call ‘absolute sim-
plicity’. According to Mertz, an ontic predicate in its entirety is not an 
                                                     
1 Cf. Mertz 2001, pp. 50f, where, among other things, the following is 
asserted. 
[B]are particulars do have properties, and moreover they have 
them necessarily, e.g., the properties of unrepeatability and sim-
plicity, the property of not having properties (in some sense), and 
the property of being the constituent of at most one object at a 
given time. 
I would say that these are doubtful cases of properties, especially if they are 
supposed to be constituents of entities. Cf. also Mertz 2003. 
2 It should be pointed out that what I have clumsily expressed in the last two 
paragraphs might prove to be a failure since Mertz also says:  
[A]ll predicates are external to their subjects in the sense that what 
is predicable of a subject (or subjects) is not a constituent of the 
subject(s), contrary to the popular containment model of predi-
cation.” (Mertz 2006, p. 31) 
What is stated here is not intended to rule out the possibility that an entity 
might be a complex as a result of having ontic predicates as constituents. 
Predicates being external, in the intended sense, to their subjects is a result of 
Mertz’ network model for complexes.  
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absolute simple. Though, he is inclined to consider each one of its 
aspects to be simple in the absolute sense.  
[A]n ontic predicate now identified as a relation instance 
Rni is a composite continuous simple, whereas its con-
stituent combinatorial act U is absolutely simple, as is its 
intension Rn in some (e.g., Red1), if not in all cases.1 
I will dwell upon the alleged absolute simplicity of redness and other 
intensions for a moment. The determination of the notion of abso-
lute simplicity itself will have to be intuitive. I rely, as Mertz seems to 
do, on an inarticulate intuition of absolute simplicity.  
Note first that instances of redness are said to resemble each 
other. The previous quotation suggests that they resemble each other 
exactly evenly. Furthermore, this is explained by their sharing the 
same intension, which is redness.  
The fact that there are multiply exactly resembling in-
stances of a ‘kind’ […] is, in this ontology, the result of 
numerically the same intension-content being a constituent 
of each such instance, i.e., exactly resembling instances 
share as their sole qualitative content one and the same 
universal […].2 
Thus, exact resemblance is explained in terms of qualitative identity. 
Now, is redness absolutely simple? Let us assume that what is meant 
by ‘redness’ is a determinate, a lowest determinate even. Assume also 
that ‘yellowness’ denotes another lowest determinate.3 Now, what 
would Mertz say of the resemblance that holds between an instance 
of the former and an instance of the latter? If they are similar to each 
other, which he would say that they are, the explanation cannot be 
that they are exactly similar to each other. It presents itself im-
mediately that there is something in each which makes them partially 
                                                     
1 Mertz 2006, p. 112.  
2 Mertz 2006, p. v. 
3 Whether these two are lowest determinates is not decisive. What is decisive 
is that they are not highest determinables. 
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similar to each other. Reasonably, this something is a determinable 
they share. This would cause resemblance between instances to have 
a uniform explanation. On the other hand, if less than exact 
resemblance between instances is not to be explained in terms of a 
common content, but exact resemblance is, resemblance is treated as 
a heterogeneous phenomenon. What would the explanation of less 
than exact resemblance look like? As far as Mertz is concerned, it can 
be ruled out that less than exact resemblance is primitive in relation 
to the qualitative contents of instances. That would be to invite some 
form of resemblance nominalism. He rejects all forms of nominalism, 
including versions of resemblance nominalism.1 Since it is difficult to 
see what other alternatives there can be left for him, the chances are 
that he would accept the explanation hinted at here. Thus, redness is 
not absolutely simple. Neither is yellowness. 
I would say that what is said regarding non-instantiated inten-
sions also supplies circumstantial evidence for the claim that inten-
sions are not absolutely simple. Ponder upon the implications of the 
following statement.  
Intensions and combinatorial acts when separated in 
abstraction from any relation instance have a conceptual 
existence only, as do any constructed non-instantiated 
intensions, e.g., Unicorn, Phlogiston […].2 
What is interesting here is that the intensions mentioned are said to 
be constructed. I take it that a non-instantiated intension is either a 
part of an instantiated intension or it is a combination of several 
instantiated intensions. In the former case, the instantiated intension 
is not absolutely simple. In the latter, the non-instantiated intension is 
not absolutely simple. What I have in mind here might be called 
‘intension empiricism’. It is through our senses that we get acquainted 
with intensions. By means of various intellectual tools these inten-
sions are manipulated in various ways. Among the products of these 
manipulations is the intension of being a unicorn. It is not pre-
                                                     
1 Cf. Mertz 1996, pp. 13, 63-5, 149, 157.  
2 Mertz 2006, p. vii. 
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requisite here that intension empiricism is the only conceivable 
option. Presumably, complex intensions would be constructible from 
other intensions irrespective of whether the latter are empirically 
obtained or innate. The existence of innate intensions would mean 
that intension rationalism is to be seriously reckoned with. However, 
it does not change anything in principle as regards the possibility of 
there being complex intensions.  
Another indicium that speaks against the notion that intensions 
are absolutely simple is the amount of information they are supposed 
to contain. The message of the following three quotations indicates 
what I am referring to.  
R-as-an-ontic predicate is not simply intension R, it is 
more; it is the linking of specific relata under the con-
comitant controlling content of R, the latter determining 
the nature, number, and order of the former combination.1 
The intension is the source (i.e., is the cause of) the num-
ber, order, and compatibility/admissibility of the linked 
relata, and, more globally, of the relation’s formal/logical 
properties. This is the more obvious the higher the adicity. 
For example, in the fact :Between(a,b,c), which is the linear 
spatial arrangement of objects b between objects a and c, 
there is the unification of three objects under the intension 
Between. The intension specifies the second-order attri-
butes of triadicity, the a–b–c order, and the logical proper-
ties such as the triadic version of symmetry, i.e., if 
:Between(a,b,c) obtains then so does :Between(c,b,a).2  
[C]onsider first that though any arbitrary entities whatso-
ever are said to form a set or sum, only certain limited 
combinations of ontic predicates and subject n-tuples form 
a fact. This is so because the unity of a fact depends upon 
the non-arbitrary match or content-determined mutual re-
levance or qualitative agreement between the predicate’s 
specific intension Rn and the determinate natures of (and 
                                                     
1 Mertz 2001, pp. 53-4. 
2 Mertz 2006, p. 31. 
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ordering among, if any) the entities in the n-tuple. The 
dyadic predicate expressed, for example, by ‘is a father of’, 
i.e., Father-of2(x1,x2), delimits as its extension pairs in-
cluding <Philip II, Alexander the Great>, but not <4,5> 
or <Apple a, Orange b>.1 
We see here that intensions determine a number of things. Among 
these are such things as the nature, number and order of the entities 
which are possible subjects of the ontic predicates of which the inten-
sions are the intensional aspects. Add to that the formal properties of 
the ontic predicates. In the light of this, my rhetorical questions are: 
Can intensions really be absolutely simple in general? Can even an 
intension such as redness be absolutely simple? The answers should 
be: no and no. 
5.3.6 Unit Attributes: Continuous Composites 
The following list provides another selection of descriptive names of 
unit attributes, supplementing the one which was given earlier: 
composite simple,2 continuous composite,3 composite continuous 
simple,4 continuous whole5 or non-standard composite.6 These deno-
minations have in view the peculiar structure of unit attributes.  
When a definition of simplicity is sought for, the immediate re-
flex is to take simplicity to be the opposite of complexity. The latter, 
in turn, is naturally thought of as having parts; put more precisely, as 
having proper parts. That which is actually undivided and potentially 
indivisible is simple. Another angle is to think of simplicity in terms 
of categorial divisibility, thus, a simple entity is something which can-
not be divided into entities belonging to different categories. In the 
chapter III we saw simplicity being defined in that way. However, the 
                                                     
1 Mertz 2006, pp. 106-7. 
2 Cf. Mertz 2006, p. 83. 
3 Cf. Mertz 2006, p. 85. 
4 Cf. Mertz 2006, p. 112. 
5 Cf. Mertz 2006, p. 86. 
6 Cf. Mertz 2006, p. 91. 
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notion of simplicity invoked there is a different one that approxi-
mates the intuitive notion of absolute simplicity.  
The notion of having internal predicative structure is the notion 
of complexity that is relevant for the notion of a continuous simple. 
According to Mertz, unit attributes lack this kind of complexity; 
therefore, they are simple in the corresponding sense, not in the sense 
of not being categorially complex. Each and every one of them has a 
universal aspect (its intension) as well as a particular one (its predica-
tional aspect). In fact, a prerequisite for an entity’s being a composite 
simple seems to be that its constituents belong to different cate-
gories.1 Suppose that I am right in my claim from section 5.3.5 where 
I said that not every intension is absolutely simple. In that case, if 
Mertz is right, that does not automatically imply that they have an 
internal predicative structure. Thus, an entity being categorially simple 
while being complex in another sense does not imply that the entity is 
an articulated complex. Being an articulated complex is the same as 
having internal predicative structure; having such a structure rules out 
its being a composite simple. 
After these preliminaries, let us try to come to grips with the 
somewhat bewildering notion of a continuous simple. As shown in 
the previous paragraphs, unit attributes are continuous simples. 
Analysis of these reveals the nature of this kind of entity. 
A clarifying thesis argued […] is that ontology’s basic par-
ticulars are ontic predicates themselves, where each is a 
union of what are the formally distinct aspects of a qualita-
tive intension and a combinatorial/unifying act among an 
n-tuple of subjects, the latter being as such unrepeatable, 
i.e., an individuating aspect. Out of the related analysis 
there will arise a clarification of our pre-critical concepts of 
the simple, complex, and composite.2 
Thus, the unit attributes are in a sense the fundamental entities of 
reality. The qualification ‘in a sense’ is inserted because unit attributes 
                                                     
1 Cf. Mertz 2006, p. 111. 
2 Mertz 2006, p. 83. 
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have aspects. I take it that the latter are even more fundamental than 
the former. Although the two aspects are fundamental, it is crucial to 
realise that they are non-identical constituents of the unit attribute 
without there being a real division between them. This explains why 
Mertz considers the entire unit attribute to be the fundamental entity 
of reality.  
According to William of Ockham (c. 1288–c. 1347), “[a]ll things 
which are distinct are really distinct and therefore, different things.”1 
The apparent claim here is that entities which are distinct are also 
discrete. Irrespective of their being constituents of the same whole, 
they are separate from each other.2 Thus, Ockham’s view is that every 
composite involves real internal differentiation between its 
constituents, irrespective of what its parts might be. Furthermore, we 
can expect him to claim that all entities on all levels of analysis are 
particulars. The latter is a, if not the, defining thesis of nominalism. 
Mertz’s description of Ockham’s view is that he considers all distinc-
tions to presuppose ontic distance between what is being dis-
tinguished. Lack of ontic distance means that there is in fact no real 
distinction. If there is no real distinction between two entities, they 
are in fact identical with each other. If they are identical, there is no 
real composition. 
John Duns Scotus (1265/6–1308) is an ally of Mertz. His 
famous formal distinction is the one Mertz has in view between the 
aspects of a unit attribute, or comes close to it. Duns Scotus’ name of 
the distinction is ‘distinctio formalis a parte rei’. As the name indi-
cates, there is supposed to be a difference in reality. The formal dis-
tinction is an intermediate between a real distinction, on the one 
hand, and a merely conceptual distinction, on the other. The latter 
has no extra-conceptual basis.3 Duns Scotus applied the formal 
distinction to the union of natura and haecceitas. . While the natura is 
                                                     
1 William of Ockham 1974, p. 84. 
2 Cf. Mertz 2006, p. 81. 
3 A merely conceptual distinction is called by the scholastics ‘distinctio ratio-
nis ratiocinantis’. It can be translated ‘distinction of the reasoning reason’. 
Duns Scotus’ formal distinction is also called ‘distinctio rationis ratiocinatae’. 
In English: ‘distinction of the reasoned reason’. Cf. Suarez 1947, p. 18.  
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universal, the haecceitas is particular; it is what combines with the natura 
to compose a substance.1 I confine myself to this extremely brief 
account of Duns Scotus’s doctrine. It is very subtle. It was not for 
nothing that his contemporaries called him by the nickname ‘Doctor 
Subtilis’. 
Now, note that the notion of a continuous simple, or con-
tinuous composite, is theoretically necessitated. Mertz explicitly says 
so himself.2 Remember what was said to be the first conceivable alter-
native concerning the relationship between the intensional and pre-
dicational aspects of a unit attribute: a pre-abstraction real complexity 
exists within the unit attribute. That proposal turned out to be wrong. 
The reason for that is that it gives rise to one out of two absurdities: a 
vicious regress or the non-relational tie view on predication.3 What is 
left then is its alternative: there is only a post-abstraction distinction 
between partial and incomplete aspects of what is itself a simple 
entity.  
Ponder upon the following statement. 
[W]e must give up the naive definition: x is simple =df x 
has no proper parts. Observed in the limiting case of 
monadic properties as far back as scholastic ontology, a 
relation instance Rni of any adicity is necessarily assayed as 
a continuous composite of cognitively distinguishable but not 
discrete constituents, the latter being the correlative as-
pects of an unrepeatable combinatorial agency (indicated 
by the subscript ‘i’) and a specific and delimiting inten-
sional content, Rn (the subscript indicating the number of 
subjects required jointly for the intension to characterize, 
what is specified by the intension itself). The uniqueness 
of the unifying act of a relation instance as predicable of its 
relata is precisely the ‘thisness’ (haecceitas) aspect dis-
tinguished but unexplainable in traditional ontology. In the 
following it will be explained how it must be the case that, 
though such a whole is internally undifferentiated, the 
                                                     
1 Cf. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, part. 1, pp. 1-6. 
2 Cf. Mertz 2006, p. 83. 
3 Cf. section 5.3.4. 
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identities of each of the constituents as constituents are 
maintained in their full and essence-specific realities, and 
so the whole is properly a composite. In other words, 
though such a whole is not a plurality of articulated parts, 
neither is it homogenous — it is not the same through-
out.1 
I would like to call attention to a few things which are said or implied 
here. Note that each constituent of a relation instance is said to have 
its own essence-specific reality. Further, it is because of these essence-
specific realities the instance is a composite. One of the constituents 
of the instance is an intension. Presumably, since it is a universal, it 
constitutes its own essence. The predicational aspect, on the other 
hand, is not a universal; it is a particular which cannot constitute its 
own essence. Since no contrary information has been given, it 
suggests itself that its essence is supplied by one or several universals. 
According to the description of it, it is a combinatorial agency. I take 
it that that is a serious determination of its nature, or essence. The 
moral of this is that the predicational aspect of an instance is some-
thing in itself; it is not a no-thing. The notion of a bare particular, the 
perennial nudist of ontology,2 is rejected by Mertz. Among his 
reasons is that the determination makes it into precisely that — i.e., a 
no-thing.3 
To what is asserted in the last quotation with regard to the par-
ticular predicational aspect of an instance we can add the following 
quote concerning particulars.  
Every individual is of one or more kinds (types, catego-
ries), F, G, H,…, and it is as an individual that it is distinct 
from every other individual of any kind, and being of kind 
F it is in some sense the ‘same as’, and so grouped as like, 
                                                     
1 Mertz 2006, pp. 85-6. 
2 Armstrong, perhaps owing to prudishness, feels more comfortable with the 
designation ‘thin particular’ for his own version of it.  
3 Mertz 2006, p. 89. Cf. also Mertz 2006, pp. 132-3. Another of Mertz’s 
reasons for rejecting bare particulars is that his network doctrine makes them 
unneeded. More is said about the networks in section 5.3.8. 
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every other individual of kind F but distinct from every 
other individual of kind G contrary to G. That we under-
stand this implies that we can at least cognitively dis-
tinguish between what is an individuating aspect and one 
or more qualitative contents or intensional aspects of indi-
vidual entities. The question is whether there is a real and 
extra-conceptual distinction in the particular that corre-
sponds to this distinction between abstractions? Essential 
to their positions, realists are required to admit such real 
distinctions a parte rei, whereas nominalists cannot allow 
them.1 
Thus, to the extent that the predicational aspect of a unit attribute is a 
particular, or individual, it is of one or more kinds. It also has an 
individuating aspect. In light of this, it seems that a predicational 
aspect does have an intensional aspect as well as an individuating one. 
It is perhaps a composite simple? 
The essence of the predicational aspect can be approached from 
another angle. Mertz often asserts that if the predicational aspect is 
not controlled by any intension, it will be a blank tie, bare linking, free 
association, etc. To this, it is frequently added that as such it can only 
produce a list, set or mereological sum of the entities linked.2 That in 
itself indicates that it is of a kind: linking.  
I will come back to the notion of predication in section 5.3.7. 
But before that, let us see what more is said about the notion of a 
continuous composite.  
What is essential for continuous composites is that they lack 
internal predicative structure. In a quotation earlier it was said that 
such a whole is internally undifferentiated. Its being undifferentiated 
must not be exaggerated. After all, it is not homogenous. This is also 
indicated in the same quotation. There are also complexes which are 
not continuous composites; these are the standard composites which 
                                                     
1 Mertz 2006, p. 88. 
2 It is hard to evaluate the relevance of the claim that a blank tie is the same 
as a set forming unit relation since it is said on occasion that a set forming 
unit relation is controlled by a specific intension. Another specific intension 
would be the one of a sum forming unit relation.  
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Mertz likes to call ‘articulated composites’. He hints at the cause for 
this descriptive name like this: 
A complex is ‘articulated’ at relata, the ‘joints’, where the 
relation instances, the ‘connecting rods’, meet. Directed 
externally, relation instances have the ontic role of effect-
ing unity-at-a-distance, i.e., unity among the yet discrete. 
This analysis explains the fact of structure […].1 
The continuous composites are not internally articulated. Particularly, 
the intensional aspect of an ontic predicate Rni(x1,x2,…,xn) is not 
predicated of the predicational aspect of the same ontic predicate. 
Allegedly, there is no unifier between the two aspects of an ontic pre-
dicate. This makes it, and all the other ontic predicates, to non-
standard composites.2 Yet another description of these composites is 
that they are internally non-differentiated wholes.3 
Now, the notion of simplicity which comes out of this is that of 
lacking internal predicative structure. Thus, this notion of simplicity 
can be defined as absence of division. An entity is simple, in this 
sense, if and only if it has no constituent which is a predicate of 
another of its constituents. This is the promised clarification of the 
pre-critical concept of the simple. Supposedly, it can replace what was 
pejoratively described earlier as the naive definition of simplicity; i.e. 
x is simple =df x has no proper parts. The corresponding notion of 
complexity is that of having internal predicative structure. This is the 
characterisation of an articulated composite. Together these form the 
disjunctive notion of a compound.4 
Instead of having an internal predicative structure, the unit attri-
bute is seamless. Mertz refers to Francisco Suarez, who describes the 
union of a quantity and its inherence in a substance as follows. 
[I]n quantity, for example, which inheres in a substance, 
two aspects may be considered: one is the entity of quanti-
                                                     
1 Mertz 2006, p. 84. 
2 Cf. Mertz 2006, p. 91. 
3 Cf. Mertz 2006, p. 83. 
4 Cf. Mertz 2006, p. 118. 
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ty itself, the other is the union or actual inherence of this 
quantity in the substance.1 
What is referred to as the actual inherence is perhaps better known 
under the denomination ‘mode of inherence’.2 It turns up in one of 
the names of the distinction exemplified here: ‘modal distinction’.  
Though it was an appropriate one four hundred years ago, that 
denomination is more or less impossible to use in our time. It dis-
tinguishes between what exists in the real order but it is less than a 
real distinction. What is distinguished does not exist as two separate 
things.3 Mertz recognises in Suarez what he himself is contemplating 
in the case of continuous composites. 
That this union between an entity and its mode is very 
similar to that of a continuous composite as characterized 
above is evident from Suarez’s description: “[A] mode is 
not, properly speaking, a thing or entity. Its imperfection is 
clearly brought out by the fact that it must invariably be 
affixed to something else to which it is per se and directly 
joined without the medium of another mode, as, for 
instance, sitting is joined the sitter, union to the things 
united, and so of other cases….”4 Specifically, then, for a 
property intension5 and its ‘mode of inherence’ in (i.e., its 
ontic predicativity of) a subject, they are distinct but 
‘directly joined without the medium of another mode’, i.e., 
without a further mode of what would be here at least a 
dyadic (relational) ‘inherence’.  Suarez also at least implies 
                                                     
1 Suarez 1947, p. 28. 
2 The Latin term ‘modus’ is used by Suarez.  
3 Cf. Suarez 1947, p. 97. 
4 This is quoted from Suarez 1947, p. 31. 
5 To use ‘intension’ here is potentially misleading. In Mertz’s terminology it is 
synonymous with ‘universal’. Suarez is a nominalist. Therefore, its realistic 
connotations should be ignored. By the way, being a nominalist Suarez con-
siders both the quantity and its mode of inherence in the subject to be parti-
culars. According to Mertz, one of the constituents in a continuous compo-
site must be a universal. Mertz 2006, p. 111. 
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that if it were otherwise then Bradley’s Regress would 
result.1 
If the quantity and its mode of inherence were really distinct, there 
would be a need for an ontic predicate to unite them. Moreover, the 
union would then be an articulated composite and not a continuous 
one. But, as it is now, the two are joined without there being any 
medium which joins them. 
As stated a few times previously, the notion of a continuous 
composite is theoretically necessitated. That might be so. But, is it 
true that a unit attribute is utterly devoid of internal predicative struc-
ture? According to Mertz, the intensional aspect of a unit attribute 
Rni(x1,x2,…,xn) controls or delimits its predicational aspect.2 The use of 
either of these two verbs suggests that the unit attribute has an inter-
nal predicative structure. If either of these two had been used in 
almost any other context, one could be certain that Mertz would have 
considered them to express relational intensions. Though, not in this 
context. However, when reading passages such as the following, it is 
quite easy to forget what is supposed to be the case. 
[I]f an ontic predicate has no qualitative constituent or 
intension determining/delimiting the range and ordering 
of its unifying causation, then it would be a ‘bare unifier’, 
analogues to and as illegitimate as a ‘bare particular’. An 
intensionless unifier would be absolutely uncontrolled and 
without limitation in its agency, both locally in the sense of 
allowing anything to be unified to anything else, and 
globally in the sense of requiring either nothing or abso-
                                                     
1 Mertz 2006, p. 97. I suspect that the two following sentences are relevant 
when Mertz says that Suarez at least implies that Bradley’s regress would 
result: 
That inherence does not add a proper new entity can scarcely be 
doubted. If it were an altogether new entity, it could not be the 
actual union between quantity and its subject, but would require 
some medium for union with subject and quantity, just as quanti-
ty itself requires an inherence whereby it is united to its subject. 
(Suarez 1947, p. 29) 
2 Cf. e.g. Metz 2006, p. 90. 
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lutely everything to be unified at once — total reality — 
without differentiation into any sub-wholes of sets, facts, 
or complexes.1 
What is of interest here is that intensions are supposed to control the 
predicational aspects of unit attributes without giving rise to internal 
predicative structure in the unit attributes. 
Let us for a moment disregard what is theoretically motivated. 
Instead, rehearse one of Mertz’s standard arguments. Assume that the 
intension Rn controls the predicative aspect of the ontic predicate of 
:Rni(a1,a2,…,an) as well as that of :R
n
j(b1,b2,…,bn). Assume also that the 
first fact ceases to obtain; then the latter must also do so since the 
same entity is the controller in both cases. When this argument is 
used against realists who take universals to be the ontic predicates of 
facts, the conclusion is that the predicates must be individuated. 
However, if we try the same move in the case at hand, it does not 
prevent the ontic predicates from not being continuous composites. 
The unit attributes controlnk and control
n
l give rise to internal predica-
tive structures in their respective wholes. To block this, the control 
performed by Rn is declared to be a non-predicative one.  
5.3.7 Predication 
Traditionally, instantiation, or exemplification, has been looked upon 
as a relation. The well-known problems this gives rise to have been 
handled in accordance with different strategies. One of the strategies 
is one which can be expected from the legendary ostrich: pretend that 
there is no problem. Another is to stipulate that the instantiation rela-
tion does not behave the same way other relations do. In contrast to 
all the others, is it neither instantiated nor is it in need of being in-
stantiated. It is still a relation though. 
When discussing his own ontology, Mertz does not use 
‘instantiation’. However, predication, which is traditionally considered 
to be the converse of instantiation, appears to be constantly present 
in that it is an aspect of each unit attribute. What does he say con-
                                                     
1 Mertz 2006, p. 107. 
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cerning there being a relation of predication? Not much explicitly. 
Among the few places where he addresses the issue in clear terms is 
the following. 
[…] I note that ontic predication cannot be identified with 
any particular relation(s), for all relations (including mona-
dic properties) of whatever intensions are all equally cases 
of ontic predication, and to otherwise make this reduction 
is to identify an aspect of every relation with the whole of 
a particular relation (or relations). The plausibility of this 
identification turns on the fact that the chosen relation(s) 
exercises that very aspect that was to be explained in all 
relations — a combinatorial act guided by an intension, 
i.e., ontic predication. In other words, the unsuccessful 
strategy here is to explicate something exhibited by every 
element in a class by identifying it with one of the exhibit-
ting elements in the class, a form of vicious circularity.1 
A significant difference between Mertz’s unit attributes and the tropes 
of many a trope theorist is that the former are ontic predicates. 
Tropes are substances in the sense that they lack predicativity. As a 
consequence there is the need for a compresence relation. Thanks to 
instances of this compresence relation, tropes are bundled together, 
forming complexes. Without the instances of compresence, there will 
not be any complex entities of that kind. Exactly what the con-
stituting relations of sets and sums are is seldom, if ever, dealt with 
explicitly.  
Mertz characterises predication as an intension-determined uni-
fying agency.2 In his later works, four principles are stated which 
jointly explicate ontic predication. They rehearse what has been stated 
in his earlier works. I quote them here with the purpose of pointing 
out a few details. 
 
 
                                                     
1 Mertz 2006, pp. 114-5. 
2 Cf. Mertz 2006, p. 98. 
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Principle I: 
Constitutive of every fact :Rni(a1,a2,…,an), for n ≥ 1, is an 
ontic predicate, Rni(x1,x2,…,xn), that is the agent/cause of 
the characterizing predicable unity of itself with its relata, 
a1, a2,…, an, a unification whose type is to result in a fact, 
as opposed to a list, set, or mereological sum. 
Principle II: 
Every ontic predicate Rni(x1,x2,…,xn) has as a constituent a 
single universal intension Rn whose ontic role is that of 
delimiting or determining non-arbitrarily the possible n-
tuples of relata <a1,a2,…,an>, that predicate R
n
i(x1,x2,…,xn) 
can unify into a fact. However, an intension Rn of itself has 
no causal agency whatsoever as a unifier (it is ‘predicably 
inert’ or ‘substance-like’). 
Principle III: 
In addition to and distinct from intension Rn, there is con-
stitutive of ontic predicate Rni(x1,x2,…,xn) its actual mode1 
of union, its combinatorial or linking agency, among and 
to its particular n-tuple of subjects. The linking aspect of 
predicate Rni(x1,x2,…,xn) is itself not a further intension in 
addition to Rn, but a causal act of unification that is ‘joined’ 
with intension Rn that controls its effects. This joining is 
the unity of a continuous composite, i.e., a union of two 
distinct entities without the agency of a further interposing 
ontic predicate or act of unification. Of fundamental 
importance, the unifying act of an ontic predicate is un-
repeatable and particular, rendering the containing predi-
cate an individual, i.e., a unit attribute (hence the sub-
scripts, e.g., ‘i’). 
Principle IV: 
The unifying act among an n-tuple of subjects is unique to 
that n-tuple. Hence, an instance ontic predicate subsuming 
this act is unique to this n-tuple of subjects, i.e., if 
:Rni(a1,a2,…,an)2 and :R
n
i(b1,b2,…,bn), then a1 = b1, a2 = 
                                                     
1 The use of ‘mode’ here is of course inspired by Suarez. 
2 I have taken the liberty of inserting the colons here and in the other three 
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b2,…, an = bn. In the opposite way, ontic economy requires 
that no n-tuple of subjects have more than one instance of 
the same intension Rn, i.e., if :Rni(a1,a2,…,an) and 
:Rnj(a1,a2,…,an), then R
n
i = R
n
j. Also, because it is intrinsic 
to an instance ontic predicate to be an agent unifier of an 
n-tuple of subjects, it cannot exist independent of this n-
tuple except cognitively in selective abstraction.1 
Of particular interest is what is stated in the second principle. The 
same principle is stated, with a slightly different wording, in Mertz 
2004a. In both versions the same claim is expressed: the predicate 
Rni(x1,x2,…,xn) can have more than one n-tuple as relata. Note the 
phrase ‘the possible n-tuples of relata <a1,a2,…,an>, that predicate 
Rni(x1,x2,…,xn) can unify into a fact’. If the plural used here, as well as 
in Mertz 2004a, is not a slip of the pen, what we are presented with is 
a universal ontic predicate. If in fact entities of this kind are con-
templated, the way to obtain them is hinted at in the following quota-
tion. 
The process of abstraction from fact to contained agent 
ontic predicate, and from the latter to contained agentless 
intension, are marked by variations on words and phrases 
in English. We can abstract from a state of affairs or fact, 
e.g., :Red1(a)2, :Loves2(b,c), :Father-of2(e,f), or :Similar-
to2(g,h), expressed respectively by ‘a is red’, ‘b loves c’, ‘e is 
the father of f’, and ‘g is similar to h’, intensions expressed 
by abstract nouns, e.g., ‘red’ or ‘redness’, ‘love’, ‘father-
hood’, and ‘similarity’, that have in themselves no com-
binatorial nuance or ‘mode’ in the scholastic sense, and 
that stand in contrast to the intermediate abstractions of 
                                                                                                   
formulas with the same form. 
1 Mertz 2006, p. 140. This quotation is from what originally is Mertz 2004b. 
Together with Mertz 20004a and five other articles it constitutes Mertz 2006. 
In Mertz 2004a the subscripts of the predicate symbols are omitted. This is 
unfortunate since it complicates the interpretation of what is being asserted.  
2 In this formula, as well as in the following ones in this quotation, the sub-
script is omitted. As was remarked in the previous footnote, this is un-
fortunate. 
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ontic predicates proper, e.g., Red1(x1), Loves2(x1,x2), 
Father-of2(x1,x2), and Similar-to2(x1,x2), expressed in the 
verb phrases, respectively, as ‘is red’, ‘is in love with’, ‘is a 
father of’, and ‘is similar to’.1 
Thus, the process of abstraction starts from a fact: :Rni(a1,a2,…,an). 
From this an ontic predicate is abstracted: Rni(x1,x2,…,xn). Next, an 
intension abstracted: Rn according to the message of the quotation. 
Now, the plural form of ‘n-tuples of relata’ suggests that there is 
another abstracted entity, one which is to be found between the 
abstracted entities Rni(x1,x2,…,xn) and R
n. The formula expressing it 
would then be: Rn(x1,x2,…,xn). Here, the omission of the subscript 
marks the significant difference. While Rni(x1,x2,…,xn) is an ontic 
predicate which can only have one single n-tuple as its relatum, 
Rn(x1,x2,…,xn) is a universal ontic predicate. While the former is a one 
time occurrence, the latter would be a repeatable entity. 
Although this discussion might emanate from a misprint, which 
occurs twice, it actualises the issue of the status of predicativity. The 
traditional pattern of predication might be rendered: 
Predn+1(Un(a1,a2,…,an)). Here U
n is a universal which is predicated of 
the n-tuple <a1,a2,…,an>. Since the predication relation is supposed to 
be the unifier, its adicity should be n+1, given that the adicity of the 
universal, which it predicates of the tuple, is n. It is of course in-
appropriate to describe the latter as having adicity. Strictly speaking, 
only Pred has adicity. Furthermore, it seems as if this model must 
postulate one predication relation per adicity. 
The pattern of Mertz’s model is more difficult to formalise since 
a universal, Rn, is supposed to operate on what is described as a pre-
dicational aspect. In turn, the predicational aspect, as controlled by 
Rn, is what operates on an n-tuple. Judging from what Mertz often 
says with regard to the forming of a set/sum, it might be the predica-
tional aspect which operates on an n-tuple. Furthermore, since the 
predicational aspect is described as a linking, it is a bare linking in 
cases where there is no intension controlling it. Perhaps the last case 
might be rendered: Predaspi(a1,a2,…,an). An implication here might 
                                                     
1 Mertz 2006, pp. 107-8. 
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then be that there must be predicational aspects with different adici-
ties. After all, the cardinalities of sets/sums vary. 
Enough of these speculations for now. Instead, I will say some-
thing about Mertz’ network theory. That concludes, for now, my 
discussion about his moderate realism.  
5.3.8 Networks of Unit Attributes 
Mertz presents his network model as an alternative to the traditional 
doctrines of complex entities. Crudely put, realists have tended to 
analyse complexes either as bundles of universals or as universals 
predicated of one or several bare particular(s). A version of the latter 
view is that some universals are predicated of the combinations of 
bare particulars and universals. Equipped with the notion of a net-
work of unit attributes, we can dispense with bundles of universals as 
well as universals predicated of bare particulars.   
What the philosopher can do, and what Mertz has done, is to 
offer a model for how the structures of reality can be constructed 
given that instances of attributes are the only building stones avail-
able. The principles I-IV, quoted in section 5.3.7, characterise these 
building stones.  
At the lowest level of spatiotemporal reality, networks are 
formed by unit attributes linking to each other.1 Thus, at this lowest 
level, the relata and the unit attributes are instances. Undoubtedly, it 
is an empirical question what instances exist at this level, as well as 
practically every other level. It cannot be answered at the writing-
desk, at least not the writing-desk of a philosopher. However, a 
matter of principle which the philosopher Mertz ventures to claim is 
found in the following quotation.  
Here we have the closed chain of three dyadic facts 
:J2i(K2j,L2k), :K2j(L2k,J2i), :L2k(J2i,K2j). It is easily seen that 
                                                     
1 A similar, if not the same, idea is expressed by Ernst Cassirer. He takes 
quantum entities to be points of intersections of certain relations. He also 
demonstrates how they can be mutual intersections of individuated relations. 
Cf. Cassirer 1956, p. 180. 
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this scheme of mutually sustaining instances can be 
extended logically to networks composed of any number 
of relation instances and of any mixture of adicities, as 
long as each instance has as subjects in its relata n-tuple 
only other instances of the network. The only constraints 
in these regards would be via the intension of each com-
posing instance and what it allows as to the natures of and 
the ordering among its relata.1 
The claim I am referring to is expressed in the last sentence. The 
intensions of the composing instances set the limits for what can be 
combined. In view of this, a descriptive term may be coined: ‘inten-
sional determinism’.2 Depending on to what degree the intensions 
allow their instances to form complexes with others, the degree of 
intensional determinism will vary. At one extreme there is no elbow 
room; at another it might be limitless. The repeatedly made reference 
to bare linking might be the latter extreme. The intension which 
determines what can make up a set or sum in general, if there is such 
an intension, does not set any limits whatsoever. This constitutes a 
state of intensional indeterminism. At the other extreme we might 
find various mathematical structures. Intensional determinism will 
then be the prerequisite of the rigour with which these structures can 
be investigated by means of deductive reasoning.3 
Two principles of network composition are discerned: hori-
zontal and vertical composition respectively. These two constitute a 
                                                     
1 Mertz 2006, pp. 154-5. Mertz mentions the Trinity as an example of a triad 
of unit relations forming a closed network: 
Since each Person is an individual, this would presumably require 
that the respective relations be individuated — that is, be 
instances. So understood, they would together constitute the 
inter-linking, self-contained whole described discursively as 
:Father1(Son1,Spirit1), :Son1(Father1,Spirit1), and :Spirit1(Father1, 
Son1). (Mertz 1996, p. 77) 
An obvious comment on this is that the three predicate names used here 
cannot have their ordinary meanings.  
2 This term is not used by Mertz; I have invented it myself.  
3 Nothing of this is explicitly asserted by Mertz. However, I think that it is 
implied by what he does assert. 
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partition; they exhaust all the possibilities. The definitions of them are 
formulated in a fifth principle: 
Principle V: All plural unity — and thus plural wholes 
(complexes or structures) — is by the following: 
a) A relation instance Rni predicable of an n-tuple of re-
lata, <a1,a2,…,an>, is the cause of an individual plural 
whole, viz., the fact :Rni(a1,a2,…,an), having R
n
i , a1, 
a2,…, an , as its only constituents. 
b) If Rni is a constituent of a plural whole x and S
n
j is a 
constituent of a plural whole y, and Rni and S
n
j , share 
one or more relata, then there is an individual plural 
whole z that has as constituents all and only the com-
bined constituents of x and y (horizontal composition). 
c) For any fact :Rni(a1,a2,…,an), if for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, aj is a 
plural whole, then there exists an individual plural 
whole whose constituents are all and only the consti-
tuents of the fact and constituents of aj (vertical com-
position).1 
The significant difference between the two composition principles is 
that in vertical composition entire structures are treated as relata. This 
is not so in horizontal composition.  
One of the gains with this model is that the need for a substra-
tum is gone. Since unit attributes of various adicities form networks, 
there is no first “point” where everything has to start with a property 
being predicated of what itself is not predicable of anything.  
Emergent unit properties can be understood in terms of hori-
zontal composition. An emergent unit property is one which is pre-
dicated of an entire structure. In other words, it does not have any 
particular constituent included in the structure as its subject.  
Mertz says this regarding the subject: 
Now, it is easy to conceive how this vertical compounding 
could be continued indefinitely up through further and 
further levels, and how at certain levels there could be pro-
perties and relations, say U3, whose instances emerge sui 
                                                     
1 Mertz 2006, p. 145. 
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generis, i.e., do not occur at lower levels and presuppose as 
at least some of their relata certain types of sub-structures. 
This fits the bill precisely for an ontology of ordinary 
objects […]: ordinary objects are immense though finite 
hierarchies of horizontally and vertically composed struc-
tures generated upwardly from what science determines 
are the ultimate sub-atomic entities. Similarly, once alerted 
to these two forms of composition one can see their itera-
tions exemplified in cognitive, mathematical, logical, social, 
etc., structures.1 
Evidently, this is truly a comprehensive model, given that the expec-
tations aroused by descriptions like this can be redeemed. 
                                                     
1 Mertz 2006, p. 144. 
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